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1 State and Local Incentive
Competition for New Investment
Over the past decade and a half, "economic development" has
become entrenched as an important function of state and city govern
ment. Unlike much of the other, more hidden, work undertaken by
states and cities, the special economic development deals offered by
local officials to lure new investment are often covered prominently in
the press. Few have been unimpressed by the $250 million Alabama
reputedly gave Mercedes-Benz or by the estimated $130 million South
Carolina gave BMW (Council of State Governments 1994, p. 12). Pos
sibly as a result of such eye-grabbing deals, it has become common
place, not only in the press but among policymakers and academics, to
characterize the current level of economic development effort as too
highly competitive and probably detrimental to sound fiscal policy.
State and local competition for new industrial investment has been
widely criticized for being a zero-sum, or worse, a negative-sum
game in other words, providing no national benefits and for being
potentially harmful to economic growth because it reduces the ability
of state and local governments to finance investments in education and
infrastructure. Indeed the subtext of much popular reporting and even
academic discussion is that states and cities have become imprudently
generous to private investment while cutting back on more typical gov
ernmental activities. It is unsurprising then that some prominent
researchers have called for the federal government to severely limit
state and local economic development efforts (Burstein and Rolnick
1996; Rolnick and Burstein 1996; Schweke, Rist, and Dabson 1994) or
for a major reorientation of the state and local economic development
effort (LeRoy 1994; Smith and Fox 1990).
Notwithstanding the existence of both this sort of criticism of eco
nomic development policy and a number of academic and policy jour
nals dedicated to the issue of state and local economic development
policy, very little is known about the size of the economic development
effort. We have some idea of the staff size at state development agen
cies and of the budgets of those agencies (although for reasons that will
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become clear, it is most unlikely that these budget numbers say much
about the size of the state economic development effort), and we have
some knowledge of what economic development instruments states are
able to use (although there are important discrepancies among the vari
ous directories of state instruments). However, there is virtually no reli
able information on the really important questions: How much are
states willing to provide to a firm? What are state incentives actually
worth to a firm? What sort of places offer the biggest incentives? At the
city level, the situation is that much worse; here there is not even a reli
able directory of instruments or budgets. One result is that public and
even academic debate on economic development issues is often seri
ously flawed.
Possibly two of the most crucial issues for economic development
concern are 1) measuring the worth to the firm of incentives offered
and 2) identifying the spatial pattern of incentives (in other words,
determining which communities offer the largest and smallest incen
tives). These issues are important because almost all economic devel
opment policy is based on the idea emanating from modern location
theory that the purpose of incentives is to influence business location
decisions by improving the relative profitability of investing at a partic
ular site (Blair and Premus 1987; Chapman and Walker 1990). Unfor
tunately, the academic and policy literature on economic development
has tended to focus on other issues, usually the cost of incentive pro
grams to government or the nominal size of incentive deals. The Ala
bama incentive package to Mercedes-Benz was reported by one source
to be composed of $112 million in infrastructure improvements, $30
million to build a training facility, $60 million for training, $8.7 million
for tax abatements on machinery and construction materials, and $39
million in other incentives (Council of State Governments 1994, p. 12).
What is unclear is the extent to which Mercedes-Benz benefits from
each dollar of public money spent. Is Mercedes-Benz able to capture
the full $30 million in state funds spent on the training facility or the
$112 million spent on infrastructure? These problems are even more
stark in the BMW deal. Fifty million dollars of BMW©s $130 million
package was for expansion of the Greenville-Spartanburg airport. It
seems unreasonable to assume that BMW will be able to capture all of
the benefits of airport expansion; airports are public facilities, and it is
much more likely that many (if not most) of the airport©s improvements
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will be captured by other individual and corporate business users, not
BMW. Much of the economic development literature ignores this prob
lem.
More generally, the literature has mostly failed to distinguish
between the nominal value of incentive awards and their actual value to
the firm. For instance, the 1980s saw considerable Japanese auto plant
investment in the United States. In a widely quoted article looking at
this issue, Milward and Newman (1989) claimed that Mazda had
received state incentives worth around $15,000 per employee for its
investment in Flat Rock, Michigan. This figure included $19 million in
worker training, $5 million in road improvements, $3 million in onsite railroad improvements, $21 million in an economic development
loan to be recaptured, and $5 million in water system improvements.
This gives a total of $53 million for what was then projected to be
3,500 employees at the new plant. In the same article, various other
Japanese auto manufacturers were reported to be receiving vast incen
tive deals. Similar claims about the nominal value of economic devel
opment deals are commonly made in the press and in the academic and
policy literature. However, there are problems with such measures
beyond the matter of a firm©s ability to capture directly the benefits of
an incentive. Consider the case of Mazda just cited. The costs and ben
efits associated with various types of economic development incentives
vary greatly; adding up nominal awards across different programs has
the effect of comparing apples with oranges. Most obviously, a $1 mil
lion capital on-site railroad improvement award is likely to be much
more costly for government, and much more beneficial to the recipient
firm, than a $1 million capital loan. In the Mazda case, consider the
$19 million worker training award. If this award provides workers with
general and transferable skills, then it is unlikely that it was worth the
full $19 million to Mazda, but if the training were highly customized to
Mazda©s special needs, then it may indeed have replaced $19 million in
expenses that Mazda would otherwise have incurred.
So, the question remains, How should the worth of incentives be
measured? The first concern of this book is to measure, from the point
of view of the firm, the true benefits of state and city incentives. A
cogent answer to this question is a prerequisite to any sensible debate
on the impact of incentives on a firm©s investment decisions. Moreover,
an answer also allows us to begin to provide innovative and useful
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responses to a related issue that has dogged the economic development
literature: can development incentives reasonably be expected to influ
ence a firm©s location decisions? In all of this, our purpose is not to add
to the already extensive econometric and survey literature on whether
economic development incentives measurably affect the location deci
sions of firms. While our results do complement this research, our pur
pose is limited to measuring the worth of incentives to the firm.
Unfortunately, providing a comprehensive and cogent measurement
of the worth of economic development incentives to firms is a dauntingly complex task. A vast proportion of the work going into the
answers provided in this book is methodological. As a result, much of
the book is itself devoted to methodology (although more technical dis
cussions are segregated into Chapter 3 and Appendixes B and C and
may be avoided by readers not interested in such issues). Simply put,
the answers we give in this book derive from the output of a very large
computer simulation model (the Tax and Incentive Model, or TAIM). It
has been our experience that the answers provided by TAIM and
equally by competing models are often crucially dependent on the
assumptions incorporated into the model. Understanding the assump
tions is an important part of understanding the answers themselves.
One of the criticisms we have of some although certainly not all of
the work done in the same tradition as ours (researchers using the
hypothetical firm method) is that public policy conclusions are made
on the basis of data and assumptions the underpinnings of which are
inadequately discussed.
The second concern we focus on is the spatial pattern of economic
development incentives. In particular, do poorer, more distressed
places tend to offer bigger incentives than wealthier, less distressed
places? We believe this matter has received insufficient attention in the
literature. An answer to this question is crucial; if competitive state and
local economic development policy is to provide net benefits for the
nation, then it should, we believe, tend to promote the redistribution of
employment from areas of low economic distress. 1 For this to occur,
economic development efforts should be concentrated or more active
in poorer, economically troubled places.
Although our research concentrates on these two issues the worth
and spatial pattern of incentives our results also shed light on a set of
related, secondary questions:
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Would it be feasible for the federal government to limit the state
and local economic development effort?
What is the role of enterprise zones in delivering incentives to
firms?
What proportion of the total incentive package is a tax-based enti
tlement and what proportion derives from non-tax awards (such
as grants, loans, and loan guarantees)?
Here we focus on taxes and incentives across the 24 most important
industrial states and a sample of 112 cities within those states. We mea
sure the value of incentives available in these states and municipalities
from the standpoint of a business.2 That is, we assess the after-tax
income effects of state and local tax and incentive regimes. This
enables us to explore the size and redistributional impacts of state and
local incentive programs in considerable detail.

THE EXPANSION OF AND JUSTIFICATION
FOR STATE AND LOCAL INCENTIVES
Although states were subsidizing private industry with public
money over a century and a half ago, and although explicit "smoke
stack chasing" began nearly 60 years ago with Mississippi©s "Balance
Agriculture with Industry" program, it is only over the past two
decades that there has been explosive growth in state and local eco
nomic development activity (McCraw 1986; Netzer 1991). Many, if
not the majority of, state-level economic development agencies were
established during this period, and although no accurate historical cen
sus of municipal economic development agencies exists, it is likely that
the majority of local economic development departments were either
established or greatly increased over the past 20 years (Eisinger 1988,
pp. 16-17). So too, the instruments of economic development have
expanded rapidly, and the use made of any single instrument has inten
sified. Eisinger (1988), using data from the annual survey of economic
development incentives by Site Selection and Industrial Development
(and the magazine©s precursors), developed a measure of state-level
policy penetration that assesses the use by states of economic develop-

6

State and Local Incentive Competition for New Investment

ment instruments available at a particular time period. He found that
from the mid 1960s to the mid 1980s there were large increases both in
the variety of instruments available to state officials and in the use
made of any particular instrument. Eisinger (1995) claims that there is
some evidence of a slowdown in the economic development effort dur
ing the early 1990s, and data from the Council of State Governments
suggest that this is indeed the case (Council of State Governments
1994, pp. 4-6). What limited information we have on the expenditures
of state and local economic development agencies suggests a substan
tial increase in spending during the 1980s (Fisher 1990) but some
"state fiscal crisis-induced" cutbacks during the early 1990s (Bradshaw, Nishikawa, and Blakely 1992). State appropriations for state
economic development agencies rose from $255 million in 1982 to
$999 million in 1988 (National Association of State Development
Agencies 1988) but declined somewhat in the early 1990s (although
these figures are far from being unambiguous indicators of the devel
opment effort). The net result is that both relocating and new plants in
the United States now appear to regularly receive incentive packages
consisting of various combinations of federal, state, and locally
financed subsidies. These can include a mix of property tax abate
ments, sundry tax credits and exemptions for such things as investment
in plant and machinery or research and development, job training cred
its and wage subsidies, road and other infrastructure improvement
incentives, and various sorts of capital grants, loans, and loan guar
antees.
The usual justification for these types of incentives is that they are
necessary for the local expansion of employment opportunities, given
the competitive investment environment in which states and municipal
ities currently exist. In other words, a locality usually finds itself com
peting for new private investment with other similarly endowed
localities; in order to "capture" a relocating firm, the locality must
ensure that it offers, other things being equal, the "least cost" site. This
understanding of the role of economic development policy is based
explicitly on traditional industrial location theory. Here, firms are held
to be profit maximizers that evaluate alternative business sites based on
product demand and the costs of production at various sites
(Wasylenko 1981). Localities having high product demand (or at least
good and cheap access to areas of high demand) and low costs for pri-
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mary inputs (such as wages, land, energy, and capital) and processing
costs (such as taxes and general regulations) will be most attractive to
firms. From the viewpoint of city or state government, the argument in
favor of economic development incentives is that they might be able to
reduce the cost structure of a potential plant just enough to induce relo
cation from the maximum-profit site to the incentive-offering site
(Blair and Premus 1987; Chapman and Walker 1990). Although the
range of incentive instruments is extraordinarily diverse, "all focus on
reducing the costs of doing business" at a particular site (Gerking and
Morgan 1991, p. 34).3
This raises a more basic question: Why should states and localities
want to use scarce revenues to encourage new industrial investment?
The political justification is almost always that, since states and munic
ipalities are part of a competitive interjurisdictional locality market,
incentives are necessary to lure new investment and the jobs (for resi
dents of the state or municipality) and the taxes resulting from that
investment. Consequently, incentive programs are usually judged in
the popular media, by politicians, and very often by development offi
cials on their ability to retain or generate new employment. The cen
tral financial justification is that new investment, and its resultant
direct, indirect, and induced jobs and spending, will help maintain or
expand the state or local government©s revenue base and presumably
improve the government©s ability to provide its residents with services
(or reduce the per-capita costs of providing the current level of ser
vices). The principal economic justification is that the new investment
and its associated multiplier will enhance the income of the locality©s
residents.4

CRITICISMS OF INCENTIVE COMPETITION
A number of criticisms have been leveled at incentive competition.
Some individuals have worried about the effects on the ability of state
and local government to provide services. Without proper analysis and
administration, incentives may become overly generous, resulting in a
net drain on a local government©s revenue base. Incentive competition
could, in fact, divert resources from state and local programs, such as
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investments in education, that in the long run are important contribu
tors to economic growth, locally and nationally. As a corollary of this
argument that the net fiscal impact of incentives could be negative,
some have noted that the economic growth sought by development
officials can in the long run raise the costs of providing municipal ser
vices. There is evidence that larger city size is associated with higher
per-capita costs of supplying city services to residents (Muller 1975,
pp. 3-19; Ladd and Yinger 1991, pp. 83-85). Thus, leaving aside the
issue of the direct costs and benefits of an incentive regime itself,
incentive-induced development may result in fewer or more costly
public services for a locality©s residents.
Others have argued that, without a commitment to the long-term
management of incentives, job creation may never materialize or may
materialize only at the expense of job loss elsewhere in the state,
municipality, or metropolitan area. Indeed, the professional economic
development literature is littered with stories in which incentives did
not produce the requisite revenue or job benefits (Glickman and Wood
ward 1989; Guskind 1990; Hovey 1986). Related to these issues is a
much broader concern that states and municipalities often provide
incentive packages based more on politics and perceptions than on a
formal consideration of either the local costs and benefits or of the
optimal size of the incentive package necessary to induce relocation.
Certainly, this has been a constant theme in the coverage by the popu
lar press of the various deals for foreign auto manufacturers. Neverthe
less, the focus of scholarly criticism has not been on these practical
issues of program administration but on the economic justification for
development incentives. Indeed, criticisms of the economic justifica
tion raise fundamental questions about the merit of locational subsi
dies.
Since American labor is highly mobile over 13 percent of the met
ropolitan population moves across metropolitan areas in any given
four-year period some economists have argued that, at least in the
long run, labor will tend to move from areas of high unemployment to
areas of low unemployment (Marston 1985). 5 Job-creating incentives
in a single locality are therefore unnecessary and probably
counterproductive. Without the incentives, unemployed or underem
ployed workers in a locality would eventually find jobs elsewhere. If
government were genuinely concerned with the welfare of its citizens,
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it would more logically spend revenues not on locational incentives to
encourage investment, but on increasing the mobility of the unem
ployed so that these individuals would benefit from the work opportu
nities in more vigorous labor markets elsewhere.
Moreover, if workers are mobile, using incentives to create jobs in
one location merely provides inducement for job-seekers from else
where to move into that location (Logan and Molotch 1987). Thus, the
original unemployed inhabitants of that locality may benefit very little,
if at all, from incentive-induced new investments. By extension, in the
long run, such investment may have little or no positive effect on the
locality©s unemployment or labor force participation rates. This sort of
argument has led others to claim that while the public rhetoric of
incentives is always couched in language focusing on the job gains for
unemployed and underemployed locals, the true beneficiaries of incen
tive-induced growth are not local job-seekers but the owners of that
immobile and scarce resource, land (Logan and Molotch 1987). There
fore, economic development policy is likely to have a regressive
impact on the local distribution of income.
Rubin and Zorn (1985) have argued that, because state and local
programs tend to be competitive and therefore merely encourage the
movement of employment opportunities from one place to another but
do not actually result in net national job creation, the overall benefits to
the nation of state and local incentive programs are close to nil. Incen
tives merely result in the spatial reshuffling of investment, which
would, sans incentives, have occurred somewhere anyway. Borrowing
a term from game theory, a number of critics have characterized state
and local incentive competition as essentially a zero-sum game. 6
Insofar as the incentive-induced reshuffling of investment results in
a spatial pattern less efficient than the pattern would have been without
such incentives, it is plausible to argue that state and local incentives
produce net economic welfare losses for the national economy and
thus may more usefully be characterized as negative-sum. 7 The conten
tion here is that incentive competition induces firms to choose loca
tions based on their tax consequences rather than on the basis of real
resource cost differentials (such as the price and productivity of land
and labor, transportation costs, and so on). Taken together, these criti
cisms present a damning picture of economic development practice in
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the United States. However, there is reason to believe that many of the
criticisms are misplaced.

WHY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES
MAY BE USEFUL: REVISIONIST RESEARCH
There is an expanding body of research suggesting that the preced
ing arguments against the use of incentives are misplaced. For
instance, there is evidence that some groups of people, especially older,
less-skilled, or minority workers, are relatively nonmobile, and that
even for skilled, younger, or nonminority workers, spatial mobility is
quite limited in the short run. Moreover, a number of economists have
argued that interjurisdictional competition for investment may be 1)
economically efficient, 2) have a much smaller negative impact than
has been claimed, or 3) have effects not nearly as strong as assumed in
the literature. Given some assumptions about the nature of competition
among localities,8 Gates and Schwab (1991) contend that, in equilib
rium, business taxes become true benefits taxes in that they equal the
value businesses place on the government services they receive. In
these circumstances, interjurisdictional competition fosters economic
efficiency. Netzer, while disagreeing with Gates and Schwab about the
efficiency of local taxes, nevertheless argues that incentive competition
does not have the negative impacts claimed by its critics: "If markets
are not functioning perfectly, economic development policy instru
ments that offset the imperfections can move toward, rather than away
from, efficiency in resource allocation" (Netzer 1991, p. 230). Thus,
economic development incentives are ... neither very good nor
very bad from the standpoint of efficient resource allocation in the
economy. With all the imperfections, the offering of incentives
does not represent a fall from grace, but neither does competition
in this form operate in ways that truly parallel the efficiency-creat
ing operations of private competitive markets. Given the low costeffectiveness of most instruments, there is little national impact,
only a waste of local resources in most instances. (Netzer 1991,
pp. 239-240)
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Netzer also maintains that the supposed zero-sum nature of Ameri
can economic development policy rests on an implausible assumption:
that the American economy is closed. Although the proportion of for
eign direct investment (FDI) in the United States (measured as a share
of total employment or assets) is still much smaller than in a number of
European countries, foreign investment has become an increasingly
important part of the American economy, and states and localities very
often target their incentives to encourage FDI (Glickman and Wood
ward 1989). In fact, a large number of American states have overseas
offices chartered specifically to encourage such investment (Archer and
Maser 1989; Kudrle and Kite 1989). Thus, incentives do not merely
move a set number of jobs around the United States; they may also
serve to encourage new investment from abroad. Other critics have
shown that the level of interjurisdictional competition is much more
limited than had previously been thought (Hanson 1993). Indeed, Hanson argues that there is inertia in the economic development efforts of
states and cities; for example, the best predictor of what a locality will
offer this year is what it offered last year.
Insofar as state and local economic development programs are con
cerned, some of the most interesting recent empirical work has sug
gested that incentives might be beneficial both to localities and to the
nation. Bartik (1991b) claims that incentive-induced employment
growth might have advantageous long-term effects on a locality©s labor
force participation and unemployment rates. Moreover, incentive com
petition may have significant benefits from the national perspective. 9
Bartik©s argument, backed by various empirical results, is that
incentive-induced employment growth in a locality©s labor market may
be long-term, progressive, and salutary. Employment growth in a met
ropolitan area will lead to a permanent drop in the area©s unemploy
ment rate and to an increase in its labor force participation rate. In
percentage terms, the real earnings effects of incentive-induced job
growth are greater for black and less-educated workers than for white
or more educated workers, and greater for lower-earning males than for
higher-earning males (Bartik 1991b, pp. 184-185). As a result, the
impact of employment growth on income distribution may be modestly
progressive. Based on these results and on a speculative benefit-cost
analysis, Bartik goes on to make two major claims:
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In places of high unemployment, economic development incen
tives are more likely to be cost-effective.
From the national standpoint, to the extent that incentives are
concentrated in places of high unemployment, economic devel
opment policy may tend to be positive-sum.
Translated crudely, economic development policy is likely, all else
being equal, to be more beneficial if pursued more vigorously by
poorer places and to be less so if pursued more vigorously by wealthier
places. The reason for both of Bartik©s claims is that the wage level
necessary to induce movement of unemployed individuals into jobs
(the reservation wage) is likely to be lower in high-unemployment
areas than in low-unemployment areas. Thus, the true benefits of
employment the wage offer made to the individual minus his or her
reservation wage are greater from a benefit-cost viewpoint in loca
tions with high unemployment than in those with low unemployment.
To the extent that areas with a low reservation wage are net investment
recipients, reshuffling of jobs may produce net national benefits. These
findings and claims clearly challenge much of the traditional scholarly
wisdom about the local and national impact of spatially competitive
economic development incentives, and they set the stage for the argu
ment of this monograph.
Bartik©s positive scenario rests on three critical and logically
sequential arguments:
Economic development incentives probably can influence firm
location and expansion decisions and thus can result in shocks
(sudden growth) to local labor demand.
Reservation wages are indeed higher in low-unemployment areas
and lower in high-unemployment areas.
The pattern of incentives at the state and local level tends to result
in the relocation of investment from areas of low unemployment
to areas of high unemployment.
Most of the rest of this book focuses on the first and third arguments.
We ignore the second because providing a cogent answer would take
us much too far from the central focus of our research and because the
academic literature on the issue, while quite thin, is generally support
ive of Bartik©s position. 10 In the case of the first argument, the literature
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is massive but still inconclusive; in the case of the third, the literature is
small and contradictory.

ISSUE 1: CAN INCENTIVES REASONABLY BE EXPECTED
TO INFLUENCE BUSINESS LOCATION DECISIONS?
It should be obvious that to claim any benefits from economic devel
opment policy we must be reasonably sure that it works that incen
tives can reasonably be expected to influence the investment behavior
of expanding and relocating firms. From a theoretical perspective,
taxes and incentives are a locationally variable business cost, and thus,
at the margin, will influence location and investment decisions. At the
same time, the costs of locally supplied labor are about 14 times state
and local business tax costs, and regional variations in construction, 11
energy, and labor costs are often larger than variations in state and local
taxes (and incentives). Small differences in labor costs can outweigh
quite large differences in tax costs. Cornia, Testa, and Stocker found
that "a mere 2 percent difference in wages could offset as much as 40
percent in taxes" (1978, p. 2). Thus, some have claimed that where
taxes and incentives do influence location decisions, it is largely as tie
breakers between essentially similar locations (Schneider 1985).
Unfortunately, measuring the impact of taxes and incentives on
growth is extremely complex. It is very difficult to evaluate the
achievements of economic development policy, because it is hard to
know what industrial investment would have occurred in its absence
(Diamond and Spence 1983). 12 Our practicable ability to model and
predict accurately changes to a local economy, a task necessary if we
are to measure the precise impact of an incentive program, is quite lim
ited. Moreover, our ability to measure cause and effect is circum
scribed by often significant (and variable) time lags between the
introduction of a policy instrument, spending allocations to that instru
ment, offers to individual firms, investment decisions on the part of a
particular firm, the actual construction of a factory by the investing
firm, and the achievement of a normal employment level at the factory
site. 13 Nevertheless, there is a vast literature on the economic impact of
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development incentives. Because there are a number of recent compre
hensive reviews, we will merely provide a summary of the literature.
In the United States, five basic methods of evaluating the impact of
incentives have been developed. Considerable work has been done
using two of these methods. Unfortunately, the results of this research
effort cannot be said to support any strong statements on the impact of
incentives on firm investment and location behavior.
The Survey Technique
In a number of studies, researchers have surveyed executives to
determine what role incentives (and other locational factors) play in a
firm©s relocation and expansion decisions. The surveys often distin
guish between "must have" location factors and merely "desirable"
factors. There is evidence that the location choice of large manufactur
ing firms tends to be based on a sequential evaluation of factors at suc
cessively narrower spatial scales, with decisions first on a broad
geographic region, then a state, a metropolitan area (or county), a city,
and, finally, a plant site. Therefore, some surveys have attempted to
distinguish the impact of incentives (and other locational factors) at
various spatial scales (Schmenner 1982).
The advantages and disadvantages of the survey technique are well
known (Calzonetti and Walker 1991). At their best, surveys provide
direct information about the actual siting decisions made by execu
tives. Also, the more complex statistical assumptions that beset econo
metric analyses can be avoided. Unfortunately, survey researchers
often have difficulty finding the cohort of individuals within a corpora
tion who were responsible for a particular location decision. Moreover,
executives may have a direct interest in saying that incentives were
important even if they were not admitting that an incentive had little
effect in one©s location decision might cause later political problems
although, given the findings of the literature, this problem may have
been exaggerated. Finally, while surveys may rank the importance of
various locational factors, they do not provide a precise measure of the
impact of each locational factor on local growth. In fact, the results
from the survey-based literature are unclear, with some research indi
cating incentives are indeed important to location decisions (Premus
1982; Walker and Greenstreet 1989; Calzonetti and Walker 1991;
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Rubin 1991), and other work indicating the opposite (Morgan 1964;
Stafford 1974; Schmenner 1982). 14
The Case Study Technique
Other researchers have taken a different tack and, using variations
on the case study method, have evaluated the impact of specific eco
nomic development programs. The advantage of this method is that the
work has covered a variety of different incentive instruments, from
enterprise zones, research parks, and property tax abatements to export
promotion schemes. Unfortunately, there are also major problems with
this approach. In the first place, incentive programs are often very
small relative to the local economy in which they operate. Thus, even
where subsidies are effective, measuring their impact on a local econ
omy is rendered difficult by economic white noise, by the other local
factors that influence growth. Moreover, impact evaluations need to
establish some sort of comparative control economy in order to mea
sure precisely the effect of incentives. In the best of all worlds, the con
trol economy would be identical to the economy receiving the
incentive except that the control would not receive the incentive, but
choosing a control is itself fraught with practical methodological and
political difficulties. Unsurprisingly, given the range of programs cov
ered, the published research using the single program approach is as
contradictory, in terms of both detailed method and results, as the sur
vey-based literature. 15 However, even work focusing on broadly similar
types of programs shows discrepant results. For instance, in a recent
widely quoted volume on enterprise zones, one study found clear evi
dence of impact success (Rubin 1991), while studies reported in two
other papers found little or none (Elling and Sheldon 1991; Grasso and
Crosse 1991).
The Econometric Technique
A third strategy has been to use econometric techniques to measure
the impact of incentives on state and local growth. At the outset it
should be noted that, although the econometric literature is large,
nearly all published models concern taxes. There is very little work on
non-tax incentives, and most of this research focuses on infrastructure
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programs. 16 Moreover, of the tax models, very few have data on local
abatements or on the various tax credits commonly in use at the state
level. Most merely use effective tax rates (ETRs) 17 as the exogenous
(independent) tax and incentive variable within the location equation.
For reasons we discuss in Chapter 3, we doubt very much that tradi
tional ETR measures provide an accurate depiction of the tax liability
faced by firms. In fact, we believe the econometric literature would be
much improved if greater use were made of more defensible measures
of tax and incentive incidence.
Econometric models have been developed for various spatial scales
and for a number of different state and local taxes. State and local
growth measures have included "levels of or "changes in" indicators
such as employment, gross state product, per-capita personal income,
number of new plant openings, and small-firm birth rates. The models
also range widely in their technical sophistication, from simple regres
sions with poorly specified locality growth variables and with no treat
ment of time lags in the growth variable or of endogeneity in the
explanatory variables, to considerably more complex models that
address most, if not all, of these issues. Almost all develop equations
that use variables such as local labor costs, transportation costs, energy
costs, infrastructure provision, and tax costs to explain (predict) local
growth.
Since impressive reviews of this literature have been published
recently, we will not repeat that work. Nevertheless, a number of points
should be noted. No definite conclusions can be reached on the basis of
the published research. Even the reviews seem to disagree about the
impact of (tax) incentives on economic growth. Eisinger (1988), in an
admittedly partial assessment of both the econometric and survey evi
dence, suggests that the majority of work still indicates that state and
local taxes have little or no influence on economic growth. Neverthe
less, also in 1988, Newman and Sullivan, in a much more involved
review, wrote, "The most recent studies, employing more detailed data
sets and more refined econometric techniques, have generated results
which cast some doubt on the received conclusion that tax effects are
generally negligible" (Newman and Sullivan 1988, p. 232). Bartik, in
what is probably the most comprehensive assessment of recent
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research to date, takes Newman and Sullivan©s conclusions a step fur
ther:
The most important conclusion ... is that most recent business
location studies have found some evidence of significant negative
effects of state and local taxes on regional business growth. The
findings of recent studies differ from those in the 1950s, 1960s,
and early and mid-1970s, which generally did not find statistically
significant and negative effects of taxes on state and local growth.
(Bartik 199 Ib, pp. 38-39)

The reason for this change is that the newer work is technically more
sophisticated and thus better able to describe the relationship between
incentives and growth.
However, there have been other dissenting voices. In a review of
Bartik©s summary of the literature, McGuire (1992), who has herself
produced important work indicating that taxes do influence growth
(Wasylenko and McGuire 1985), argues that Bartik claims too much.
In particular, McGuire is concerned that some studies that did find a
significant effect of state taxes on job growth have not been replicable
and are not robust to changes in specification or time period. 18 She
argues that the recent literature is as contradictory and inconclusive as
the earlier literature. Our own sense is that there is a pressing need in
econometric studies for a better measure of state and local tax and
incentive policy. Underlying all of the econometric literature is the
assumption that firms select locations so as to maximize their income.
Thus, taxes and incentives should not be evaluated from the point of
view of government receipts or spending but from the point of view
of the firm©s income. We provide such a firm-oriented measure later in
this book.
The General Equilibrium Technique
A fourth and quite recent strategy has been to use applied general
equilibrium models to measure the impact of tax policy, for example,
on the location of economic activity (Morgan, Mutti, and Partridge
1990). General equilibrium models have an advantage over economet
ric models in that they specify the structural relationships, and thus
interactions, between the economic variables in the model. Unfortu
nately, the work in this area is still too new to draw definite conclusions
about the impact of taxes on local growth.
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The Hypothetical Firm Technique
Given the difficulties of drawing any solid conclusions based on the
existing literature, a few researchers have opted for an entirely differ
ent approach to the problem of taxes, incentives, and growth. This
solution involves looking at the impact local taxes and incentives have
on a firm©s actual income. In order to accomplish this, researchers
build models that replicate the operating ratios, balance sheets, income,
and tax statements of real (or, at least, potentially real) firms; this tech
nique is sometimes called the "hypothetical firm," or "representative
firm," method. It allows researchers to calculate exactly what impact a
state©s or city©s taxes would have on a firm©s income. Almost all of the
work in this tradition has looked at comparative tax burdens. 19 Very lit
tle research has used hypothetical firm results within an explicit eco
nomic development framework. Bartik et al. (1987) analyzed the
location of the General Motors Saturn plant. Using realistic simula
tions of transportation, labor, and tax costs, they calculated that the
best location for the new plant would be Nashville, Tennessee, about
30 miles from Spring Hill, the actual site chosen by the company.
However, as yet, no hypothetical firm models have explicitly incorpo
rated economic development incentives such as grants, loans, and
training awards.20 All current models remain essentially tools for calcu
lating comparative tax burdens.
Hypothetical firm models, because they focus directly on the
income effects of taxes, have tended to show that state and local taxes
can and do have an important influence on the returns on investment of
the firm. Few studies, on the other hand, have directly compared the
impact of spatial variation in taxes with spatial variation in, for exam
ple, the costs of labor, transportation, or infrastructure. Those that have
appear to suggest that in some circumstances taxes (and other incen
tives) may have a major impact on the profitability of various invest
ment locations (Bartik et al. 1987; Peters and Fisher 1996).
We will not pursue the hypothetical firm literature here, since most
of the rest of the book is taken up with our extension of the hypotheti
cal firm technique to include most major economic development incen
tives. However, a few points are worth noting right away. There is
increasing policy interest in using the hypothetical firm approach to
look at the relationship between incentives and growth. Recently, a
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number of states (and quasi-government organizations) have commis
sioned hypothetical firm studies (Brooks et al. 1986; Laughlin 1993;
Wisconsin Department of Revenue 1995).21 We believe part of the rea
son for this movement is disappointment that the other techniques,
those that are generally much simpler to implement, have failed to pro
vide clear prescriptive answers on the question of taxes and growth.
Another factor is that recent developments in computer technology
have made hypothetical firm models much easier to build. Finally,
there also is the misguided belief that the hypothetical firm technique
does not suffer from the ambiguities (particularly the statistical ambi
guities) that beset the other methods, that the effect of two competing
states© tax regimes on a firm©s income can indeed be calculated
directly.
In a few cases, the results of hypothetical firm studies have been
included in econometric analyses of the relationship between taxes and
growth (or, at least, taxes and investment). Industry-specific measures
of the burden of taxes deriving from the hypothetical firm model
replace ETRs as one of the dependent variables in the econometric
equation (Steinnes 1984; L. Papke 1987, 1991; Tannenwald and Kendrick 1995; Tannenwald 1996). Obviously, none of these studies was
able to include non-tax incentives. Nevertheless, we believe that in
general this is the right way to measure taxes (and incentives) within
econometric models of the impact of state and local policy on growth.
Conclusions: How We Propose to Deal with the Incentive Question
Leaving aside work in the hypothetical firm tradition, solid conclu
sions about the broad impact of business incentives on the locational
decisions of firms cannot be drawn from the existing academic litera
ture. As it now stands, the published research is contradictory on many
of the most important issues. Although we are inclined to believe that
taxes and incentives have major impacts on some locational decisions,
we are also bound to admit that the scholarly literature again exclud
ing research in the hypothetical firm tradition does not necessarily
support or contradict our position.
Part of the confusion in the literature is a consequence of the way in
which taxes and incentives have been assessed. This appears to be par
ticularly true for the econometric studies that have relied on averaged
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tax measures (in other words, ETRs) or simple tax rates as the "incen
tive." As noted, very few econometric (or other) studies have taken the
results of detailed tax impact models as their "incentive measure,"
although it is clear that doing so would provide a vastly more accurate
picture of the influence of taxes and incentives on firm investment and
location behavior. A major move forward in the econometric literature
would seem to be unlikely without first having a rigorous implementa
tion of the hypothetical firm technique to cover both taxes and non-tax
economic development incentives. We believe that our work with the
hypothetical firm method, discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, provides such
a step. The incorporation of the results of this model may give future
researchers a much more accurate picture of taxes and incentives, and
thus could bring about a more reliable measure of the impact of taxes
and incentives on location decisions.22

ISSUE 2: THE SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF INCENTIVES
The second issue we consider refers to Bartik©s minimum require
ment that state and local incentive programs must meet if they, taken
together, have the potential to produce net national benefits. It is the
requirement that the spatial pattern of incentives offered by states and
localities does not run counter to the need to promote the redistribution
of jobs from places with lower unemployment to places with higher
unemployment. In practical terms, if state and local incentives do pro
duce national net benefits, we should expect, at the very least, that
places with higher unemployment would offer greater incentives than
places with lower unemployment. As indicated earlier, from the
national perspective the point of redistributing employment (even the
identical number of jobs paying identical wages) from places of low
unemployment to places of high unemployment is to exploit the differ
ential between offered wages and reservation wages. Most of this book
contains our empirical evaluation of the spatial distribution of incen
tives. We now turn to the extant literature on this distribution. We look
at the research in some detail because it has not been recently
reviewed.
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Do poorer places provide more in the way of incentives? It is rea
sonable to assume that the states and municipalities with the highest
unemployment face the greatest political pressure to create jobs, and
thus one might expect them to offer the largest incentives. On the other
hand, high unemployment and slow job growth are likely to coincide
with state and local fiscal distress, a declining tax base, and a reduced
capacity to support new expenditure initiatives (Guskind 1990). Fur
thermore, many of these programs are tax expenditures and thus escape
scrutiny during the annual budget process; once enacted, during a
recession perhaps, they will tend to persist long after their political, no
less economic, rationale has disappeared. Indeed, Hanson (1993) found
that there is considerable long-term inertia in state-level economic
development policy-making. Also, it is hard to imagine a state official
who would not believe that having more jobs is always a good thing.
Given the tendency of states to imitate one another and their fear of
appearing antibusiness by not having a decent menu of financial
inducements to offer prospective businesses,23 there is every reason to
suppose that economic development incentives will become quite
widespread and may end up bearing little or no relationship to state and
local economic conditions.
The empirical work on this question is sketchy and contradictory. At
the broadest level, Fosler (1988) has claimed that, historically, states
experiencing economic distress have tended to be the ones adopting
new economic development instruments and institutionalizing the eco
nomic development process. According to Eisinger (1988), the expan
sion in economic development incentives in the Northeast and
Midwest during the 1970s and 1980s was a direct result of deindustrialization in those regions. At the local level, Fainstein (1991) has
argued that the administrative switch from regulating growth (with
zoning and other growth management instruments) to promoting
growth (through incentives) was a direct result of economic restructur
ing in the United States. All three writers have supported these claims
with simple historical data showing policy adoption following eco
nomic decline.
It is true that, in a number of states, severe economic decline did
prompt the development of new and powerful instruments. For exam
ple, the combined impact of severe employment loss in Iowa©s biggest
manufacturing sector and the farm crisis provided the political impetus
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for the development, in the mid 1980s, of the state©s flagship economic
development program, the Community Economic Betterment Account
(CEBA). It is also true, however, that this program continues today, at a
time when Iowa©s unemployment rate is between 2 and 3 percentage
points below the national average.
Clarke©s (1986) more detailed study of state governments, con
ducted for the National Governors© Association, suggests that reces
sion and industrial restructuring, and the gubernatorial initiatives they
trigger, are important catalysts for expansion of the state economic
development effort. Of recent statistical analyses undertaken, Lugar
(1987) developed models predicting state economic development pol
icy adoption in eight categories (plus a summary category). He found
that "overall state effort in industrial development is associated with
lower wages and higher unemployment" (p. 47). Gray and Lowery
(1990) ran regressions on the adoption of 43 state-level economic
development instruments (and on two subsets of these 43). According
to their results, the level of economic distress (measured by 1982 percapita manufacturing income and by the 1983 unemployment rate) was
an important motive for policy adoption.
At the city level, Clingermayer and Feiock (1990) ran separate
regression models for five different categories of economic develop
ment instruments: industrial revenue bonds (IRBs), Urban Develop
ment Action Grants, abatements, national advertising, and business
assistance centers. Their economic need variables (measured by city
per-capita personal income and the city bond rating) were positively
related to policy adoption in all five policy categories. On the other
hand, the local development of pro-growth coalitions and various local
institutional arrangements, such as a mayor-council form of govern
ment, accounted for far more of the adoption of highly visible eco
nomic development instruments than did the level of local economic
distress. Green and Fleischman (1991) compared policy adoption by
central cities, suburbs, and nonmetropolitan communities. They found
that in suburban communities the 1980 poverty rate was positively and
significantly related to the development effort, but this was not the case
in central cities or nonmetropolitan communities. However, their other
"economic need" measures the percentage of the population minority
and the percentage of jobs in manufacturing were not statistically
significant in any of the models they developed.
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Other studies broadly support these results. Bowman (1987), Rubin
and Rubin (1987), and Feiock and Clingermayer (1986) found that
more distressed localities tended to use a wider set of economic
development tools or to spend more on incentives. 24 For economic
development policy that targeted high technology, Atkinson (1991)
found greater political and administrative commitment to policy instru
ments in states that perceived economic distress.
In contrast, Grady (1987) found little correlation at the state level
between changes in the level of economic distress and expanded use of
economic development incentives. Hanson (1993) found that the state
unemployment rate did not account for much variation in economic
development policy choices in two of his four broad state policy cate
gories. Interestingly, he found considerable policy inertia; states modi
fied incrementally what they had already been doing. Confirming
Brierly©s (1986) earlier work, Reese (1991) found in a study of tax
abatements in Michigan that wealthier cities and cities with growing
economies abated more.
Two recent pieces, which pay much more attention than do other
studies to defining how policy expenditures vary spatially, have also
demonstrated little positive correlation between the amount of incen
tives offered by and the economic distress of a locality. Fisher©s (1991)
simulation of the impact of investment and job creation tax credits, and
of sales tax exemptions for manufacturing machinery and equipment,
on the cost structure of two hypothetical firms found little evidence to
suggest that the spatial pattern of incentives favored states and cities
with high unemployment. "Competition does not appear to be perverse
in its effects, [by] redistributing jobs away from distressed states; the
pattern simply shows no consistent relation between a state©s economic
distress . . . and the magnitude of the state tax incentives offered . . ."
(Fisher 1991, p. 20). Sridhar©s (1996) study of the distribution of
spending in the Illinois Enterprise Zone program uncovered no clear
link between the intensity of incentives offered and the local unem
ployment rate.
Overall, the literature is inconclusive about whether incentives are
concentrated in more distressed localities. Four factors account for the
inconclusiveness: 1) varying methodological approaches, with some
researchers using broad historical analyses and others using statistical
ones; 2) varying levels of sophistication, even within the body of statis-
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tical research; 3) model misspecification, especially the failure to
include measures of the impact of locality competition on policy adop
tion (Feiock 1989, p. 267),25 and 4) disparate independent and depen
dent variables. The dependent variable issue requires special
consideration. In other words, the problem is similar to that of the
econometric literature on taxes, incentives, and growth. Not enough
effort has been put into accurately measuring taxes and incentives.

MEASURING INCENTIVES AND THE STANDING OFFER
Most studies measure the economic development effort in ways that
lack a sound theoretical basis for comparing variations in incentive lev
els across localities. For instance, the increase in the number of pro
grams offered by a state or locality says nothing about the increase in
spending on those incentives. In fact, states often have incentives on
their books that are essentially unfunded.26 Conceivably, the size of the
economic development staff might say a lot about the proper manage
ment of the locality©s economic development instruments (although we
doubt it), but it says nothing of how much money is available for subsi
dizing individual firms. Similarly, total spending ignores the discrepan
cies in the size of states. A $10 million program in Wisconsin shows a
very different economic development effort than a similarly sized pro
gram in California. Spending per capita solves this latter problem but
raises a yet more fundamental one. If two states both spend an identical
per-capita amount on a particular sort of economic development instru
ment and if, in the first state, the program funds a much larger number
of plants (again on a per-capita basis) than in the second state, then at
least from the point of view of the firm, the second state would be
offering a larger locational incentive than the first. Thus per-capita
expenditure differences among localities ignore the way localities see
fit to distribute their funds. Spending per job created or retained has
more intuitive appeal for measuring policy concentration because it
provides a seemingly clear (and comparative) measure of the actual
value that the locality puts on each new or retained job. It indicates
how much the locality is willing to give to create 50 or 100 or 200 jobs.
This can be compared to spending on a similar number of jobs in other
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programs and other localities (the method has been used in a number of
federal programs to indicate something of incentive costliness). Never
theless, this approach has severe methodological problems.
Different sectors, and even different plants within the same sector,
operate at different levels of capital intensity. Identical incentive
expenditures per job might result in disparate levels of total invest
ment. Moreover, per-job data are not available for many programs,
especially those that are part of state tax codes. There are also very
important conceptual and administrative difficulties involved in using
jobs created or retained as an outcome measure (these are discussed in
Chapter 3). The most important objection is that, if incentives do influ
ence a firm©s location decision, it is only because the incentives alter
the relative costs associated with operating at a particular site. Per-job
incentive expenditures fail to capture this notion. Except for job train
ing grants and loans and jobs tax credits, almost all incentives lower
the cost of capital, not labor, so incentive dollars per job will not reflect
the incentive amount per dollar of capital. Although there may be
some, presumably sector- and asset-size-specific, relationship between
the reduction in plant (establishment or operating) costs associated
with an incentive and actual spending on the incentive (measured on a
per-job basis), as far as we are aware no empirical test of this relation
ship exists. We also do not believe that the empirical data for such a
test are available.
Thus, it turns out that the answers to two of the most important
questions facing economic development policy suffer from the same
sort of problem. On the issue of whether taxes and incentives signifi
cantly affect growth, almost all work has used inferior measures of
state and local taxes and where indeed researchers have been con
cerned with non-tax subsidies incentives. On the issue of what causes
localities to offer higher or lower levels of incentives, the identical
problem arises, but now in a more pronounced form, because much of
this literature has been concerned with non-tax subsidies rather than
taxes. No logically and empirically coherent measure of the economic
development effort exists.
The intensity of a locality©s tax and non-tax incentive effort is best
measured not by incentive spending per job, but by the locality©s stand
ing incentive offer to the individual firm. The standing offer is obtained
from the standard menu of taxes and incentives applicable to a firm
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locating at a particular site; it is the dollar value of the income deriving
from that tax and incentive package available to the firm at that site. In
this book, a comparison of spatial variation in the size of the standing
offer to spatial variation in wage rates is used to assess the impact of
taxes and incentives on firm investment and location behavior. The
relationship between the size of this standing offer and the economic
health (especially the unemployment rate) of the locality making the
offer is used to assess whether economically distressed places pursue
development policy more vigorously.
In this study, we analyze spatial variations in state and city standing
offers and then correlate the standing offer of each state and city in our
sample with the unemployment rates of those states and cities. We find
that there are large differences among the standing offers of various
states and cities. Indeed, in some cases the standing offer differences
between two sites are larger than the labor costs differences. This sug
gests to us that taxes and incentives may have an important impact on
firm investment and location decisions.
With regard to the overall pattern of standing offers, we find a some
what distressing pattern. There is little reason to believe that higher
unemployment states and cities provide the largest standing offers.
This suggests that the antecedent condition for Bartik©s argument that
incentives may have net national benefits is not true: the spatial pattern
of taxes and incentives in America is not likely to promote the redistri
bution of jobs from places of low unemployment to places of high
unemployment.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK

This book is divided into six chapters. Chapter 2 covers some basic,
albeit important, empirical issues, such as our choice of states, cities,
incentives, and industrial sectors, and briefly describes our implemen
tation of the hypothetical firm method. The methodological descrip
tions in Chapter 2 are restricted to a few sets of issues crucial to
understanding our results; a much more comprehensive discussion is in
Chapter 3, which covers most of the questions that readers familiar
with the hypothetical firm method will want answered. (Readers with
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less interest in these technical issues may want to pass over this chapter
and proceed directly to Chapter 4.) The substantive focus in Chapter 3
is on two separate sets of concerns: 1) the traditional methodology of
hypothetical firm simulations and our extensions of this methodology
and 2) our technique for the inclusion of non-tax incentives into the tra
ditional hypothetical firm framework. The chapter, especially the sec
ond part, provides a very extensive discussion of a range of quite
practical modeling issues. The reason for this detail is that because we
are the first to incorporate non-tax incentives comprehensively, on
many technical issues there was no established literature to guide our
decisions. Methodological assumptions play an important role in deter
mining the results of hypothetical firm simulations; consequently,
transparency of method is crucial.
In Chapters 4 and 5 we present our substantive results. Chapter 4
looks at the menu of incentives that states and cities offer and the dif
ferences these incentives make to a firm©s income. Chapter 5 considers
the spatial pattern of the standing offer. It focuses on whether poorer
places actually offer larger incentives. The conclusion, Chapter 6, sum
marizes our findings and defines a future research agenda for economic
development in the United States. We also discuss briefly a number of
economic development policy issues for which our results have some
bearing.
NOTES
1. Our interest is in competitive economic development policy, in other words, policy instru
ments that encourage the relocation of investment within the United States. We are not concerned
here with those economic development tools meant to increase productivity, such as industrial
extension services, or those tools meant to promote exports or encourage entrepreneurship.
2. In a manner similar to that advocated by Rasmussen, Bendick, and Ledebur (1984).
3. Unfortunately for policymakers, there is evidence from the survey literature that busi
nesses often make location decisions on the basis of non-economic factors, such as a good cli
mate. Statistical models of the growth of high-technology industries routinely include climate
indexes, not because of the "least cost" issue of plant heating costs but because it is believed that
high-technology engineers prefer to work in places with attributes such as sunshine (Markusen et
al. 1986). Opportunities for good golfing were a claimed reason Scotland was the recipient of
such a large proportion of Japanese and American high-technology inward investment during the
1980s. There is a range of evidence that locational behavior is influenced in a manner not obvious
from traditional location theory. For instance, geographical models of corporate growth have indi
cated a distance-decay relationship in the establishment of branch plants. Ray (1971) found that
American branch plants operating in Canada were much more likely to be controlled by head
quarters in Chicago, Detroit, or New York, while those in Mexico were more likely to be con-
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trolled by headquarters in Los Angeles. Models of corporate expansion developed by Taylor
(1975) and Watts (1980) also support the idea of limited spatial searches.
However, neither the use of non-economic factors nor the spatial restriction of search behavior
necessarily undermines the general appropriateness of traditional location theory. Non-economic
factors may have a clear economic impact on the availability of inputs; for instance, if an impor
tant cohort of a firm©s employees values sunshine and other amenities highly, then the provision of
these through appropriate location may be considered part of the employee©s competitive benefit
package. A more general point should also be made: personal factors may enter location deci
sions, "but to the extent that firm©s profit-maximizing location is altered by personal preferences,
the firm will trade off profits for personal factors" (Wasylenko 1981, p. 160). With regard to the
spatial search issue, traditional location theory can be expanded to take into account factors such
as the costs of locational information and the friction of distance.
4. This is the central "positive" justification for economic development policy. It is true that
there are a number of other important justifications. Kieschnick (1981, p. 26) discusses five:
equalizing interstate tax differentials, which may serve as an inducement for a firm to select
an alternative business location;
serving as a wage subsidy to offset the effects of wage rigidity or labor immobility;
lowering the costs of capital to induce greater overall capital formation, independent of loca
tion choices;
serving to redistribute income from labor to capital under the politically acceptable guise of
providing development incentives; and
serving as a "signal" to out-of-state businesses that the state has "pro-business" regulatory
and spending policies.
5. For a statement of this argument in the context of infrastructural incentives, see Foster,
Forkenbrock, and Pogue (1991).
6. For restatements of the zero-sum position, see Glickman and Woodward (1989) and Rubin
and Zorn (1985). For an early discussion of the zero-sum aspect of economic development policy,
see Rinehart and Laird (1972). Interestingly, Rinehart and Laird argue that there may be national
benefits from state and local competition for jobs. Wolkoff (1990) believes that critics who have
described economic development policy in zero-sum terms have tended to misuse or, at least, to
overly simplify game theory.
7. This would be true until a locality market equilibrium were reached and all localities pro
vided an equivalent level of incentives. At this point, the impact of incentives might be zero-sum.
Of course, equilibrium will not be a normal condition of the market because it will always be in
the interest of a locality to provide some new incentive to gain some short-term advantage over all
other localities (Netzer 1991, p. 225). However, even at the equilibrium point there may be nega
tive economic consequences for the nation through a misallocation of resources. Most obviously,
capital subsidies would lead to excessive national capital intensity (with potentially negative con
sequences for jobs).
The problem with this latter argument, as Netzer fully admits, is that its assumptions cannot
be sustained: there already exist significant imperfections in the locality market; the United States
is not a closed economy, and incentives could attract investment from other countries; jurisdictional spillover effects exist; and state and local governments already levy an inefficient system of
taxes. Incentives do not necessarily increase these inefficiencies.
Some researchers do not put much store in the misallocation of resources argument and claim
that insofar as various incentives work to lower the cost of capital, they induce greater overall cap
ital formation, independent of location factors. They may therefore be "good" from the national
perspective (Kieschnick 1981, p. 26).
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8. These are as follows: 1) jurisdictions compete for business investment by lowering their
taxes and by providing the services needed by business; 2) there are no interjurisdictional spill
over effects; and 3) there are sufficient jurisdictions to approximate a competitive market.
9. Underlying Bartik©s results is a theory of skill acquisition, the "hysteresis effect." Essen
tially, migration towards places that have experienced demand-induced job shocks will take place
over a period of time because people are not perfectly mobile. Original residents of the place
undergoing growth will therefore receive some short-term labor market advantages: for instance,
some residents who would otherwise not have jobs will be employed. The human capital
resources of these workers will improve, and they will thus be better able to compete with new inmigrants when the latter finally arrive. Thus, a temporary labor market advantage will have
longer-term effects.
10. Job search theory suggests that the optimal search strategy for the job seeker is to accept
the first job offer that exceeds the seeker©s reservation wage (Zuckerman 1984). The reservation
wage is the lowest wage at which the worker would be willing to accept a job offer and is usually
interpreted as a measure of the benefits, psychic and otherwise, that the individual places on lei
sure time. Bartik (1991b) argues that, on average, the local reservation wage will vary inversely
with the local unemployment rate. The reason for this is that in low-unemployment localities,
where obtaining a job is relatively easy, individuals who place a high value on getting a job would
tend to find work, while those who do not clearly place a high value on their leisure time. On the
other hand, in high-unemployment localities, where finding a job is relatively difficult, individuals
tend to be willing to work for low wages. As indicated, this purported relationship between the
local unemployment rate and the reservation wage is crucial for Bartik©s broader argument about
the potential positive net national benefits of state and local incentives. It also underpins the
research presented in this book: if incentives do tend to promote the redistribution of investment
(and therefore jobs) to places of high unemployment, this is beneficial only to the extent that the
benefits of employment are greater in high-unemployment localities than in low-unemployment
localities.
Unfortunately, only one published study has looked directly at the relationship between the
local unemployment rate and the reservation wage. This study was conducted on British data and
found that for every 1 percentage point increase in the local unemployment rate, the average res
ervation wage of the unemployed declined by £0.012, or 1.6 percent (Jones 1989). Sridhar (1996)
replicated, as closely as possible, Jones©s model using U.S. data from the 1987 Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID) established at the University of Michigan. Sridhar©s results generally
accord with Jones©s: she found that for every 1 percentage point increase in the unemployment
rate, there was a 10 cent decrease in the reservation wage. This is the first clear U.S. evidence of
an inverse relationship between the local unemployment rate and the reservation wage of the
unemployed.
11. These estimates are from Bartik (1991b, p. 61). As our work and that of others show (see,
for example, Papke 1995), this number varies considerably across sectors.
12. Diamond and Spence (1983) are referring to the evaluation of British regional policy. In
fact, many of the instruments, goals, outcomes, and problems of British and European "regional
policy" are reflected in U.S. "economic development policy." Both have focused on promoting job
growth within subnational regions. Very often, grants, municipal loans, and labor subsidies have
been used to encourage relocation (or "inward investment," to use the British euphemism) of
firms from other regions. In this book, where appropriate, we treat regional policy and economic
development policy as essentially equivalent and make use of the regional policy literature.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that there are some important differences between "economic
development policy" and "regional policy." Regional policy is generally financed and directed by
central government; for instance, Regional Selective Assistance (a major British subsidy provided
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during the 1980s) was funded and managed by the London-based Department of Trade and Indus
try. Economic development policy in the United States is directed by, and very often financed by,
state and local government. As a result, central control of regional competition, and thus restric
tions on that competition, are clear with most regional policy instruments, but less so with eco
nomic development policy.
13. This fact poses considerable problems for the administration of policy incentives as well
as for research on policy effectiveness (Peters 1993).
14. For recent reviews of the survey literature, see Calzonetti and Walker (1991), Eisinger
(1988), and Blair and Premus (1987).
15. Bartik (1991b) has also provided a recent review of this literature and finds that it is gener
ally supportive of the concept that incentives influence the locational behavior of firms.
16. Recent exceptions include Goss (1994), Goss and Phillips (1994), and Spiegel and de
Bartolome (forthcoming), all of whom looked at the impact of economic development agency
spending in their models. As indicated in the text, the relationship between infrastructure and
growth has been studied in some detail. See Singletary et al. (1995) for recent evidence from the
infrastructure literature. There is also a limited amount of work that considers other incentives.
See Loh (1995) for a very useful recent study of jobs-targeted development incentives. Marlin
(1990), for instance, has looked at the relationship between the issue of IDBs and gross state
product. Krmenec (1990) has investigated the relationship between IDBs and employment
growth.
17. Effective tax rates are usually calculated by dividing regional gross tax receipts (from all
taxes or from particular taxes such as corporate income taxes) by some base, usually employment
or population.
18. This refers to a comparison of the results in Wasylenko and McGuire (1985) to those in
McGuire and Wasylenko (1987), Carroll and Wasylenko (1990), and Carroll and Wasylenko
(1991).
19. This literature is covered comprehensively in Chapter 3. For two recent implementations
of this method by the scholar most closely associated with the method, see J. Papke (1995, 1996).
20. This would mean to endogenously incorporate economic development incentives into the
financial statements of the firm.
21. A review of this literature is provided in Chapter 3.
22. Until now, hypothetical firm simulations have not included modeling of non-tax incentives
such as grants, loans, and loan guarantees (although there has been one very limited attempt).
Moreover, the hypothetical firm simulations have suffered from problems of spatial and sectoral
scale. These are discussed more fully in Chapter 3.
23. Discussions of business climate surveys certainly bear this out; see Eisinger (1988) and
Skoro(1988).
24. See also Hanson (1985), Sharp (1986), Swanstrom (1985), and Young and Mason (1983).
25. Hanson (1993) presents the most sophisticated attempt at including variables for policy
competition between states.
26. Also, the directories on which incentive counts are based are sometimes seriously unreli
able.

2 An Overview of Method
In this book, we investigate the variation in the provision of eco
nomic development incentives (as measured by the standing offer)
across the 24 largest manufacturing states in the nation and a random
sample of 112 cities within those states. We measure the magnitude of
tax differences and the value of the standing incentive offer and its
components in each state and city. We then relate the value of the busi
ness incentive package available in a state or city to various indicators
of economic distress for that state or locality. This study focuses on
the year 1992.
In this chapter, we provide an overview of the research method
employed to accomplish these tasks: how we selected the incentive pro
grams to include in the analysis, which taxes we modeled, how we
chose states and cities, and how we developed a hypothetical firm model
to measure the effects of taxes and the value of incentive programs. We
have included here only those details essential to an understanding of
our study and to interpretation of the results; a more technical and com
plete discussion of methodology follows in Chapter 3.

WHAT ARE COMPETITIVE ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES?
Since this is a study of state and local government competition for
jobs, we focus our analysis on competitive incentives over which state
and local governments have some direct control. But what is a compet
itive economic development incentive? One could argue that nearly
everything that state and local governments do has at least an indirect
effect on economic activity. Infrastructure, which provides services
used directly by businesses, obviously supports production in the pri
vate sector, while certain taxes directly reduce business profits. Fur
thermore, a whole range of services to households arguably increases
the productivity of local labor or facilitates the assembling of a labor
force, and so has indirect (though often incidental) effects on economic
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development. Moreover, lawmakers feel compelled to package spend
ing whether on basic education, higher education, infrastructure, or
the arts on the merits of its ability to improve the state or local cli
mate for growth. Political leaders in Oregon went so far as to campaign
for a sales tax on the basis of its economic development purpose: a
sales tax would allow a reduction in corporate and some personal taxes
and thus improve the state©s development prospects (Hovey 1986, pp.
90-91).
Nonetheless, it is useful to identify a subset of state and local poli
cies with an explicit economic development objective, programs that
would in all likelihood not exist but for the public concern with pro
moting job creation and economic growth. Since this research is con
cerned with the effects of intergovernmental competition for jobs and
capital, it is this set of overtly development-focused programs that is of
interest.
As we are dealing only with competitive incentives, we exclude
"new wave" or "demand side" programs, which are aimed at stimulat
ing entrepreneurship, subsidizing research and development, promot
ing technology transfer or the commercialization of university
research, providing venture capital, stimulating exports, or facilitating
the incubation of new small businesses. Such programs tend not to be
used as relocation incentives for mobile firms; instead, they are usually
designed to stimulate the generation of new indigenous technologies or
new indigenous firms or to open new markets.
We also exclude those incentives, almost all of which are federally
financed, that are offered in a standard format across most localities in
the nation, such as industrial revenue bond (IRB) financing and federal
programs that operate outside the control of state and local government
or that focus on rural areas. The latter incentives include, for example,
most Small Business Administration programs, all Department of
Agriculture programs, and all Bureau of Indian Affairs programs.
We distinguish between tax and non-tax incentives. 1 The majority of
tax subsidies are provided automatically. That is, if a firm meets certain
criteria specified in the tax code and makes an investment of the speci
fied sort (a new industrial building, for example) or hires some cate
gory of worker, then the firm will receive the incentive. The
government unit provides the incentive in an all-or-nothing fashion; it
is not possible to focus the incentive program on only those firms that
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"need" (however this is construed) the subsidy to survive or to enable
them to relocate. (The exception is local property tax abatements; for
the most part, the cities in our sample offered standard abatement terms
for all industrial investments, but in many instances there was some
discretion exercised.) Non-tax incentives are usually discretionary;
they tend to be negotiated between governmental units and prospective
firms. Firms that meet program requirements do not automatically
receive a subsidy but must compete with other prospective firms for
incentives. In this case, the incentive program might be thought of as
an investment vehicle for public funds: program managers should
invest only in those projects where the expected rate of return (broadly
conceived to include returns on certain social goals) is sufficient.
The distinction between tax and non-tax programs is important in
building the simulation model and in interpreting the results. Within
clearly definable limits, we know that a firm of a designated asset and
employment size in a particular sector making a specific new invest
ment will receive a certain level of tax incentives (negotiated abate
ments being an exception). However, we can only determine the most
likely non-tax award. It should be noted that there is evidence from
regional incentive programs in Great Britain that firms are more likely
to take into account automatic rather than discretionary incentives
when making locational decisions, presumably because automatic
incentives are certain and can be incorporated early into the firm©s
planning process (Swales 1989).2

TAXES AND TAX INCENTIVES
One can make a distinction between the effects of competition on
overall spending or tax levels and the effects of competition on the cre
ation of particular programs (or tax laws) with an explicit development
purpose. This research focuses on economic development tax expendi
tures, credits or exemptions that represent departures from the normal
tax base and that are aimed at stimulating private investment. Three
kinds of incentives fall clearly into this category: investment and job
creation credits against the corporate income or franchise tax, sales tax
exemptions provided only to firms locating in enterprise zones, and
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property tax abatements for new business investment. The investment
and jobs tax credits, the sales tax exemptions, and, in many cases, the
property tax abatements differ in one significant respect from the other
competitive incentives discussed: they are entitlements, provided auto
matically to any firm meeting the qualifications in the law.
In the area of tax policy, it is more difficult to draw the line between
explicit economic development tax laws and general tax policy
changes adopted with an eye to their economic development implica
tions. John Shannon has argued that the competition for jobs has led
states to become concerned with their overall business tax climate and
that they have taken steps to avoid having any of the tax "sore thumbs"
that are thought to be trouble signs to potential investors. Shannon
identifies the six most often cited "sore thumbs" as 1) a high overall tax
burden, 2) a heavy and progressive individual income tax, 3) business
taxes (corporate income tax, workers© compensation tax, or unemploy
ment insurance tax) that are clearly out of line with those of other
states, 4) heavy property taxes on business realty (land and buildings),
5) any property tax on business personal property (machinery or inven
tories), and 6) a sales tax on a substantial share of business purchases
(such as machinery or fuels and utilities). He then asserts that "the
more ©sore thumbs© a jurisdiction exhibits, the greater the likelihood
that its policymakers will resort to a wide variety of temporary pain
killers business tax concessions as the most expedient way to deal
with these competitive problems" (Shannon 1991, p. 118).
If Shannon©s observation is accurate, then it could be quite mislead
ing to measure only the three clear economic development tax incen
tives identified at the beginning of this section. It could be that the
states that do not provide such incentives, or do so at a very low level,
are precisely the ones that have responded to competitive pressures by
adopting more general tax policies favorable to business and thus see
no need for the explicit investment incentives. Furthermore, economic
development concerns have undoubtedly played a significant role in
the past 20 years in the decisions by many states to exempt business
inventories from the property tax; to exempt machinery and equipment
purchases, fuels, and utilities from the sales tax; to exempt or preferen
tially assess machinery for purposes of the property tax; and to keep
down or reduce business tax rates as well as the top individual tax rate.
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To avoid seriously biasing our study against states that have chosen a
particular approach to keeping the business tax climate competitive, we
will simulate the overall burden of state and local taxes having an initial
impact on business: the corporate income tax,3 the property tax on busi
ness realty and personal property, and the sales tax on major business
purchases (machinery and equipment, and fuel and electricity). The
analysis includes federal corporation income taxes as well. There is
another significant advantage to modeling the federal and state income
taxes: the results will then automatically measure the value to the firm
of the after-tax effects of all state and local incentive programs. To the
extent that a local grant program or property tax reduction reduces the
firm©s deductible costs, the firm©s state and federal taxable income will
increase and its total state and federal income tax bill will rise, dimin
ishing the net value of the incentive program. Unless income taxes are
fully modeled, the value of incentives will be overstated.
Corporate Income Tax
Modeling the complete corporate income tax codes in each state
would require a large investment of time involving a host of relatively
insignificant differences in law. Papke and Papke (1984) argue that the
major differences are due to rates; deductibility of income taxes paid to
other states, the federal government, or one©s own state; deductibility
of property taxes; rules for apportionment of income; depreciation
methods; and rules for carrying net operating losses (NOL) backward
or forward. Studies using the hypothetical firm method generally
account for all of these corporate income tax features except for the
NOL carryforward rules. Studies looking at average taxes paid in one
year sometimes model firms with losses, but since they do not consider
tax burdens in other years, they do not model the NOL carryforward.
On the other hand, multiyear models do not include firms with losses
because of the logical and practical difficulties in doing so; thus, the
NOL provisions, even if modeled, would never apply.4
Variations among the selected 24 states with respect to the key fea
tures of the income tax are shown later in this book (see Table 4.2). To
the Papke list might be added the following: 1) the availability of gen
eral credits for other taxes paid, such as sales or property taxes; 2) the
treatment of nonbusiness income (how it is allocated, whether it is sub-
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ject to apportionment); 3) whether the property factor in the apportion
ment formula is measured by acquisition cost or book value; 4)
whether the sales factor includes nonbusiness receipts; and 5) the avail
ability of investment tax credits or jobs tax credits. All of these features
are included in our model.
There seems to be agreement that there is little point in modeling the
very minor differences in the measurement of the payroll factor or in
modeling the differences in the treatment of subcategories of nonbusi
ness income, such as rents, royalties, interest on federal bonds, interest
on state and local bonds, dividends from subsidiaries, and capital
gains. We would argue that since the focus of the research is on the
location of facilities for the generation of sales of products business
income the treatment of such items is not relevant. There is a practi
cal argument as well: data at this level of detail are not generally avail
able, and the simulation of the myriad differences in state law would
greatly complicate model building. There are two simplifying assump
tions that can then be made: 1) the hypothetical firms have no nonbusi
ness income or 2) the hypothetical firms have aggregate nonbusiness
income as given by the statistical data sources, but it is entirely in the
form of interest on corporate bonds, which is treated uniformly by the
states. The latter approach allows one to model rules for the allocation
or apportionment of nonbusiness income without getting into the
details of what counts as nonbusiness income and what does not. Also
generally ignored (by creating firms that have no such income or asset
category) are the treatment of foreign business income, foreign nonbusiness income, foreign tax credits, extraordinary items such as write
offs for plant closures, goodwill, and recapture of federal investment
tax credits, or the adding back of federal job incentive credits.

The Sales Tax
Most studies consider only the sales tax on purchases of fuel and
electricity and of machinery and equipment. These are the two major
categories of expenditure by manufacturers that are sometimes taxed
and sometimes exempted by the states. The exemptions are most often
targeted exclusively at manufacturing machinery and at fuel and elec
tricity used directly in the manufacturing process, which suggests that
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at least part of the motivation for the exemption was an economic
development one.
Hunt (1985) estimated expenditures on other business purchases
that are subject to sales tax (at least in some states): office equipment,
furniture, nonmanufacturing supplies, building materials for repair and
for new construction, and pollution abatement equipment. Of the total
expenditures on these items plus fuel and electricity and manufacturing
machinery, the latter two categories represented 74 percent, averaged
across Hunt©s seven manufacturing industries. Thus the studies that
model sales taxes only on fuel and electricity and on machinery and
equipment are omitting about 26 percent of the total sales tax. Pollu
tion abatement equipment represented just 2 percent of the total; even
though some states tax it and some exempt it, the omission of sales tax
ation of pollution equipment from a model can have only a trivial
effect on overall state tax differentials. Office equipment, furniture and
fixtures, and office supplies are almost universally subject to the full
sales tax rate; failure to include such expenses in the model thus cre
ates differences only because of variations in tax rates. Our model
includes expenditures on machinery and equipment, furniture and fix
tures, computers, and fuel and electricity; it does not include expendi
ture detail for office supplies, construction materials, or pollution
control equipment, so the results do not reflect the minor differences
caused by state variation in taxing these latter items.
We have chosen not to separately identify, in the results, the effects
of state sales tax treatment of purchases of various kinds of machinery
and equipment or purchases of fuel and electricity. Each state©s sales
tax is part of the model; to the extent that the state applies the sales tax
fully to purchases of manufacturing machinery, computers, furniture
and fixtures, transportation equipment, or other personal property, that
will be reflected in a higher acquisition cost for those assets and hence
larger depreciation deductions and larger financing requirements. To
the extent that the state taxes or exempts purchases of electricity or
fuel, or exempts the portion used directly in the manufacturing process,
the firm©s operating costs will be more or less each year. 5 Some would
argue that sales tax exemptions for personal property or utilities used
by manufacturers are not tax expenditures, but are better viewed as
attempts to make the actual tax base conform to the ideal: a tax on final
consumption, not on intermediate goods. For practical modeling rea-
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sons as well, sales tax effects are not separately identified in the results
but are included in the measure of the state©s overall "base" tax system.

The Property Tax
There are three aspects of the property tax system that are modeled.
First, state policy will generally determine whether local property taxes
apply to business inventories and to personal property in general,
whether categories of personal property such as manufacturing
machinery and equipment are exempt, and whether different classes of
property must be assessed at different ratios to market value. States
also generally establish rules or guidelines for local assessors in deter
mining the market value of personal property; typically, the state will
publish depreciation schedules by industry and/or type of property.
These state guidelines are used by the model to value personal prop
erty; book value is assumed for real property, using straight-line depre
ciation over the life of the building.
Second, local policy will determine the effective general tax rate on
business realty and personalty. Third, local policy will determine
whether certain new investments in realty or machinery and equipment
are fully or partly exempt from property taxes and for how many years,
within state-defined limits on such local abatements. The effects of the
first two are part of the local "base" tax system; the effects of abate
ments are identified separately as an explicit local economic develop
ment incentive.
Our list of tax features that are modeled, and the implied list of fea
tures that are not, can be further justified by considering evidence of
what firms think of as state policy incentives, or what state develop
ment officials consider relevant when comparing the competitive posi
tions of states. The Directory of Incentives for Business Investment and
Development in the United States, compiled by the National Associa
tion of State Development Agencies (1991), includes the specific eco
nomic development tax expenditures that have been cited and also
includes information on overall business taxes: the corporate income
tax, the sales tax on machinery and equipment and fuel and utilities,
and the property tax on machinery and equipment and inventories. It
has, in other words, all of Shannon©s "sore thumbs" except for individ
ual income taxes. The lists of incentives published annually in the fore-

Industrial Incentives 39

most two U.S. location periodicals, Area Development and Site
Selection and Industrial Development, are very similar. It should be
noted that none of these directories of incentives includes any broader
measures of financing policy, general job training or education expen
ditures, or infrastructure spending.

NON-TAX INCENTIVES
Hypothetical firm models have not included non-tax incentives since
these are mostly negotiated, whereas tax incentives are usually auto
matic and applied uniformly. Thus, in order to simulate the impact of
non-tax incentives on investment, the model must be able to generate a
set of incentives that a plant would likely receive from a state or city
and then apply those incentives to an investment. This is a very differ
ent sort of problem than is found in modeling tax systems. There are
four major steps involved in integrating discretionary non-tax incen
tives into a hypothetical firm model:
Develop an "administrative history" for each incentive program,
such as incentive dollars awarded per jobs created or incentive
dollars awarded per associated total investment. These ratios can
then be utilized to develop likely amounts that a firm would
receive from a particular incentive program.
Apply the various explicit program rules. Common rules include
a maximum amount a firm may receive from an incentive pro
gram or a stipulated minimum equity contribution.
Assemble the best package of incentives available from a unit of
government. The model should be able to mirror the way in
which economic development officials assemble their incentives
into competitive packages.
Calculate the present value of a firm©s return on investment with
out any discretionary incentives and then again with a particular
package of discretionary incentives. The difference between these
two amounts measures the after-tax worth of a state©s or city©s
discretionary incentives to a firm.
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Competitive non-tax incentive programs fall into three broad cate
gories: general-purpose capital-financing programs, employment train
ing subsidies, and infrastructure subsidies. We now focus on each of
these in turn.
General-Purpose Financing Programs
State or local programs providing grants, loans, loan guarantees, or
loan subsidies directly or indirectly (through linked-deposit programs)
to private businesses in order to finance working capital or the acquisi
tion of land, plant, or equipment are competitive development incen
tives. The principal or sole purpose of these programs is the attraction
of business capital and the creation of jobs. Essentially all of these pro
grams aim to lower the costs of doing business by reducing the cost of
capital. Usually the funds are provided by the government or by a
quasi-public authority. One could argue that there are other state poli
cies that can improve the terms of business financing and hence foster
development. State banking regulatory policies, for example, may well
have been reformed in recent years partly in an effort to stimulate the
flow of capital to business investment generally. This study focuses on
the more narrowly defined set of programs providing direct public
financing (or financing subsidies) to particular businesses. 6
Customized Job Training and Wage Subsidies
State and local job training programs (often run through community
colleges) that are customized to the training needs of particular firms
opening new facilities or expanding operations fall within our defini
tion of a non-tax incentive. This category includes programs whereby
the state pays a portion of the "training wages" for new employees who
are trained on the job by the firm, as well as programs providing train
ing per se. Through these programs, the state subsidizes firms© labor
costs. Job training programs are usually grants to the firm, but they
may also take the form of loans or loan guarantees.
Training programs meant for general skill development and educa
tional purposes, such as those available to laid-off and unemployed
workers, are excluded from our model. We consider customized train
ing programs only those that specifically provide for the training (or
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subsidy) of workers at a particular firm. Many such customized pro
grams provide for on-the-job training. Here, the recipient firm, not an
outside educational institution, is paid to train workers for the positions
being created or retained. There is some evidence that on-the-job train
ing often serves as a wage subsidy: funds for on-the-job training con
tinue longer than the individual worker is being trained in the plant,
often much longer. Public funds thus effectively reduce the costs of hir
ing a worker; they serve to subsidize wages. Since so many state and
local training programs that fit our research criteria allow on-the-job
training, we decided not to distinguish between job training programs
and wage subsidy programs.
Vocational education, or education in general, is a traditional func
tion of state and local government that predates the competition for
jobs and that would continue to be supported even in the absence of a
competitive environment. One could argue that the support for educa
tion would be different were it not for competition. Perhaps more funds
have been directed in recent years to education in general and to voca
tional training in particular because of the concern with economic
growth. There is, in fact, anecdotal evidence to support this. The south
ern states, for example, have raised taxes to bring their educational sys
tems nearer to the national standard, in recognition that their economic
future is at stake (Shannon 1991). However, it is impossible to identify
the magnitude of public expenditure on education and training that is
attributable to competition, or to make any presumption about its value
to a particular business, or even to be sure that the net effects on educa
tion funding of expenditure and tax competition in particular states
have been positive.
Our model does not include any of the federal training programs,
such as Jobs Training Partnership Act (JTPA) funds, Job Opportunities
and Basic Skills (JOBS) training, Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA),
or the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (TJTC). These are programs that are
available reasonably uniformly across the states. We model only state
and locally financed and directed training and subsidy programs.
Unfortunately, the situation is complicated by the fact that many state
training programs are organized in concert with JTPA and other federal
funds. Where this is the case, we model (insofar as it is possible) only
the state-capitalized portion of training.
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Infrastructure Subsidies
State-funded infrastructure improvements, tied to new investment
by a particular firm that is relocating or expanding operations, and part
of a program whose primary purpose is job creation, clearly fall within
the definition of a competitive economic development incentive. Most
states operate at least one infrastructure grant, loan, or loan guarantee.
In almost all instances, the instrument is in the form of a direct grant,
usually for the building of a section of an access road or a bridge to the
new plant. In many cases, the responsible local unit of government
applies, on behalf of the firm, to the state Department of Transportation
(DOT). Usually, the state DOT, not the state economic development
agency, runs the infrastructure program. Many bigger cities have simi
lar programs, but these will often allow expenditures for other site
assembly expenses.
It is common for states and cities to use federal Community Devel
opment Block Grant (CDBG) funds for infrastructure provision, and
many states and cities advertise the CDBG as an infrastructure incen
tive. We exclude CDBG-based infrastructure subsidies, since the
CDBG is essentially a national program with a reasonably standard set
of rules applying across all states.
Some cities reported to us that, although they did not have a separate
set-aside fund dedicated to providing infrastructure to new and expand
ing firms, they often used general revenues for this purpose, but on an
ad hoc basis. For example, if a road to a plant needed to be upgraded,
then a portion of city street maintenance funds would be used for this
purpose. In a few instances, state road programs were also ad hoc. Illi
nois, as an illustration, no longer has a dedicated pot of money to be
used for building access roads; 7 nevertheless, general road funds may
be used for economic development purposes.
Our research covers only state and local infrastructure grants, loans,
and loan guarantees that existed in 1992 as dedicated, separate incen
tives. We found it impossible to assemble the data necessary to model
ad hoc infrastructure incentives, or, for that matter, any ad hoc incen
tives. Modeling incentives from general revenues would have required
a massive historical data collection effort. It is our experience that such
data do not exist for the most part; where they do exist, they are not
compiled, and time constraints on city officials make it unlikely that
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they would provide the information. Moreover, the statistical modeling
of ad hoc incentives would likely introduce a significant new source of
error into our more general simulation of state and local incentives.
From the point of view of our major research questions, the omis
sion of ad hoc incentives is not a major limitation. We aim at measur
ing the explicit economic development incentive effort of state and
local governments. Over and above the complex empirical issues of
data collection and modeling involved in measuring non-explicit pro
grams, we do not believe there is a good theoretical case for including
incentives that may exist only for a single firm©s investment. Moreover,
to the extent that incentives do influence a firm©s locational and invest
ment decisions, explicit incentives will be of much greater importance
than implied ad hoc incentives. 8
As with job training programs, ambiguity arises in defining incen
tives when one considers the whole range of infrastructure spending by
state and local governments, most of which provides transportation or
utility-type services used directly by the private sector. It may be that
the level of infrastructure spending as a whole is greater than it would
have been in the absence of state and local competition for jobs. Again,
the magnitude of this effect is very difficult to ascertain; furthermore,
much of the infrastructure spending in the past two decades has had
primarily a health or environmental purpose. We focus on the portion
of infrastructure spending providing special benefits to particular firms
and with funding coming from a special program with an economic
development purpose.
Other Incentive Programs Not Included

Inevitably, some programs were not included in the model. In many
cases, this was because the program was too small or its use was too
infrequent. However, many programs were deliberately ignored: in
particular, those funded by the federal government in such a way that
there is little local control of spending.
The federal government has a long and complex relationship with
local economic development efforts. The contours of this relationship
were solidified during the Depression and Roosevelt©s New Deal and
greatly expanded after World War II. In essence, the federal govern
ment would pay for programs for example, Urban Renewal, Urban
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Development Action Grants, CDBGs, or the interest exemption for
industrial revenue bonds but the money or benefits would be dis
persed by state and local governments. To the extent that these pro
grams have been used as major instruments of state and local economic
development policy, the federal government has been subsidizing and
encouraging locational competition in the United States.
Currently, CDBGs are commonly used for economic development
purposes, in particular, for local infrastructure development. Over the
past decade, they have also capitalized local economic development
revolving loan funds (RLFs). In addition, many other federal programs
may be used for economic development purposes: federal funding for
highways and road improvements, the Federal Aviation Authority©s
subsidization of the building and upgrading of commercial airports, the
Economic Development Administration (EDA) Title IX program also
capitalizing RLFs, and the JTPA funds for technical training and skills
enhancement. There are numerous additional programs that target rural
areas, distressed areas, small firms, and disadvantaged population
groups through, respectively, Farmers Home Administration business
loans, various Small Business Administration capital programs, and
Minority Business Administration and Bureau of Indian Affairs loan,
loan guarantee, subcontracting, and business education programs.
All such programs serve to reduce the costs of doing business. Other
things being equal, the use of any of these programs might confer sig
nificant economic development advantages on a locality. However,
with one exception, our study does not take into account any of these
federal programs affecting local economic development potential. The
focus of our study is on the use of resources by states and localities to
enhance their position in the competition for investment and jobs. We
exclude IRBs, for example, because they require no local commitment
of resources and because their availability is nearly universal, so that
their use confers no competitive advantage. 9 For similar reasons, most
of the other federal programs previously cited are excluded. We do,
however, include RLFs capitalized with federal funds, usually with the
state©s CDBG allocation or with a locality©s CDBG entitlement. Even
though the funds are federal, RLFs are not a uniformly available pro
gram. The states and localities have considerable discretion in use of
the funds, so that the decision to capitalize an RLF means that those
CDBG monies are not available for other purposes, such as housing

Industrial Incentives 45

rehabilitation or infrastructure improvements. In that sense, the
resources do represent a state or local commitment, and variation in
their use can result in a pattern of competitive advantage.
Finally, there are a number of other quasi-governmental organiza
tions that are often involved in the building of a particular incentive
package offer. These include local power companies, chambers of
commerce, bankers and real estate developers, small business invest
ment companies (SBICs), and even community development corpora
tions. Particularly in smaller communities or with smaller investments
in larger communities, all or some of these groups may help package
local incentives or even offer their own incentives, such as RLFs, so
that a local deal may "happen." No attempt to quantify this involve
ment in the state and local economic development effort exists. On the
basis of our experience with economic development officials, we
believe the involvement is widespread and that it may be effective in
influencing the location decisions of firms, at least compared to many
other state and local incentives. Nevertheless, we do not include quasigovernmental incentives in our model. In the first instance, they do not
indicate anything of the state or municipal government©s commitment
to economic development activity, and it is this commitment that is the
focus of our study. In the second, it is plausible to argue that the
involvement of quasi-governmental organizations is based on selfinterest (increasing local demand for energy, enhancing commercial
real estate values, expanding the local market for financial services) in
a way in which the involvement of state and city government is not.
The presumed link between the level of local distress and the intensity
of the incentive offer is thus much less clear with quasi-governmental
organizations.

THE HYPOTHETICAL FIRM METHOD: AN INTRODUCTION
Our method for measuring the value of each locality©s standing offer
is based on the process by which firms make investment decisions.
According to traditional location theory, a particular firm in a specified
industry, with given production technology and needs for various kinds
of assets, labor, and other inputs, will evaluate alternative sites for new
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investment on the basis of the profitability of the marginal investment
in each location under consideration. Our measure of this effect is the
present value of the increase in a firm©s after-tax cash flow over a 20year period it could expect to derive from an investment in a new plant
in a particular state and city, given that state and city©s tax and incen
tive regime.
The present study uses the hypothetical firm method to measure the
value of competitive incentives to typical manufacturing firms. The
implementation of this method in what we call the Tax and Incentive
Model (TAIM) begins with the construction of financial statements for
firms representative of various industries and firm sizes. TAIM then
measures the net returns to each firm, after state, local, and federal
taxes, on a new plant investment. For the state-level analysis, the new
plant is located in one of 24 states, the 24 that account for the most
manufacturing employment in the United States (Map 2.1). (Together,
the 24 states accounted for about 86 percent of total manufacturing
employment in 1990.) In the city-level analysis, the plant is located in
one of 112 cities of 10,000 population or more (also shown in Map
2.1), randomly selected within these 24 states. The model then mea
sures the increase in return on investment that occurs as a result of the
state or local "standing offer": the set of tax incentives, infrastructure
incentives, job training programs, and general loan and grant programs
available to new businesses. The value of this incentive package to the
firm is subsequently compared to the unemployment rate or rate of job
growth in the state or city.
Thus, the value to the firm of a locality©s incentive package is the
amount the package adds to the profitability of a new investment in that
locality. The effect of the standing offer on a firm©s return on invest
ment depends on the characteristics of the firm. We constructed 16
hypothetical firms, having the characteristics of a typical large and a
typical small firm in each of 8 manufacturing industries. Sectoral dif
ferentiation is necessary because the responsiveness to taxes and incen
tives is not uniform across industries due to differences in the relative
importance of certain kinds of assets or differences in the ratios of jobs
to assets. In general, we chose sectors that are growing and that are, at
least potentially, geographically mobile. New plant construction was
assumed for each firm, with plant sizes based on employment and asset
data for typical large and small manufacturing establishments.

Map 2.1 Geographic Dispersion of States and Cities Included in the Analysis
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Balance sheets and income statements were developed for each firm
based on published data from annual reports, federal tax statistics, and
the Census of Manufactures. In each case, we specified a new manu
facturing facility (including total plant, equipment, and working capital
needed, employment, sales, etc.); the balance sheet and income state
ment for the new plant mirrored the attributes of the parent firm. (The
characteristics of the firms are shown in Table 3.1.)
For each of the 16 firms, two alternative location assumptions were
made: 1) that the firm initially has operations only in the state in ques
tion and expands at the same site; and 2) that the firm is initially a multistate corporation with facilities spread throughout the 24 states in our
sample and then builds a new plant in a particular state among the 24. 10
In all cases, the firm is assumed to sell in a national market, and its
sales are distributed among the states in proportion to population.
This analytical approach is a variation of the hypothetical firm
method, which has appeared infrequently in literature on the effect of
business incentives. The hypothetical firm method has been employed
primarily to study differences in state tax systems. 11 Because of its data
requirements and computational complexity, most hypothetical firm
work has been done by, or for, state governments. To our knowledge,
we are the first to use this approach to measure comprehensively the
effects of non-tax incentives, such as state grants, loans, and loan guar
antees. We have also made a number of significant refinements to the
best practice of the method; these are described in detail in Chapter 3.
The model begins by simulating the firm©s costs, revenues, and
changes in its balance sheet over a 20-year period, producing a stream
of annual cash flows. The simulations are performed twice: the first
with the firm operating in a "steady state" for 20 years with no new
investment and with constant sales and operating costs, and the second
with the firm constructing the new plant in one of the states or cities in
our study. The incremental cash flow attributable to the operations of
the new plant is the measure of project returns. We take the present
value of this incremental cash flow as our single summary measure of
the firm©s return on its new plant investment.
Differences in project returns across states and cities reflect differ
ences in the state and local tax structure and incentive package. Simu
lations were performed with and without the various categories of
incentives included in the analysis. The first run included only the
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basic tax structure: state (and local) corporate income and net worth
taxes, state (and local) sales taxes on machinery and equipment and on
fuel and electricity, and state (and local) property taxes on real and per
sonal business property. A second run added tax incentives: state cor
porate income tax credits for investment or job creation, and local
property tax abatements. Subsequent runs added non-tax incentives
such as loans, grants, and loan guarantees. The difference between
returns with tax incentives and returns with only basic taxes measures
the value to the firm of the tax incentives offered. The difference
between project returns with all incentives included and returns with
just tax incentives measures the after-tax value of the entire non-tax
incentive package.

EXTENSIONS TO THE HYPOTHETICAL FIRM METHOD TO
INCLUDE NON-TAX INCENTIVES
The modeling of non-tax incentives involves some important modi
fications. As indicated earlier, states have laws and administrative rules
that govern the way in which non-tax incentives are dispersed. In order
to be eligible for an incentive, a firm must meet certain criteria. More
over, the amount of non-tax incentives provided to a firm will depend
both on the sort of investment the firm intends to make and on negotia
tions between program officials and the firm. We call the historical out
come of these negotiations the program©s "administrative history."
Once TAIM has created the operating ratios and balance sheets for a
new investment (as described in the previous section), this information
must then be made available to a rule-based system (or "expert system"
or "knowledge base") that determines the non-tax incentives for which
the investment is eligible and calculates a likely amount for each incen
tive based on historical ratios for that type of offering. Each state and
local program has its own expert system that attempts to model both
the explicit administrative rules and the administrative history of each
program. An example of an explicit administrative rule would be "Pro
gram X will award no more than $2,000 in grants per job created or
retained." An example of a portion of administrative history would be
"In most instances, program Y imposes a rate on loans 2 percentage
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points below the private rate for that asset class." However, most states
and cities offer a menu of non-tax incentives. Thus states and cities
have rules (or at least precedent) about the ways in which incentive
packages may be assembled. As a result, for each state and city there
must be another expert system to control the assembly individual
incentives into incentive packages.
Once the incentive package has been established, the non-tax sec
tion of TAIM distributes incentives to appropriate asset categories
(land, plant, machinery, infrastructure, working capital). Finally, for
incentives in the form of loans, loan guarantees, and linked deposits,
future interest and principal payments must be generated in accordance
with program rules. The firm©s income and tax statements are then
recalculated by the hypothetical firm section of TAIM using new data
on public financing.

SELECTION OF THE STATE AND CITY SAMPLES
Using the 1990 Annual Survey of Manufactures (U.S. Bureau of the
Census 1992a), we identified the 24 states with the greatest manufac
turing employment. 12 The 24 states chosen accounted for 86 percent of
all manufacturing jobs in the United States. The study was limited to
these states; this reduced the task of state-level data collection by about
50 percent (compared with a study of all 50 states) while losing little in
generality, since we included the vast majority of states that can be
considered serious players in the game for more industrial employ
ment. A list of the states, with population and employment data, can be
found in Appendix A, Table A. 1.
We then used a geographic information systems (GIS) database
based on the 1990 Census to identify all cities and places in these 24
states with a population of over 10,000 and with some manufacturing
presence. We excluded locations that were not either incorporated
places with active government units or consolidated cities. This
resulted in a set of 1,960 cities. We stratified this set of cities by popu
lation size in order to avoid drawing mostly small cities into the sam
ple. We also established a threshold ratio of manufacturing
employment to population; cities below this threshold were excluded
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from the sample on the grounds that they represented purely residential
communities, which were not in the competition for manufacturing
jobs.
Four population classes were created: 10,000-24,999, 25,00099,999, 100,000-499,999, and 500,000 or more. We included in our
sample all 21 cities with a population of 500,000 or more. We listed the
cities within each of the other three size classes randomly; the sample
of cities in those classes was then drawn by proceeding down the list,
excluding any that fell below the manufacturing employment thresh
old, until we had a sufficient number of cities of that size. The number
of cities in each size class in our original sample and the number for
which complete data were obtained are shown in Table 2.1. The final
city sample (with state and city characteristics) is listed in Appendix
Table A.2.
Data on state taxes and tax incentives were obtained largely from the
Commerce Clearing House Multistate Corporate Income Tax Guide
and from copies of corporate income tax forms and instructions for
each state. State non-tax programs were initially identified from pub
lished sources, including the Directory of Incentives, published by the
National Association of State Development Agencies (1991), and 1992
incentive checklists published in Site Selection and Area Development,
and brochures published by state departments of economic develop
ment. 13 Appropriate state agencies were then contacted by letter and by
phone, with numerous follow-up calls, mailed survey forms, and let
ters, to verify the existence of the incentive programs during 1992 and
Table 2.1 Sample of Cities
Number of cities
Size class

Population

Sampled

Data
complete

Percentage
complete

1

500,000 or more

21

12

57

2

100,000 to 499,999

87

41

47

3

25,000 to 99,999

98

38

39

4

10,000 to 24,999

57

21

37

263

112

43

Totals
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to secure details on program eligibility, operation, and performance.
Local property tax rates and property tax abatement schedules and
information on the details of local non-tax incentive programs were
obtained from community chambers of commerce, development agen
cies, and city and county officials, with a similar combination of tele
phone and mail surveys and follow-up inquiries. State sources were
sometimes helpful in providing the details on enterprise zone incen
tives and local property tax rates throughout the state.
NOTES
1. This is similar to Kieschnick©s (1981) distinction between automatic and discretionary
incentives.
2. Haug©s (1984) work on incentives in the Scottish electronics industry seems to agree with
this. We know of no direct comparison of automatic and discretionary economic development
incentives in the United States.
3. Since some states integrate a net worth tax with the income tax, we also consider all state
taxes based on assets, net worth, stockholders© equity, or similar measures, and any investment or
jobs credits associated with such taxes.
4. If one is modeling a firm over a long period of time, obviously it makes no sense for the
firm to continue in business losing money every year. To incorporate losses in some years but
profits in others would be possible, but it is difficult to do so in a nonarbitrary fashion, it would
complicate the calculations enormously, and the number of possible scenarios would multiply.
5. Other features of the sales tax are not included in the model, such as the taxation of con
struction materials or of repair parts or services. Data on expenditures for such items by industry
are not available, to our knowledge. Almost all states exempt purchases of raw materials or inter
mediate goods actually incorporated into the final product, so the absence of sales taxation of
these items is not a competitive issue.
6. The choice was also subject to certain program size constraints. For state incentives, grant
programs had to have awarded $100,000 in funds during fiscal year 1992, loan and loan guarantee
programs had to have awarded at least $500,000. For city incentives, programs had to have
awarded at least $100,000, and program rules should have allowed individual awards of $50,000
or more. The size constraints were used to exclude small, seldom-used programs and programs
aimed only at microbusinesses.
7. Previously, Illinois did have such an incentive as part of the broader package of funds
available through the Build Illinois program.
8. As far as we are aware, there has been no academic work done on this issue.
9. The existence of federally imposed state-by-state caps on the annual volume of private
activity bonds, of which IRBs are one variety, may limit this universality to a degree, but this
would be difficult to assess by state.
10. We do not specify particular locations in these states but represent them by assuming that
the firm is initially situated entirely in a mythical "median state," which has a state and local tax
system representing the median of our 24 states.
11. See, for example, Papke and Papke (1986), L. Papke (1987, 1991), Hunt (1985), Hunt and
O©Leary (1989), and Laughlin (1993). Earlier work is discussed in Kieschnick (1981). A complete
discussion of this literature is provided in Chapter 3.
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12. There is one minor exception: we substituted the 25th state (Iowa) for the 24th state (Mis
sissippi) due to the ease of data collection in the former and severe difficulties in obtaining data in
the early stages of the project for the latter. Iowa accounted for 1.22 percent of the jobs, Missis
sippi 1.24 percent.
13. Bradshaw, Nishikawa, and Blakely (1992) was useful for some states.

3 The Hypothetical Firm
Method Extended
The Tax and Incentive Model (TAIM) described briefly in Chapter 2
is an extension of what has been called the hypothetical firm (or repre
sentative firm) method, previously used primarily in studies comparing
tax burdens across states or cities. We developed a model of the state
and local tax systems in the 24 states and 112 cities in our study and
extended the model to incorporate tax incentives and a range of non
tax incentive programs as well. This chapter describes our implementa
tion of the hypothetical firm method in detail. We critique alternative
methods of measuring incentive competition, describe criticisms of the
hypothetical firm method, explain how we dealt with the problems
identified, and spell out the assumptions and procedures built into the
model. We also specify how non-tax incentive programs such as job
training subsidies and loan guarantees are incorporated into the model.
This chapter is intended for those interested in the technical method
ological issues; those who are primarily interested in the results of the
study can safely skip to Chapter 4.
The majority of previous studies of interstate differences in business
taxation have relied upon aggregate summary measures, such as state
wide taxes on business per capita, per $1,000 of personal income, or
per $100 of estimated business profits. A handful of studies have used
the hypothetical firm approach, in which financial statements for an
average manufacturing corporation are constructed and the firm©s tax
burdens in a number of different states are then calculated. Most stud
ies of either kind have not included tax incentives. Discretionary pro
grams such as capital grants, low-interest loans, loan guarantees, or
subsidized job training have generally been measured simply by
counting the programs.
There are serious problems with the summary measures of tax bur
den and with the counting of programs or measurement of total pro
gram expenditure. The best yardstick for measuring tax effects, as well
as the whole range of financial incentives, is the hypothetical firm
approach. While this approach is not without problems, most of these
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can be resolved or minimized. To understand the advantages of the
hypothetical firm method, it is useful to review the major alternatives.
We will then describe the implementation of the hypothetical firm
method in the present study and the refinements we have made to the
method.

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
Aggregate Tax Measures
Researchers attempting to assess the effects of state and local taxes
on business investment have generally relied upon some aggregate
measure of state tax levels, such as the total state (or state and local)
taxes per capita or per $1,000 of personal income or the effective busi
ness tax rates, defined as total state business tax collections divided by
business income or business assets (see Bartik 1991b, for a compre
hensive review of such studies). Many have confined the measure to
taxes with an initial impact on business, on the grounds that personal
taxes have a more tenuous relationship to location decisions. Business
taxes would generally include the corporate income tax, local property
taxes on commercial and industrial real estate and personal property
(inventories and machinery and equipment), and perhaps sales taxes on
inputs purchased by businesses (primarily machinery and equipment,
and fuel and electricity); workers© compensation taxes and unemploy
ment insurance taxes have rarely been included.
There are serious problems with such measures. First, the level of
aggregation is excessive; if the research question focuses on invest
ment decisions by firms in certain sectors (usually manufacturing), one
needs to assess at the very least the average state tax burden on those
kinds of firms. Aggregate measures reflect state differences in the taxa
tion of all business sectors including such diverse enterprises as
insurance companies, banks, restaurants, electric utilities, hospitals,
construction companies, janitorial services, and railroads and will
not indicate even the average actual burden for any particular industry.
State statistics on corporate income tax and sales tax receipts are rarely
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broken out by industrial sector, and property tax collections can be sep
arated at best into industrial and commercial categories.
Second, aggregate measures show average, not marginal, tax bur
dens. The industrial location decision, if it is affected by taxes at all, is
affected by the change in a firm©s tax burden as a result of a change in
investment i.e., the effective marginal tax rate on new investment.
Few location decisions entail the uprooting of an entire corporation
from one place to another. Marginal tax rates can be significantly
altered by such factors as accelerated depreciation, investment tax
credits, and temporary property tax abatements. States and localities
concerned with the incentive effects of taxes have probably focused
their attention more on measures to reduce the marginal rates on new
investment rather than on reductions in the overall average rate of tax.
L. Papke (1987) compared taxes in 20 states using two alternative mea
sures: Wheaton©s (1983) average effective tax rate for manufacturing in
general, and the marginal tax rate on new investment for particular
manufacturing industries. The Spearman rank-order correlation
between the two indices was only 0.29.
Program Counting

Studies attempting to explain the pattern of incentive adoption
why some places offer more than others have generally relied on pro
gram counting. A variety of problems render this measure almost
meaningless. In a survey of state and local economic development offi
cials in 24 states, the authors have found 1) programs on the books, and
in the incentive directories, that were never funded; 2) states that con
solidated several programs into one program without changing the
actual incentives available, and vice versa; 3) states with several pro
grams providing essentially the same thing, such as loans, but in
slightly different circumstances; 4) similar sounding programs of very
dissimilar magnitude because of differences in program constraints or
ceilings; 5) multiple programs in one state providing less of value to a
business, taken altogether, than a single large program in another state;
and 6) multiple programs that were independent and additive in one
state, but mutually exclusive in another. While program counting may
be appropriate when researching how programs of a particular type are
adopted (innovation diffusion studies, for example), the number of
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incentive programs offered is clearly useless as a proxy for the actual
value of the incentive package to a potential new business.

Program or Tax Expenditures
One is tempted to use total state expenditures on economic develop
ment programs or tax incentives as a comprehensive measure of the
state©s generosity. Such expenditures would best be expressed as a
rate probably expenditures per $1,000 of new business investment
in order to make comparisons among states of widely varying size and
level of business activity. The denominator should be the total volume
of investment potentially eligible for those incentives included in the
numerator. However, the aggregation problem here is just as severe as
with the summary measures of business tax burden, particularly when
the numerator includes a variety of programs with differing eligibility
criteria. The rate calculated may bear little relation to the actual incen
tive value to firms in any particular industry.
Another problem with this approach is that expenditure data are dif
ficult to assemble in a consistent fashion. It is very hard to determine,
from state budgets, the actual outlay on any particular incentive pro
gram, exclusive of administrative costs. Data on tax incentives are
available only for those states that regularly conduct tax expenditure
studies. 1 The expenditure approach also precludes consideration of the
state©s overall tax system or of the incentive value net of taxes.

THE HYPOTHETICAL FIRM METHOD
The hypothetical firm method can be designed to avoid all of the
preceding problems: it can be highly disaggregated, it can model mar
ginal rather than average effects, it measures the actual value of incen
tives or taxes to the firm (instead of simply the existence of a program),
and it does not rely on the availability of state tax expenditure studies
or detailed program budgets. It can be used to measure overall tax bur
dens, the value of particular tax incentives, and, with some modifica
tion, the effects of any economic development programs that provide
direct financial benefits to the firm.
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The method works as follows. A model of a hypothetical firm is
constructed. The core of the model is an income statement and a bal
ance sheet representative of an average firm in an industry. The finan
cial statements are based on published data such as the Census of
Manufactures or Internal Revenue Service (IRS) corporate income tax
return summaries. The tax liabilities of the firm, to the federal govern
ment and to any states in which it is taxable, are calculated as a "sub
routine" to the financial statements by applying the appropriate tax
laws to the firm, given its individual asset composition and profit level.
One can then observe how a particular tax regime changes the firm©s
net income or cash flow.
In a comparative tax burden study, that might be the end of the story.
For purposes of analyzing economic development incentives, however,
the next step would be to model the opening of a new plant in state X;
appropriate changes would be made to the firm©s asset and liability
accounts and to its income statement. One could then simulate all of
the tax incentives and economic development programs offered by
state X for which the firm would qualify. For example, below-market
interest rates on public loans used to finance the new plant would
reduce annual interest expense, while subsidized job training would
reduce first-year labor costs. The interaction between incentives and
the state and federal income taxes is automatically taken into account.
The hypothetical firm model thus becomes the yardstick for compari
sons among states (or localities); it measures the after-tax value to the
firm of all the economic development programs and taxes that one
chooses to include in the model, taken in combination.
This approach is not new. It has been used primarily to study differ
ences in state tax systems; in most cases, the studies were commis
sioned by a particular state. Among the earliest of such studies were
those conducted by Williams (1967), the Wisconsin Department of
Revenue (1973), and Price, Waterhouse & Co. for the State of Missouri
in 1978. More recently, state tax comparisons have been undertaken by
Papke and Papke (1984) 2 for Indiana, Hunt (1985) for Michigan,
Brooks et al. (1986) for Massachusetts, Laughlin (1993) for Indiana,
Brooks (1993) for Massachusetts, and KPMG Peat Marwick for New
York (1994). The Wisconsin study has been updated several times,
most recently in 1990 and 1995. A few econometric studies of the
influence of taxes on business investment have used the hypothetical
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firm approach to measure tax burdens: Steinnes (1984), L. Papke
(1987, 1991), and Tannenwald and Kendrick (1995). We believe our
model to be the first to include comprehensive simulation of non-tax
incentives.
The use of hypothetical corporations to measure the relative size of
tax and non-tax incentives is not without problems. Kieschnick (1981,
pp. 38-41) has identified a number of these issues, three of which are
of particular theoretical importance: 1) the burden of taxes is assumed
to rest entirely with the corporation, while theories of tax incidence tell
us that significant shifting may occur; 2) the focus on tax effects
ignores the expenditure or benefit side of state and local government;
and 3) the use of hypothetical firms assumes that the firm operates in
all locations using the same relative proportions of factors such as
labor and machinery, but a firm may, for example, use a more laborintensive technology in a low-wage state. With regard to issue 3, it is
conceivable that a firm will not only change its location as a result of
tax and other incentives, but will also change its asset composition,
using relatively less of the factors that are more heavily taxed in a par
ticular place.
These criticisms apply with equal force to alternative methods, but it
is worthwhile to consider whether they in fact indicate serious prob
lems. Insofar as the issue of tax incidence is concerned, the entities
modeled are usually intended to represent multilocational firms selling
in national or international markets under reasonably competitive con
ditions (the hypothetical firm method is difficult to adapt to modeling
new entrepreneurial firms, although Brooks et al. [1986] attempted to
do so). As such, multilocation firms will have very limited ability to
pass tax burdens forward to consumers (which would render taxes
irrelevant to the location decision). With regard to the argument that
they may pass taxes back onto immobile factors, land and labor, the
response is, indeed, they may. That, in fact, is precisely the point of
studies of relative tax burden. The ability to pass taxes backward does
not imply that the firm bears no burden, so that taxes are irrelevant to
the location decision, but quite the opposite: it is by inducing firms to
change location that the taxes are passed back to local immobile fac
tors. If taxes in high-tax states are borne by labor, it is because firms
avoid locating there, creating surplus labor and driving down wages.
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As for the expenditure issue, the purpose of the hypothetical firm
method is limited: it is to model the effects of taxes and of incentive
programs that raise or lower the costs of doing business. There is noth
ing in the method itself that prevents incorporating estimates of the
effects of state expenditure (for example, on highways) on firm costs. It
is simply that such estimates are extremely difficult to make and there
fore are usually omitted from the analysis; as a result, one must use the
model©s outcomes in full knowledge of what they portray and what
they do not. In an econometric model of business investment or loca
tion, the tax estimates from a hypothetical firm approach could be used
as the tax variable in the equation; other variables could be included as
proxies for service levels, as in fact some studies have done (for exam
ple, L. Papke 1987, 1991; Tannenwald and Kendrick 1995).
The factor proportions problem appears to be the most serious one.
All tax or incentive studies that we are aware of have assumed constant
proportions across localities that is, proportions that do not vary even
though some locations may substantially reduce the cost of capital,
while others reduce primarily the cost of labor. The changing of factor
proportions in response to variations in factor prices or incentives
would require current, industry-specific empirical estimates of factor
price elasticities and presents formidable problems for modeling.
It is not possible to say whether the constant proportions assumption
produces results that overstate or understate tax differences. For exam
ple, suppose states A and B impose identical property taxes on capital
(plant and equipment). State A is a low-wage state, while state B is a
high-wage state, so that the firm choosing to locate in state B would
employ a higher proportion of capital (and lower proportion of the
high-cost labor) than if it located in state A and therefore would pay
higher property taxes in B. By forcing constant proportions of capital
and labor, the model fails to capture this tax difference. On the other
hand, suppose factor costs were identical in the two states, but that
state B imposes a much higher property tax rate. The firm choosing B
could reduce this tax burden by substituting labor for capital. In this
case, the use of constant proportions results in overstating the differ
ence in tax burdens between A and B.
However, factor price differences appear to be most important to
location decisions only at the first spatial decision stage: the choice of a
broad region or of a state in which to locate (McMillan 1965; Kie-

62

The Hypothetical Firm Method Extended

schnick 1981; Schmenner 1982; Wardrep 1985). Taxes and incentives
are generally thought to be influential at the next level in the location
decision process, i.e., the choice of a particular site within the region.
Factor prices will probably vary less within a region or labor market
than across regions.
As for the second part of the problem, is there reason to believe that
tax-induced changes in factor proportions are significant in magnitude?
This is a problem for interpretation of the results of hypothetical firm
studies only if 1) there is significant variation among the states in the
size of capital and labor incentives, and 2) the firm©s behavioral
response to this differential would be so substantial that the actual
value of the incentive package would be significantly affected. Among
the 24 states in this study, incentives are for the most part directed at
capital rather than labor. Only 3 of the 24 offer a jobs tax credit that is
generally available (as opposed to a credit only for firms located in
enterprise zones or the like). In these three states (Missouri, Iowa, and
South Carolina), the jobs credit reduces total wage costs over the first
10 years of a new investment by less than 1 percent. This is hardly
enough to induce a noticeable shift towards more labor-intensive pro
duction techniques.
Four states offer a statewide investment tax credit, ranging from 0.5
percent to 1.0 percent of the investment in plant and equipment; again,
this is hardly enough to induce firms to alter factor proportions. New
York has a very substantial combined tax credit related both to invest
ment and jobs created; for a large firm, the credit (which extends over
several years) could be worth about 8 percent of the firm©s investment.
However, the incentive is tied to both capital and labor, so the effect on
factor proportions is probably nil. A state loan program that reduced
the interest rate on machinery and equipment loans by 1 percentage
point would, over a 20-year period, produce savings (in present value
terms) equal to at most about 1 percent of the investment in property,
plant, and equipment. Our investigation of incentives in these states,
then, leads us to conclude that the factor proportions effects of tax and
other incentives are probably small or even non-existent.
A similar problem of modeling behavioral responses arises with
respect to the firm©s assumed method of financing new investment.
Taxes can affect the firm©s optimal capital structure, the proportions of
debt and equity. Development incentives in the form of below-market-
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rate loans or loan guarantees lower the relative price of debt financing
and may lead the firm to employ more debt and less equity. Grants rep
resent free equity and may be used to reduce borrowing rather than
simply to substitute for other forms of equity (issuing additional
shares). Nonetheless, all of the studies assume constant proportions of
debt and equity financing across states (although this may be allowed
to vary across industries).
The additional problems identified by Kieschnick (1981) and others
are not inherent in the hypothetical firm method but are simply limita
tions of some of the studies employing that approach. In the next sev
eral sections of this chapter, we address these and further problems, in
the context of the crucial decisions and assumptions that we made in
developing a satisfactory hypothetical firm model to measure tax and
incentive differences.

WHICH INDUSTRIES AND FIRM SIZES?

There is substantial variation across industries on a number of
dimensions that can significantly affect the firm©s tax liability and the
value of incentives. Industries also differ in the importance of the role
they play in the interstate competition for jobs. For these reasons, it is
not very satisfactory to construct only one or two firms to represent the
entire manufacturing sector, as in some of the early studies (e.g., Price,
Waterhouse & Co., 1978). The questions are how many industries, at
what level of disaggregation, and which particular ones?
We constructed financial statements typical of firms in selected
industries with the commercial Compustat database, which is widely
used in business research. It is a micro database (each observation
being a single firm) of corporations, with detailed annual financial
data. Our selection process began with an examination of the employ
ment growth between 1980 and 1990 of each of the 125 three-digit
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) manufacturing industries.
From the fastest-growing 32 such industries (those which added at
least 9,000 jobs), we eliminated a few (guided missiles, aircraft, meat
products, plywood) on the grounds that their plant location choices
were too constrained. The Compustat database did not contain a large
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enough sample of firms from each of the remaining industries to pro
duce reliable averages for financial ratios in every case; as a result,
some three-digit industries among this group of 32 were combined,
and others had to be omitted. Industries were also eliminated if the
average firm in that industry in the Compustat database had negative
earnings in 1992. Since we simulated firms in a "steady state" over a
20-year period, we needed an average positive rate of return for that
industry. It would not make sense to simulate a firm remaining in oper
ation for 20 years while losing money every year. In the end, we settled
on 8 industries (encompassing 12 of the high-growth three-digit indus
tries), which exhibit a high degree of variability on most of the preced
ing dimensions.
The three-digit SIC code level, which contains 125 manufacturing
industries, is probably the most appropriate level of aggregation. Use
of two-digit industries would yield greater coverage or
representativeness3 but would conceal substantial variability within the
industry. Four-digit industries are more homogeneous, but there are
many hundreds of such classifications, making summarization of
results very difficult. The three-digit level represents a compromise.
The three recent state studies that examine average tax burdens for a
single-location firm for a single year use two-digit industries (Hunt
1985; Wisconsin Department of Revenue 1990; Laughlin 1993). The
recent studies applying the more sophisticated approach marginal tax
rates for multilocation firms over a period of years use firms defined
at the two- or three-digit level (the various Papke studies and Brooks
1993). All of the studies reviewed focus exclusively on manufacturing
with the exception of Hunt (1985), in which one business services firm
is included, and KPMG Peat Marwick (1994), which includes three
nonmanufacturing sectors: communications, depository institutions,
and security and commodity brokers.
In narrowing the selection to a manageable number of firms, we
tried to create a set of industries that exhibits substantial variation in
the characteristics that affect tax liability and eligibility for incentives.
The most important of these characteristics are 1) asset composition,
since states vary in terms of the types of assets included in the sales
and property tax bases and since incentive programs are targeted at cer
tain classes of assets; 2) capital intensity, which affects the relative
importance of investment and employment incentives; 3) the ratio of
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sales to total assets, which affects the relative importance of income
and property taxes; 4) the average wage, which can alter the value of
employment incentives; 5) the importance of energy costs, which may
or may not be subject to sales tax; 6) the average employment or asset
size of a firm or establishment, which may be a factor is program eligi
bility; and 7) profitability, which affects the relative importance of
income and property taxes.
The variability on these dimensions for the firms in our study is
shown in Table 3.1. The 16 firms represent 8 industries, with a small
and a large firm in each industry. The financial characteristics are based
on aggregations of firm-level data in the commercial Compustat data
base for 1992. As Hunt (1985, p. 20) has pointed out, "the industry
identification of these firms should not be over-emphasized." Looking
at Table 3.1, one could think of study results for firm number 14 as a
measure of the tax and incentive differences relevant to the location of
a typical auto plant. It is probably preferable, however, to think of the
results as applying to the typical large, capital-intensive, low-profit
firm, regardless of industry, for it is those kinds of features, by and
large, that will account for the differences in taxes and incentives.
Variation in firm size is at least as important as variation in industry.
This is because tax codes and incentive programs are rife with discon
tinuous functions, such as eligibility criteria requiring a minimum
amount of new investment, a minimum number of new jobs, or a mini
mum percentage increase in employment or assets; annual ceilings on
tax credits; and requirements that taxes be calculated two ways with
the firm paying whichever is larger, or whichever is smaller. One rea
son for simulating many firms of widely varying characteristics and
sizes is to be able to illustrate the effects of these various thresholds
and ceilings. If the firms are chosen at the two-digit level, and with
only one average firm size, it is likely that these effects will be con
cealed. The average firm may always or never qualify for a particular
incentive, for example, so to use that firm to represent all potential
firms results in overstating or understating the importance of that
incentive. There are also ceilings on the dollar amount of certain incen
tives, with the result that the relative value to large firms is much
smaller than to small firms.
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Table 3.1 Characteristics of the 16 Hypothetical Firms, by Industry, SIC
Code, and Size
Furniture &
fixtures
SIC 25
Characteristic

Drugs
SIC 283

Soap, cleaners,
toiletries
SIC 284

Small
#1

Large
#2

Small
#3

Large
#4

Small
#5

Large
#6

Firm total assets ($ millions)

10

500

500

4,000

500

4,000

New plant assets ($ millions)

5

40

50

470

20

110

New plant employees

67

625

362

2,056

148

960

PP&E (net): % of total assets

24

27

26

35

26

29

M&E(gr):%ofPP&E(gr)

67

69

50

61

70

65

PP&E per employee ($)

13,127

16,385

39,330

75,733

35,892

35,913

Average annual wage ($)

20,376

20,376

39,096

30,096

30,512

30,512

1.7

1.8

1.7

3.0

1.7

1.5

Energy expense: % of COGS
LT debt/(equity + LT debt), %

36

33

19

14

30

30

Operating margin (EBIT/sales), %

3.8

8.4

17.5

23.4

9.5

9.1

Sales/assets

2.11

1.74

1.09

1.03

1.88

1.95

Earning power (EBIT/assets), %

8.0

14.6

19.1

24.2

17.9

17.8

Overall return on equity, %

17.5

14.1

16.2

28.7

16.7

17.3

SOURCES: All data except wages and energy costs are based on averages for firms in that SIC
group and asset size class from the Compustat database for 1992. Wages and energy costs are
from the 1987 Census of Manufactures (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1990), which shows average
wage by SIC code but not by firm asset size within SIC grouping.
DEFINITIONS:
PP&E (net) = property, plant and equipment, net of depreciation.
M&E (gr) = machinery and equipment, gross (at acquisition cost).
PP&E (gr) = property, plant and equipment, gross (at acquisition cost).
LT debt = long-term debt.
COGS = cost of goods sold.
Operating margin = net operating income (earnings before interest and taxes [EBIT]) divided
by net sales.
Sales/assets = net sales divided by assets (current assets plus net property, plant, and equiment).
Earning power = product of above two ratios, or earnings before interest and taxes divided by
assets. This is the best measure of the return to be expected on new plant investment,
because it excludes extraordinary items and income from investments, both of which are
included in the firm©s return on equity.
Return on equity = net income divided by stockholders© equity.
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Table 3.1 (continued)
Miscellaneous
plastic products
SIC 308

Industrial
machinery
SIC 35 less 357

Small
#7

Large
#8

Small
#9

Large
#10

Small
#11

Large
#12

Small
#13

Large
#14

Small
#15

Large
#16

10

300

300

4,000

200

2,000

1,000

20,000

35

1,000

5

70

10

250

20

200

120

600

10

180

53

572

84

2,007

223

1,652

1,386

4,589

103

1,438

35

36

26

25

27

35

31

30

14

25

Electronic
components
SIC 367

Motor vehicles
and parts
SIC 371

Instruments
SIC 382+384

72

73

74

74

74

72

75

75

65

66

24,739

41,755

26,805

30,795

19,687

34,440

26,489

41,781

12,388

31,000

20,204

23,204

29,761

29,761

29,798

29,798

36,569

36,569

32,069

32,069

3.7

3.8

1.9

1.7

2.3

2.4

1.0

0.9

1.7

1.6

26

46

27

31

17

20

34

41

22

27

6.1

9.2

7.6

6.8

10.1

10.9

6.2

4.1

10.0

12.6

1.75

1.60

1.39

1.50

1.32

1.14

1.81

1.80

1.44

1.24

10.7

14.8

10.6

10.3

13.2

12.3

11.1

7.4

14.4

15.6

11.3

16.3

9.0

8.8

13.6

12.3

11.8

8.0

14.7

14.8

Firm (and plant) size is sufficiently important that it should be an
additional dimension, or the hypothetical firms should vary substan
tially in size across industries. This is not always done, however. Papke
and Papke (1984) modeled three asset sizes for each industry $25$49 million, $50-$99 million, and $100-$249 million and assumed
the same percentage of expansion for all firms. Brooks (1993) assumed
that all firms had $100 million in assets and expanded by 10 percent. In
the Wisconsin and Indiana studies, the six firms varied in size but were
all small, with assets ranging from $9 million to $18 million. Hunt
(1985) used eight firms ranging in asset size from $1 million to $759
million, in the only study that varied size substantially and that used
sizes appropriate to the industry.
These assumptions can be compared to the asset sizes for the 16
firms in Table 3.1. The total asset size of the large firm in each industry
is approximately the 75th percentile in the distribution of firms by total
assets in that industry. The small firm represents approximately the
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25th percentile; that is, 25 percent of the firms in that industry have
lower total assets. These distributions come from the Internal Revenue
Service Corporation Source Book 1990. The substantial industry varia
tion in firm size is apparent; a firm that is large for the plastics industry,
for example, would be quite small in the automobile sector. The total
asset sizes represented at the 75th percentile are also much larger, in
many cases, than the sizes assumed in previous studies; in six of the
eight industries, the typical large firm has in excess of $1 billion in
assets. Of the 16 firms, 12 have assets greater than the largest asset
class assumed by Papke and Papke (1984) and greater than the $100
million assumed by Brooks (1993).
Previous studies that modeled an expansion decision, rather than the
average tax burden on a static, single-location firm, had to assume an
asset size for the new establishment as well (the six Papke studies and
Brooks 1993). All assumed that the new establishment assets were a
certain percentage of the firm©s total assets before expansion, a per
centage that did not vary by industry. This turns out to be an important
assumption, in part because the size of a new plant relative to the total
firm can affect the value of certain tax incentives. This is because cor
porate tax credits are usually not refundable and so cannot exceed tax
liability. In some states, the ceiling is the firm©s total corporate income
tax liability in that state, while in other states the ceiling is the income
tax liability attributed to the new plant only.
Plant or establishment sizes typical of an industry can be con
structed in a fashion similar to the firm size distributions, using estab
lishment data from the 1987 Census of Manufactures. These data show
distributions of establishments by employment size. For each of the
eight industries, we estimated the establishment employment size at
the 25th and 75th percentiles. Using industry average ratios of assets to
employment, we then inferred establishment total asset size. We
assumed that large firms build large plants, and small firms build small
plants. This seems to be a reasonably harmless assumption, but one we
cannot confirm empirically. Again, substantial industry variability is
exhibited, both in terms of typical small or large plant sizes (varying
from $5 million to $600 million) and in the ratio of plant size to firm
size (which varies from about 3 percent to 50 percent). We assumed, as
has been done with all previous "marginal investment" studies, that the
operating characteristics of the parent firm are mirrored in the new
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plant: the same ratio of sales to assets, the same asset composition,
average wage, and assets per employee.
The critical importance of industry, firm size, and plant size assump
tions is illustrated in Table 3.2. The 24 states in our study were ranked
according to net returns on investment in a new plant in that state by an
out-of-state firm, after state and local taxes and tax incentives. (Local
taxes were computed for a representative city in each state; a more
complete discussion of these results is deferred to chapter 4.) We show
the rankings for eight of these states and for five of the hypothetical
firms. States A and D were consistently near the top of the rankings
regardless of firm, while states B and C were consistently near the bot
tom of the rankings. (This was true for all 16 firms, not just for the five
illustrated in Table 3.2.) On the other hand, states W, X, Y, and Z
changed rank drastically depending on the firm, from near the top to
near the bottom of the 24 states.
Table 3.2 How Firm Characteristics Affect Rankings of Investment
Returns for Selected Multistate Firms
Firm #2:
Furniture
State
States with least
variation
A
B
C
D
States with most
variation
W
X
Y
Z

($40)a

5
23
21
1

#4:
Drugs
($470)

4
23

19
1

#7:
Plastics
($5)

3
23
20
2

#14:
Autos
($600)

3
21
20
1

#16:
Instruments
($180)

3
24
20
2

17
7
3
9
5
17
22
14
13
5
24
22
12
6
9
2
21
12
11
8
NOTE: See Chapter 4 for an explanation of the representative city modeling. Rank is based on the
firm©s return on investment in a new plant in a representative city in each state after state, local,
and federal income, sales, and property taxes and after state and local tax incentives, including
enterprise zone incentives. Highest return among the 24 states is ranked 1. In this and subsequent
tables, "Furniture" is short for "furniture and fixtures," "Soaps" for "soaps, cleaners, and toilet
ries," "Plastics" for "miscellaneous plastic products," and "Autos" for "motor vehicles and parts."
a. Plant size in millions.

70

The Hypothetical Firm Method Extended

The hypothetical firm method leads to a set of interstate compari
sons: for each hypothetical firm, one can rank the states according to
the after-tax return on investment in a new plant of the assumed size in
that firm©s industry. Is it possible then to construct a single summary
measure, to compute ah overall average tax rate or incentive package
value for a state or an average ranking over all firms? Probably not. If a
limited number of firms have been selected, then they are unlikely to
be representative of all manufacturing firms (or all footloose ones), and
certainly not in equal proportions. There is no way around this prob
lem, short of conducting a massive number of simulations based on a
stratified sample of the actual universe of corporations (itself impossi
ble due to the absence of a comprehensive micro database) and weight
ing each firm.4

FIRM, PLANT, AND HEADQUARTERS LOCATION

Some studies using the hypothetical firm approach to compare state
business tax burdens treat each firm as if it consisted of a single plant,
or at least a single location. This may make sense for comparative tax
studies, but it is not appropriate for the measurement of development
incentives, which are provided for new investment. An entity with the
financial characteristics and asset size of the average mature firm in the
industry cannot be treated as if it were a brand new establishment. The
sensible approach is to assume an ongoing profitable business that
invests in a new branch plant.
The question immediately arises, does it matter where the parent
firm and the new plant are located? Suppose one is examining 24 sites,
one in each of our 24 states. If one assumes that the parent firm, before
building the new plant, has facilities at only one location but allows the
new plant to be at another, then there are 24 times 24 or 576 possible
combinations of firm and plant location: the parent firm in each of the
24 states, paired with each of the 24 possible locations for the new
plant. In reality, of course, things are much more complicated than this,
with existing firms already having facilities in many states rather than
in just one.
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All of this matters, of course, because tax burdens can differ dramat
ically depending on where a firm©s sales, property, and payroll are
located; these factors determine what proportion of income is taxed in
each state. States vary significantly in how they apportion and tax
income of multistate firms. How does one render the simulation pro
cess manageable while doing justice to the importance of location of
multiplant firms? The problem becomes quite intractable if one
includes multiple localities within each state so as to capture actual
local tax and incentive policies.
Our solution was to simplify the computations and the interpretation
of results by modeling an additional hypothetical state intended to rep
resent all of the other locations for the initial parent firm. This mythical
state was given a tax system with rates, tax base, and other features
representing the median among the 24 actual states in the study. The
median sales tax rate among these states is 5 percent (21 of the 24
states have rates between 4 percent and 6 percent), and the median
sales tax base would fully exempt manufacturing machinery and equip
ment (19 of 24 states) and fuel and utilities used directly in manufac
turing (15 of the 24 states). The median corporate income tax would
follow federal depreciation rules, allow no deductions for federal or
state income taxes, apportion income on the basis of a three-factor for
mula with double-weighted sales, would not require the throwback of
sales to states in which the firm has no tax nexus, and would apply a
flat rate of 7 percent (only 3 of the 24 have a progressive rate structure)
with no credits. We did not need to model investment incentives in the
median state (such as jobs credits or property tax abatement) because
the new plant would always be located in one of the 24 actual states or
112 actual cities. For the city level analysis, we assumed a "median
city" location for the parent firm in the median state, with a property
tax rate of 2.4 percent and a local sales tax of 1 percent.
By constructing the mythical median state, we can produce a single
ranking of the 24 states for each hypothetical firm. In each instance, the
parent firm is located and taxed in the median state, while the new
plant is located in each of the 24 actual states in turn, generating tax
liabilities in that state as well. The firm©s return on the new plant
becomes the measure of competitiveness for new investment by out-ofstate firms. (For comparisons of the return on investment in an expan-
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sion within the home state by a firm that is currently located solely in
that home state, the median state is not necessary.)
Is the median-state simplification valid? The median-state approach
provides one ranking of the 24 states for each firm. Generating the 576
pairwise comparisons, on the other hand, would yield 24 rankings, one
for each initial firm location, which could then be averaged for some
overall assessment of competitiveness. Whether the median-state rank
ing would diverge significantly from the average of the 24 separate
rankings is difficult to say. However, if most firms in fact already have
facilities in many states, the median-state method may be a satisfactory
approximation. Simple pairwise comparisons will illuminate and
emphasize state differences that may not be particularly relevant, if
those differences tend to be swamped by the average policy in other
states.
The importance of looking at differences in headquarters assump
tions is illustrated in Table 3.3. The 112 cities in our study were ranked
by returns on new investment in each city after federal, state, and local
taxes, and after economic development incentives, under two sets of
assumptions: 1) the investing firm is initially located out of state
(entirely in the mythical median state) or 2) the firm is initially located
entirely.within the state in question and remains a single-location firm.
For places with certain kinds of tax systems, the location assumption is
clearly critical, while for others it makes little difference.5 Some loca
tions clearly favor multistate firms, others clearly favor domestic sin
gle-location firms, and still others sometimes favor one, sometimes the
other. Certain cities maintain a similar ranking regardless of location
assumption, but the general rule is for rankings to differ substantially.

HOW ARE THE FIRM©S SALES DISTRIBUTED
AMONG STATES?
Assumptions regarding the destination of the hypothetical firm©s
sales are critical because of the way in which states apportion business
income for purposes of taxation. Most states use a three-factor appor
tionment formula, where the three factors are payroll, property, and
sales. The payroll factor, for example, is the ratio of the firm©s payroll

Table 3.3 Selected Cities Ranked by Returns on Investment for Multistate and Single-Location Firms

City

#2: Furniture
SingleMultilocation
state

#4: Drugs
SingleMultilocation
state

#7: Plastics
SingleMultilocation
state

#13: Autos
SingleMultilocation
state

Cities ranked higher
for single-location firms
83

3

95

2

73

2

29

80

20

99

24

101

21

98

34

51

24

96

23

100

26

D

2

65

4

52

10

37

12

64

E

8

21

5

8

21

36

25

25

F

14

35

2

25

34

64

10

64

G

49

45

47

48

58

49

49

44

H

54

61

111

63

5

62

45

61

A

95

2

B

106

C
Cities ranked higher
for multistate firms

Cities with no clear
location bias

NOTE: Among the eight cities in this table, there are no two cities in the same state. Cities are ranked according to returns on new plant investment after
federal, state, and local taxes and after state and local economic development incentives. The highest return among the 112 cities is ranked 1.
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located within the state to the firm©s payroll everywhere. The sales fac
tor is the ratio of the firm©s sales with a destination within the state to
the firm©s sales everywhere. A weighted average of the three factors
produces the apportionment factor; when multiplied by the firm©s tax
able income derived from operations everywhere, the result is income
taxable by the state in question. The weight applied to the sales factor
varies from 33 percent in a number of states (i.e., equal weight given to
the three factors) to 50 percent in many states (double-weighted sales)
and 100 percent in a few states (single-factor apportionment).
The sales factor is complicated by throwback rules. In several states,
shipments from facilities in that state to states in which the firm has no
tax nexus, or to the federal government, are thrown back to that state,
i.e., counted as part of the numerator in the sales factor. Sales destined
for a state where the firm is taxable (and where those sales will be
reflected in that state©s apportionment formula) are never thrown back.
In constructing a hypothetical firm simulation, arbitrary assump
tions must be made with respect to the proportion of firm sales destined
for 1) the state in which the new plant is located, 2) the state(s) in
which the original firm is located, 3) other states in which the firm is
taxable, and 4) other states where the firm has no tax nexus. These
assumptions significantly affect the apparent relative competitiveness
of states. If a large share of sales is assumed to go to category 4, states
such as Wisconsin and Massachusetts that require throwback of all
such sales and that double-weight sales in the apportionment formula
are at a disadvantage. On the other hand, assuming all sales are to
states where the firm is taxable increases the firm©s tax liability to those
states; this, in turn, puts a premium on the deductibility of other states©
income taxes (allowed in only a few states) and eliminates throwback
effects entirely.
The design of the model may constrain the sales assumptions that
one can make. If the model permits each firm to be located and taxed in
only one or two states, as most models do, one must assume that sales
are quite unevenly distributed (with all or most sales going to just those
one or two states) or one must assume that most sales are to the other
48 or 49 states and that the firm has no tax nexus (not even a sales
office) in any of those states. 6 The first assumption is not consistent
with the supposition that one is modeling relatively footloose firms
competing in national markets. The second assumption is unrealistic.
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Tannenwald and Kendrick (1995) report that throwback sales are in
fact insignificant for most Massachusetts manufacturers; they assert
that firms tend to have a tax nexus (even if it is only a sales office) in
states where they do substantial business. Data from Wisconsin corpo
rate income tax returns indicate that, among apportioning corporations,
about 16 percent of total sales are thrown back in the aggregate.7
The creation of a median state to represent all other states in which
the firm has facilities provides a solution to the sales allocation
dilemma. This mythical state can be given a population representing a
large share of the total U.S. population, and sales can then be allocated
between the particular actual state, the mythical median state, and the
remaining (non-taxing) states in proportion to population. This has the
effect of attributing only a small share of sales to non-taxing states (we
assume 20 percent) without forcing the remainder to occur in the actual
state; most of the remainder will be destined instead for the median
state, where the firm is taxed. This should provide more accurate com
parisons of throwback versus nonthrowback states, as well as of states
allowing the deduction for other state©s income taxes versus states that
do not. It is also consistent with the national markets assumption; the
actual state is allocated sales only in proportion to its share of national
population.

INTERSTATE OR INTERLOCAL COMPETITION?

Since location choices are made among actual sites, with particular
local taxes and incentives, studies of location competition should take
local public policies into account. This raises the question of how local
tax variables are to be included in an analysis of interstate competition.
Two approaches have been used: 1) a statewide average property tax
rate is employed, generally without consideration of any abatements,
or 2) particular localities are modeled rather than the state as a whole,
so the actual tax regime in that community governs the local tax com
ponent. The first approach raises questions of accuracy, while the sec
ond brings up questions of representativeness. We apply both
approaches in this study; a discussion of the estimates of average prop
erty tax rates is contained in the notes to Appendix Table A.3.
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A similar, but more difficult, question arises with respect to stateprovided tax incentives. Of the many states that offer investment or
jobs tax credits, only a few do so on a uniform basis throughout the
state. The others offer the credits only in specified areas such as enter
prise zones or counties with above-average unemployment rates or
offer the credits on more favorable terms in such places. The targeted
areas may be limited to a small number of neighborhood enterprise
zones, or they may include a majority of the counties in the state. If one
is comparing state tax regimes, how is geographic variation in such
incentives to be incorporated? There are four alternatives: 1) include
only incentives available generally throughout the state; 2) model the
most generous incentive package the state offers, regardless of how
limited the availability in geographic terms; 3) attempt to calculate an
average over the entire state, taking into account the prevalence or cov
erage of the targeted incentives; or 4) calculate an average for some
arbitrary subset of locations, such as the three largest cities. The best
approach is probably the first. States can then be compared on the basis
of their lowest offer (or highest effective tax rate), which will also be
the typical offer, unless targeted incentives are quite widespread.
The concept of a statewide average incentive offer, or property tax
rate, is problematic.8 How are the different locations with different tax
and incentive rates to be weighted in the computation of the average
by their shares of land area, population, industrial property value, man
ufacturing employment, number of unemployed, manufacturing value
added, or tax collections, to mention some of the possibilities? How
are we to know whether any of these will reflect the future distribution
of plant locations within the state? Narrowly targeted incentives are
best studied not by looking at states as the unit of analysis but by look
ing at localities.
Complicating matters further, however, is variation in taxes and
incentives within a particular city. This can occur for two reasons: the
city includes multiple taxing jurisdictions (such as school districts or
improvement districts that have issued bonds for local infrastructure),
or the city contains an enterprise zone with special state and local
incentives. In the first case, we have obtained the local tax rate for the
area of the city most likely to be the site for new industry; if this cannot
be determined, we have computed a citywide average tax rate. Sub
stantial variation in rates within cities occurs only in a few states.
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As for the treatment of enterprise zones, we have chosen to use the
tax rates and incentives that prevail within the zone to represent the
entire city for purposes of computing the tax on income from new
investment. In some cases, the zone is the whole county, so this
approach is strictly correct. In other instances, the decision is equiva
lent to assuming that the majority of new industrial expansion in a city
with an enterprise zone will occur within that zone. This is justified to
the extent that the zone location compared with nonzone locations
would bring with it similar costs for labor (the labor market presum
ably being broader than the city in most cases) and for transportation
and utilities, but would provide significant additional tax benefits.
For multistate firms, the initial production facilities are located
entirely in a single median city (with a median local tax system) in the
median state. The new plant is located in a particular city in the sample
state (except for the state-level analyses, where local taxes and incen
tives are not included). If the city contains an enterprise zone, we
assume that the new plant is located in that zone.
For single-state firms, the location assumption possibilities become
more complex. For simplicity, we assume that the new plant represents
an expansion of an existing facility at the same site. Thus, if a city has
an enterprise zone, the existing firm©s production facilities as well as
the new plant are located in that zone. The alternative would have been
to model an existing firm at some hypothetical average city in the state,
with only the new plant being located in the sample city (and in the
enterprise zone, if any). This assumption makes a difference only in a
state that provides investment or jobs tax credits that can be applied
solely to the tax attributable to facilities within enterprise zones
(whether new facilities or not). In most cases, such credits can be
applied against the firm©s total state tax liability from all facilities
wherever located, or only to the firm©s state tax liability attributable to
the new plant, so the assumption regarding the location of the existing
firm has no bearing.
In many instances, jobs tax credits are available only for certain cat
egories of employees rather than for all those employed at the new
plant. Most often, the criteria relate to the employee©s location of resi
dence and previous employment status. Appendix Table B.3 shows our
assumptions regarding the percentage of new plant employees residing
within the city as a whole and within the enterprise zone itself, and the
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percentage who were unemployed at the time of hiring or who were
unemployed at least 90 days prior to hiring. Since some states apply
both criteria, we also show how these two assumptions combine.

MEASURING EFFECTS OVER TIME
Kieschnick criticized the hypothetical firm method for ignoring the
life cycle of firms. The method is indeed limited in this regard; it is not
practicable to simulate in a nonarbitrary fashion a new firm over the
first 20 years of its life cycle. The method is thus not suitable for mea
suring tax effects on new businesses or incentive programs aimed at
stimulating entrepreneurship or new business formation.
A multiyear analysis is nonetheless essential. Taxes and incentives
affect the profitability of new investment not just in the initial invest
ment year, but for many years thereafter. Credits sometimes must be
used in the first year but in other instances can be carried forward for
up to 20 years. Property tax abatements often provide the largest bene
fit the first year but frequently continue at some level for 10 years or
more. Favorable loan terms are felt over the life of the loan. It is very
difficult to accurately capture these effects over time with a one-year
analysis that includes, for example, the present value of future property
tax abatements. Such an approach ignores the interaction year by year
between incentives and state and federal taxes. Furthermore, location
decisions are surely made on the basis of a longer time horizon. A 20year span is probably sufficient to capture all of the significant differ
ences in state policy, although some studies have carried the analysis to
60 years (Papke and Papke 1986; Brooks et al. 1986; Brooks 1993).
When the hypothetical firm method is used to analyze the competi
tive effects of taxes or incentives, the question being posed, implicitly,
is this: For a given firm contemplating an investment in a new plant of
a specified size, which location for that new plant produces the greatest
profit? The answer is found by simulating the firm©s revenues and costs
over some time period, producing a stream of annual cash flow figures.
If two simulations are performed with and without the new plant
then the difference measures project returns: the increase in the firm©s
cash flow attributable to the investment in the new plant.
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How is this flow of project returns over time to be reduced to a sin
gle measure of profitability? There are two logical contenders: the net
present value (NPV) of project returns and the internal rate of return
(IRR) on the investment in the new plant. In capital budgeting terms,
the decision is between a set of mutually exclusive projects of equal
size: the same investment is contemplated in each location, but only
one location will be selected. By which measure should these projects
(each one representing a state or site) be ranked?
The capital budgeting literature has generally come down in favor of
the NPV as the best criterion for ranking projects (see for example,
Stevens 1979 or Brigham 1985) because of three problems with the
IRR. First, the IRR can produce the wrong rankings when there are dif
ferences in project size, although that is not an issue here. Second, the
IRR method can produce multiple solutions whenever there is a nonnormal income stream (one containing a negative flow in at least one
future year); such streams can readily exist with the hypothetical firm
method if substantial replacement investment occurs within the time
horizon. Since machinery and equipment is the major asset category,
generally with an economic life of less than 20 years, substantial
replacement investment will have to be modeled. The third problem is
the reinvestment rate assumption. The IRR calculation is based on the
implicit assumption that project returns will be reinvested at the
project©s IRR. For example, the firm choosing a $10 million plant in
state A will reinvest the returns from that plant in a series of similar
projects in the same state, each producing the same rate of return. This
further requires the assumption that similar investments are available
each year in small increments, so that all net income can be immedi
ately reinvested. The NPV rule, on the other hand, is based on the
assumption that project returns will be reinvested at the firm©s discount
rate, which should be equal to the firm©s cost of capital. The returns
from project A, in other words, substitute for retained earnings, debt,
and new shares of stock in the financing of other firm projects, saving
the business the cost of raising capital. The NPV assumption is more
defensible than the IRR reinvestment assumption.
The AFTAX model, employed by J. and L. Papke and in the Massa
chusetts study (Brooks 1993), uses the IRR as the measure of project
profitability and differences in after-tax rates of return as measures of
the tax implications of one location versus another. They argue that this
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avoids making an arbitrary assumption regarding the discount rate. Use
of the IRR, however, requires an arbitrary assumption itself regarding
the reinvestment of project returns. Furthermore, there is something to
be said for the heuristic value of results expressed in NPV terms. Pub
lic discussion of the competitive effects of taxes and incentives is
invariably carried on in relation to the dollar value to the firm of a par
ticular incentive or package, and NPV provides a way of expressing the
value of a tax program or incentive in just those terms: How much it is
worth to a firm in today©s dollars to receive certain benefits over the
next 20 years?
We conclude that the competitive effects of taxes and incentives are
best analyzed by simulating capital budgeting decisions by hypotheti
cal firms. The textbook solution to a capital budgeting problem begins
with an estimate of the stream of cash flows produced by the planned
project. It is the incremental cash flow that is relevant: the difference
between cash flows with the project and cash flows without the project.
Cash flows are measured by net income after taxes, with noncash
expenses added back (depreciation deductions and deferred taxes). The
result is the annual incremental cash flow from operations. The acqui
sition cost of new property and plant and equipment and the additional
net working capital required by the project are deducted from the firstyear cash flow. The cost of replacement equipment is deducted in the
appropriate years. The project is assumed to have a finite life; salvage
value (assumed equal to book value) becomes an additional source of
cash at the end of the project, as does the return of net working capital.
Finally, debt financing flows are added, with the proceeds of bond
issues being a source of cash and the repayment of principal a use of
cash. The end result is the stream of net cash flows available to equity
investors. This stream is discounted at the firm©s assumed cost of
equity to arrive at the NPV of project cash flows. A detailed description
of the operation of the model and of the assumptions employed is con
tained in Appendix B.
Almost all hypothetical firm studies have assumed zero inflation;
that is, the financial projections are in real terms. At first glance, this
assumption seems harmless. A firm©s cost of capital will reflect infla
tion premiums incorporated into current nominal interest rates and
required rates of return on equity. Suppose the inflation premium were
5 percent. If all project revenues and costs were inflated at 5 percent
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per year over 20 years, and the resulting cash flow discounted at the
current nominal cost of capital, the result would be the same as if one
had discounted real (uninflated) cash flows at the real discount rate. In
the absence of good reasons to assume different rates of inflation for
each project component, or different rates for each year, one may as
well leave the analysis in real terms. This would be true enough if it
were not for taxes; deductions are allowed for depreciation and interest
expenses, and these expenses will not rise each year with inflation
(although they will jump up as assets are replaced at inflated cost). The
higher the inflation rate, the longer the replacement period, and the
larger the replacement cost relative to income, the greater the will be
divergence between tax calculations based on nominal flows and those
based on uninflated flows.
The zero inflation assumption could bias comparisons across states
to the extent that depreciation rules or the timing of incentives differ.
Almost all states allow federal Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery
System (MACRS) depreciation, with California and New Jersey being
among the notable exceptions that require a less accelerated form of
depreciation. By ignoring inflation we disregard the lesser real value of
the depreciation rules of California and New Jersey as compared to
those of other states. Similarly, consider state A, which provides incen
tives up front in the form of grants, and state B, which provides incen
tives spread over 10 years in the form of below-market rate loans.
Inflation has no effect on the value of A©s grants but reduces the real
value of B©s annual interest cost reductions unless the interest subsidy
is increased during periods of high inflation.
How substantial is the bias produced by assuming no inflation?
Brooks et al. (1986) tested the effects of a 5 percent inflation rate over
the entire 60-year period of their analysis, which calculated after-tax
rates of return on new investment at 16 sites in 11 states. Ten of the
states allowed federal Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS)
depreciation at that time; one (New York) required pre-ACRS deprecia
tion, resulting in quite different allowances in the first few years. The
analysis also provided a test of the significance of incentive timing dif
ferences: investment tax credits (ITCs) were offered at various rates by
4 of the 11 states. (Unlike other tax features that apply uniformly from
year to year, an ITC usually provides all its benefits in the year an asset
is acquired.) Despite these differences among states, the researchers

82

The Hypothetical Firm Method Extended

found that "the actual rankings of the sixteen sites are virtually identi
cal to those calculated assuming zero inflation" (p. 65).

DISAGGREGATING THE RESULTS
The basic result produced by the simulation model is the present
value of net income over 20 years attributable to investment in a new
plant at a particular location, given the taxes and the package of incen
tives available at that location. The overall value of the incentive pack
age represents the maximum benefits obtainable by a firm if it were
able to take advantage of all of the programs available in the state,
given the state©s income and sales tax structure. In order to identify
how different components of the tax and non-tax program package
contribute to the total incentive value, we also calculate the value of
components of that package. This is done by performing the simula
tions in six ways. For state-level comparisons, with state taxes and
incentives only, the simulations are as follows:
Level 1 = present value of net cash flow attributable to investment
in the new plant over 20 years, taking into account the state©s
basic tax system (including corporate income taxes and sales
taxes on machinery and equipment and on fuels and utilities, but
not including economic development incentive credits).
Level 2 = level 1 plus the effects of state economic development
entitlements (income tax investment and jobs credits).
Level 3 = level 2 plus the effects of state infrastructure subsidy
programs.
Level 4 = level 2 plus the effects of state job training and wage
subsidy programs.
Level 5 = level 2 plus the effects of state general purpose financ
ing programs (grants, loans, and loan guarantees).
Level 6 = level 2 plus the effects of all state incentive programs
included separately in levels 3 through 5.
The increment in net income attributable to the state©s economic
development entitlements (income tax investment and jobs credits),
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compared with net income under the state©s basic tax system, is calcu
lated in level 2. This represents the value of the tax credits to the firm.
Levels 3 through 5 are not additive; each assumes the existence of the
state©s tax system, including development credits, but no other non-tax
programs. This is because there are overall constraints on the use of
incentives, as well as individual program constraints. An infrastructure
program might award a firm $500,000, for example, and a general cap
ital grant might award it $300,000 to be applied to infrastructure, if
each program operated independently. However, if the firm©s total
infrastructure needs are only $600,000, it will receive only $600,000 in
total from the two programs, not $800,000. Thus, amounts from levels
3, 4, and 5 cannot be added together to arrive at the total (level 6), nor
is there a nonarbitrary way of disaggregating the level-6 total to iden
tify the contribution that each type of program made. In the preceding
example, how would one decide how much of the $600,000 for infra
structure came from a specific infrastructure program and how much
from the general grant program? The purpose of simulation levels 3, 4,
and 5, then, is simply to allow comparisons among states for different
kinds of programs.
Localities are compared in similar fashion. Local sales, corporate
income, and property taxes are included in the calculation of project
income at level 1, including the effects of deductibility of local prop
erty taxes from state and federal income taxes. Local property tax
abatements for new investment are added in level 2, as are state or local
tax incentives automatically available in enterprise zones or similar,
targeted areas (where applicable). Level 2 project income minus level 1
project income now measures the value to the firm of the combined
state and local tax incentive package. Discretionary locally funded
loan, grant, or job training programs are included in levels 3 through 5,
as with the state analyses. Level 6 net income minus level 1 net income
then produces the value of the combined state and local incentive pack
age for that locality.
SIMULATING THE WORTH OF NON-TAX INCENTIVES
Hypothetical firm models have not included non-tax state and local
incentives such as grants, loans, loan guarantees and subsidies, and
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linked deposits. In order to model discretionary incentives, a hypothet
ical firm model must be able to generate a set of incentives that a firm
would likely receive from a state or city and then apply those incen
tives to an investment. As we noted in Chapter 2, this is a very different
sort of problem from that of modeling tax systems. Discretionary
incentives are negotiated; tax incentives are automatic and applied uni
formly. There are four major steps involved in integrating discretionary
incentives into a hypothetical firm model.
The first step is to develop historical "administrative" ratios for all
non-tax incentives offered by each state or city. The most important
ratios are incentive dollars awarded per jobs created or retained and
incentive dollars awarded per associated total investment, although
others are also used in TAIM. These ratios can then be employed to
develop likely amounts that a firm would receive from a particular
incentive program. Once incentive amounts have been generated, the
various program rules must then be applied (step 2). Common rules
include a maximum amount a firm may receive from an incentive pro
gram, from all incentive programs (in other words, a stipulated limit on
total government-sponsored funding of a project), a minimum equity
contribution, or a stipulated minimum number of jobs created. Most
incentive programs have further rules governing the way in which an
incentive may be spent (on land, plant, infrastructure, machinery, or
working capital); whether it is extended only to firms headquartered in
the state; whether it is offered only to small firms; and whether it is
available, or available on more favorable terms, only in targeted
regions of the state. Essentially, an expert system must be built so that
these and other rules can be applied to the incentive amount generated
in the first step. For example, if an incentive program requires an
equity stake equal to or greater than the incentive amount awarded, the
expert system should be able to vary the amount awarded in step 1 so
that this program rule is not broken.
Next, since states and cities usually offer multiple incentives, the
expert system should be able to assemble the best package of incen
tives available from a unit of government (step 3). In other words, it
should not only be able to apply the administrative rules guiding the
delivery of a particular program, but it should be able to mirror the way
in which economic development officials assemble their incentives into
competitive packages. Here the expert system must be able to apply the
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explicit and implicit rules that govern how packages are assembled (for
example, a state may have more than one general capital grant program
but may nevertheless require that a firm be awarded funds from only
one of these), and within these rules it should be able to create an opti
mum package (the one that maximizes after-tax returns) for the firm
being simulated.
In order to simplify modeling, awarded discretionary incentives can
be divided into two broad classes: grants (including capital, training,
and infrastructure grants, tax increment financing bonds, and other
instruments providing cash payments to the firm or the equivalent of
such cash payments) and loans (any discretionary debt instrument).
Grants and loans can then be applied to the appropriate (and allowable)
asset classes. Again, the application of incentives to the various asset
classes should be such that returns on investment are maximized and
naturally should not result in a situation where any incentive program
rules are broken. In the case of debt instruments, payback schedules
including appropriate rates, fees, and terms for each asset class need to
be developed and applied to the firm©s balance sheets.
The present value of a firm©s return on investment may be calculated
without any discretionary incentives and then again with a particular
package of discretionary incentives (step 4). The difference between
these two amounts provides the measure of the after-tax worth of a
state©s or city©s discretionary or non-tax incentives to a firm.
Our simulations always assume that an incentive, be it general-use,
training-based, or for infrastructure, is used to replace private invest
ment expenditures the firm would otherwise have made, provided such
a replacement does not result in any breach of the administrative rules
governing the award of the incentive. Thus, an infrastructure grant of
$0.5 million replaces $0.5 million in equity expenditures the firm
would have made on infrastructure. Similarly, a $0.5 million loan or
loan guarantee replaces $0.5 million of private debt the firm would
have otherwise raised. However, if the $0.5 million grant results in the
firm reducing its equity stake below that allowed by program adminis
trative rules, then the incentive award is decreased to the point where
the rules are no longer broken.9 The worth of a grant, then, is the extent
to which its use raises the firm©s rate of return on investment. The
worth of a public loan or loan guarantee is the extent to which the more
favorable rates, terms, or fees of the public loan or loan guarantee, rel-
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ative to a private loan, raise the rate of return on a firm©s investment. 10
Assumptions concerning the impact of discretionary incentives on the
size of the investment amount and on factor proportions are consistent
with the assumptions previously described for the tax part of the hypo
thetical firm model. In other words, the firm chooses a standard, fixed
plant and technology and a capital financing plan before selecting a
location and before knowing the terms of any public component of that
financing.
Practically, TAIM assigns state and local discretionary incentives to
each firm modeled and then replaces private debt and equity expendi
tures with these amounts. Incentives are assigned using a series of
expert systems that, in the first place, model both the "administrative
rules" and the "administrative history" of each non-tax program and in
the second, model the way in which incentives are combined to create
"incentive packages." TAIM then recalculates a firm©s income and tax
statements using the new data on public financing. The general method
is summarized in Figure 3.1. The remainder of this chapter is concerned
with the major assumptions involved in implementing this method. A
computational description of the method is found in Appendix C.
Figure 3.1 TAIM Extended to Include Non-Tax Incentives
TAIM
Operating Ratios
of Simulated Investment

1
Balance Sheet
of Simulated Investment

1
Non-Tax Incentives
Expert System
Assembles incentive package
Assigns to asset classes
Income Statement
Tax Statement

Cash-Flow Analysis
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Infrastructure Incentives
Our measurement of infrastructure incentives is based on five broa
principles.
Principle 1: In our model, the amount a firm receives from an
infrastructure incentive program (or from a package of such
incentives) is never more than the firm©s simulated expenditure on
infrastructure for its new plant.
Principle 2: We treat all infrastructure and all related incen
tives as homogeneous.
Thus, for example, we do not distinguish between incentives
providing funds for roads and incentives providing funds for sew
erage mains. All infrastructure programs are treated as if they
could apply to any and all categories of infrastructure expendi
ture. The reason for this is that there are no reliable data on the
ways in which firms make detailed expenditures on different cate
gories of infrastructure. In theory, this assumption could lead to
significant errors. As an illustration, imagine a state-level infra
structure grant program that provides funds for road building and
improvement. Suppose that our model simulated that a firm
would be spending $10 million on infrastructure for its new plant
and that the firm would be eligible for $1 million from a road
fund program. It is quite conceivable that, while the firm might
have a total infrastructure expenditure of $10 million, it might
spend only $0.25 million on roads. If this were the case, our
model would award the firm $0.75 million too much.
Unfortunately, there is no easy way around this problem since,
as we indicated earlier, there are no data providing sufficient
detail for better modeling of infrastructure expenditure catego
ries. How big a concern is this? Given the lack of data, it is
impossible to provide a definitive answer; nevertheless, we are
inclined to believe that the problem is minor. In practice, most
infrastructure incentives are very small relative to the amount
being invested in a new plant©s infrastructure. Thus, the probabil
ity is reasonably small that our model will, because of the homo
geneity assumption, award too much.
Principle 3: We assume that the use of an infrastructure incen
tive does not result in any substitution.
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Consider the following example. A firm is about to invest in a
new plant and believes it will have to upgrade the roadway con
necting it to the city©s existing street system. The firm would pre
fer a four-lane connection but for cost reasons decides to build a
two-lane roadway. However, the provision of a state road incen
tive reduces the cost of road building just enough that the firm
decides now to build the preferred four-lane roadway.
We discussed the more general version of this problem earlier
in this chapter. There we were concerned that, while economic
theory suggests capital subsidies result in the substitution of capi
tal for labor, our model assumes the elasticity of substitution is
zero. The model assumes that a firm employs a technology with
fixed factor proportions and so does not respond to changes in
relative input costs. We reiterate our justification for this assump
tion here, but now in the context of non-tax incentives.
First, no hypothetical firm model has comprehensively simu
lated the substitution effects of incentives because of the practical
data and technical difficulties presented by such a research
project. Although there have been empirical estimations of pro
duction functions showing the elasticity of factor proportions
with respect to relative factor prices, there has been no work on
the impact of incentives on factor proportions. In the much more
specific infrastructure case at hand, there is absolutely no litera
ture to guide our simulation of the situation. In fact, in order to
accomplish such modeling within a hypothetical firm framework,
an enormous amount of detailed data would be required on the
various infrastructure-related and other costs experienced by the
firm and on the amount by which incentives could reasonably be
expected to reduce these costs. This information is unavailable.
Modeling without such data is likely to introduce further error
into our simulations.
Second, our research purpose is not to model investment deci
sions across space but to measure the standing offer. The standing
offer is a standardized assessment of the worth of an incentive to
a typical firm in a particular sector. The investment (and the com
position of investment) of the firm is a given within the model (by
the size and structure of typical plants within a sector), not as an
outcome of the model. In other words, we measure the worth of
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various state and city incentive packages for identical amounts
and compositions of investment. Thus, we ignore substitution.
Principle 4: We assume publicly funded infrastructure is no
more expensive to produce than privately funded infrastructure.
It is possible that infrastructure supplied through incentives is
more costly than infrastructure supplied without incentives. For
example, many road programs have rules specifying maintenance
and public usage, both of which are likely to increase the longterm costs of infrastructure provision and maintenance. If this is
the case, then each dollar of public incentive money will only
replace some fraction of each private dollar of investment in
infrastructure. In situations such as this, our simulation will over
estimate the financial worth of an incentive to a firm. We return to
this issue later in this chapter.
Principle 5: As we indicated in the discussion of substitution,
we assume that the provision of a public subsidy does not change
the size of the firm©s investment. In theory, the profit-maximizing
firm will add capital up to the point where the expected marginal
income equals the marginal cost. Suppose that a firm receives a
$1 million infrastructure grant (for simplicity©s sake, assume also
that the incentive may only be used on capital improvements).
The opportunity costs of adding that $1 million of infrastructure
will drop to zero; so, all other things being equal, the firm will
add $1 million to its capital investment (provided that this does
not result in the rate of return becoming negative). Incentives,
inasmuch as they lower the cost of investment, encourage more
investment. The reason we do not model the impact of incentives
on the investment decision is that we are measuring the standing
offer for a typical investment; we are not modeling the optimal
investment. 11

Wage Subsidy and Worker Training Incentives
The problems with modeling wage subsidy programs and worker
training programs are much the same as those with infrastructure. It is
unclear whether public funds replace private training expenditure on a
one-for-one basis, or whether public training is less cost-effective than
private training. It is also true that most public funds have associated
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conditions, which may mean that the cost of providing training is more
expensive using public funds. For example, the program may require
that workers be trained at designated community colleges, which may
be less efficient at providing training than a private firm. Moreover,
training funds, insofar as they function as a subsidy for labor, may pro
mote some substitution. Generally, such monies may encourage firms
to train workers more than they otherwise would have. Since there are
no useful data on these issues, we have ignored them in the model. The
worth of training and wage subsidies is measured in the same way as
that of infrastructure subsidies. A public grant, loan, loan guarantee, or
loan subsidy is valued as the amount by which its use raises a firm©s
20-year after-tax cash flow.
General-Use Grants, Loans, Loan Guarantees, and Related
Debt Instruments
General-use grants, loans, loan guarantees, and related instruments
(such as linked-deposits and interest subsidies) may be applied to a
wider list of asset classes than infrastructure or training incentives.
Most often, general-use incentives may be used for all asset classes.
The most frequent exception to this pattern is the limitation that public
funds should not be used for working capital. Presumably, the funds
applying this restriction do so with the goal of protecting the security
of public investment. There are also a few funds that exclude other
asset classes: plant and land, machinery, or infrastructure.
On the whole, we treat public grants as replacements for the private
equity stake in an investment and public debt instruments as replace
ments for private-sector debt, provided that such replacements do not
result in breaching program administrative rules. Some of the problems
associated with the directed programs that have been discussed should
not be as apparent with general-use incentives. In particular, while it is
always the case that general-use incentives have rules governing the
ways public monies may be spent, they usually do not have rules gov
erning the mechanisms of spending. Unlike training programs, which
often specify in great detail how training should be provided, or infra
structure programs, which specify how roads are to be built and main
tained, general-use programs tend not to prescribe a particular
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spending mechanism. As a result, the efficiency problems are likely to
be less obvious (although some may still exist).
However, as indicated earlier, the substitution problem remains.
General-use grants, loans, and loan guarantees tend to cheapen the cost
of capital and, thus, from a theoretical and possibly practical perspec
tive, are likely to result in the substitution of capital for labor. We also
ignore the impact of general-use subsidies on the size of the invest
ment. A further problem pertains to the structure of public debt. Very
often the public general-use debt instruments of a firm are subordi
nated. The result is that private debt is more secure and thus presum
ably costs less (at least in the case of smaller firms). We collected
information on subordination but found no reasonable way to model
reductions in private debt interest rates. TAIM thus ignores the rate
effect that the subordination of public debt may have. On the whole,
the worth of general-use grants, loans, loan guarantees and related debt
instruments is treated the same as that of infrastructure and training
subsidies: their worth is the increment they provide to firm income.
Generating Incentive Amounts and Incentive Terms
As simulated by our model, the amount a firm may receive from a
particular incentive program is determined by applying the explicit
rules of the program and by multiplying the average fiscal year (FY)
1992 incentive amount per job or per dollar of total investment by the
number of new jobs or dollars of investment by the hypothetical firm. 12
The incentive ratios are based on data provided by state or local offi
cials. From a practical standpoint, all of the rules applied by program
officials (rules deriving from the state code or city ordnance, generaluse departmental rules, specific program guidelines, and the informal
input of program administrators) could not be simulated. This would
have required creating a detailed "expert system" or "knowledge base"
for each program in each city and state. Setting up such "expert sys
tems" would have necessitated an enormous amount of historical infor
mation on each incentive. Program administrators, in our experience,
would be unwilling to provide such detailed material, for the rather
simple reason that most work with severe time and labor constraints.
We developed simplified "expert systems" for each state program.
Here we applied a streamlined set of rules for every program:
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The maximum amount available from a program;
The maximum amount per job created or retained, and per dollar
of investment;
Leverage ratios required and equity contribution required;
Limitations on the size of a given program©s contribution to a
project and on a project©s particular asset expenditures;
Restrictions on the size of all public financing of a project;
Other basic limitations to firms of a particular size (however
size is construed), to firms in particular sectors, and to firms head
quartered in and out of state;
Any other limiting rule that seemed crucial to the operation of the
program.
The actual amount of the incentive simulated for a firm was deter
mined by applying the preceding rules to the average of the historical
ratios of public funds per job created or retained and public funds per
dollar of investment size. In some cases, the size of an incentive award
is based on a schedule, which we used to generate the actual incentive
amount. Where a schedule-based program had to meet some other
administrative criteria of the type that have been described, those crite
ria were applied to the award.
City programs could not be modeled in this way. The data we have
on city grant, loan, and loan guarantee programs are not detailed
enough to permit the creation of even the limited "expert systems" that
have been discussed. Instead, we applied the historical ratios of public
funds per job created or retained and public funds per dollar of invest
ment size and then applied the relevant size limits (such as maximum
incentive amount or maximum amount per job), finally adding the city
incentives to the state incentives.
Many states and a few cities have incentive programs with some
substantive overlap. For example, Ohio has two general-use capital
programs, one of which is directed towards smaller firms. In fact, this
pattern a state having different programs for different sizes of firm
is reasonably common. However, in many cases, it is possible that a
particular investment project may be eligible to receive incentives from
more than one state incentive program of the same type. Based on our
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discussions with state officials, in cases such as these, states would be
inclined to offer only a single discretionary incentive. Thus, the model
must not only simulate a likely amount from each incentive program, it
must also be able to create a package of likely incentives.
For general-use incentives, the following rules have been applied. If
two programs in a state have a broadly similar purpose, they are treated
as mutually exclusive. If a state offers more than one incentive in a
broad category, our model simulates the amount for which a firm is eli
gible from each of these incentives and then chooses one for the firm.
The one chosen is always that which, within the program rules, is
worth more to the firm. This is interpreted to mean the one that most
reduces the costs of debt to the firm. Practically, the present value of
the flow of interest and principal payments on each public sector loan
is compared to such payments on a private sector loan (these compari
sons are made within individual asset classes and then summed over all
asset classes). 13 TAIM is programmed to choose the public sector loan
maximizing that difference between public and private loans. 14 In a few
cases, this method results in large swings in the debt structure of the
firm. As an illustration, very generous incentive loan programs with
terms considerably shorter than those available for the same asset class
in the private sector result in the firm retiring too much debt too early
(the firm accepts a large and generous loan and pays it off quickly).
The outcome is a sudden decline in debt at the end of the term of the
public loan. This can result in a generous public loan actually lowering
project returns. 15 To solve this problem, TAIM has an algorithm that
refinances excessive early principal payments using the private debt
market, thus maintaining a reasonably constant debt structure.
These same rules have been applied to the city incentive simulation.
However, state and city incentives were treated as additive. If a state
and a city within that state each has a separately capitalized generaluse grant, and a firm is eligible for both, then the firm will receive both.
The exception to the latter rule is that some city Community Develop
ment Block Grant (CDBG)-capitalized revolving loan funds effectively
replace similar state-level CDBG loan programs and have been treated
accordingly. 16
Where there was more than one incentive within a particular cate
gory, but where each incentive program in such a category was aimed
at a different substantive purpose, then the various incentives have been
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treated as inclusive or additive. For example, within the category of
infrastructure incentives, a state may have a fund to provide roads and
a fund to aid site assembly. Both of these programs will be included in
the final package because they are aimed at achieving specific but nonoverlapping goals. Pennsylvania has a very complex set of non-tax
incentives. Within the broad category of general-use incentives, it has a
loan program directed at subsidizing the purchase of machinery and
another directed at the purchase of land. On top of these, it has a num
ber of other general-use programs for a wide range of asset expendi
tures. In this case, the machinery-directed fund and the land-directed
fund were treated as additive, but the programs whose activities over
lapped are treated as exclusive. A firm may only receive incentives
from one of these. We believe the application of this rule simplifies our
comparison of non-tax incentives across states and agrees with the way
that states and cities package incentives to firms.
There is one important complication to this scheme. Tax increment
financing instruments (TIFs) pose special problems. TIFs are discre
tionary instruments financed out of future increments to property taxes
(and sometimes payroll taxes). 17 Essentially, property taxes on real
improvements are used to retire notes issued for those improvements.
TIFs and property tax abatements work at cross purposes; because an
abatement relieves the property owner of the need to pay taxes on
improvements, it also removes the mechanism to retire TIP debt (at
least for a period of several years), thus making such debt financially
difficult, if not impossible. However, one can imagine a situation where
the optimal financial solution for a firm would be TIP debt raised on a
portion of property improvements, with taxes on the remaining
improvements subject to abatement. This would be most likely in situ
ations where the firm would prefer TIFs over abatements and could not
(for one reason or another) make full use of TIP funds raised on all
property improvements. Since this sort of situation is extremely
unusual and would severely complicate our model, we treat property
tax abatements and TIFs as mutually exclusive. Abatements are on the
whole more generous than TIFs, so our model only assigns TIFs if
abatements are not available in a community (the exception being pay
roll tax-retired training TIFs). Since the TIF is, in effect, a lump-sum
payment made to the firm, which the firm does not pay back (essen
tially the city, county, school, and other districts pay it back for the firm
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out of diverted property taxes), we treat TIFs as grants. As is true for
grants, the TIP is used to replace private equity investment and is
applied to allowed asset classes.
Distributing Incentives across Asset Classes
Once TAIM has generated an incentive package from a state or city, it
distributes the package to the appropriate asset classes. As indicated,
infrastructure incentives are always applied to infrastructure, and wage
subsidy and worker training incentives are always applied to working
capital. In all instances, the distribution of these directed incentives
occurs before the distribution of general-use incentives. In the case of
general-use incentives, three broad principles apply: 1) funds are dis
tributed only to those asset classes allowed under program rules; 2) the
funds distributed to an asset class may be no greater than the expendi
ture the firm would have made on that asset class had the incentives not
been available; and 3) insofar as this is possible under program rules,
general-use funds are distributed first to plant and land, then to infra
structure, then to machinery, and finally to working capital. The reason
for this order is quite simple. Public money is used, wherever possible,
on assets that do not depreciate, or that depreciate more slowly, allow
ing private money to be spent on assets which depreciate more quickly.
Because longer-lived assets are generally financed with longer-term
debt, and because in normal times interest rates are higher the longer
the term, this rule has the effect of substituting low-cost public money
for the most costly private funds first. This arrangement maximizes the
after-tax income impact of an incentive.
Awarding Grants, Loans, and Loan Guarantees
In the case of grants (and TIFs), once the various awards have been
distributed to land and plant, infrastructure, machinery, and finally
working capital, the model assumes that the recipient firm is able to
make full use of all funds going to each asset class in the initial year of
establishing the new plant. TAIM assumes that public grants are first
used to replace private equity. In the case of loans, the situation is more
complex. TAIM assumes that public debt is first used to replace private
debt. The full loan award must be distributed across appropriate asset
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classes. Once this has been done, loan repayment schedules must be
developed. This requires that appropriate interest rates, terms, and fees
be applied to the loan for each asset class. A few programs had sched
ules that specified rates, terms, and fees by asset class or by size of the
loan. Indeed, in a very few cases, the marginal interest rate increased
by the size of the total loan amount. For those state programs that did
not specify a schedule or a term and rate specific to individual asset
classes, we use the lowest reported interest rate in FY 1992 and longest
reported term (and where applicable, lowest fees) available in FY
1992, and we apply these to loans made to all asset classes. Thus, if a
firm were eligible for a $1 million loan from a program that in 1992
had a low rate of 7 percent and a term of 10 years, and if $700,000 of
that $1 million went to plant and land and $100,000 went to each of
infrastructure, machinery and working capital, the 7 percent rate and
10-year term would be applied to each of these four amounts. One
result is that, in highly unusual situations, public loans may still be out
standing on assets that no longer have value. As an illustration, most
categories of machinery have a book value of zero after 10 years.
The only reasonable alterative to this method of applying the best
rate and term to the entire loan is to restrict the term on a public loan
for a particular asset class to no longer than the term available on a pri
vate sector loan for that class (or to the private sector term plus some
chosen time period meant to account for the relative generosity of pub
lic loans). This latter strategy is highly arbitrary and is too restrictive.
Our method seldom causes mistakes: most programs fund such a small
proportion of the total investment that almost all public funds are
applied to asset categories with the full 20-year life.
For our purposes, loan guarantee programs only serve to reduce risk
on private sector loans by guaranteeing to a financial institution that a
firm©s loan will be repaid. Guarantees thus tend to have the effect of
reducing interest rates on private sector loans. Our model treats a loan
guarantee program as a public loan incentive; in other words, the
model replaces a firm©s private sector loan with a public sector loan at
the now lower interest rate. Obviously, the loans secured by public
guarantees are always private sector loans. However, from the point of
view of the recipient firm, the guaranteed private sector loan functions
as a public loan. Most guarantee programs keep records of the impact
of the public guarantee in reducing interest rates. These reductions are
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then applied to our data on average rates for private loans. If a guaran
tee resulted in an average rate reduction of 1.5 percent, and if our his
torical data on private loans to finance working capital showed that the
average rate for a loan of that size was 12 percent over three years, then
a rate of 10.5 percent on a 3-year term to the loan would be applied by
our model. Thus, one important difference between our treatment of
public loans and guaranteed loans is that for the guarantee we always
maintain the usual private sector term for that type of firm and that
asset class, unless a different term is explicitly specified by the guaran
tee program. It is common for states to charge extra fees on loan guar
antees (the fees usually help capitalize the guarantee fund). In our
model, these fees are added to the interest payment for the first year,
except where fees are explicitly multiyear. The private interest rate and
loan term assumptions are described in Appendix B, Table B.2. In
those cases where program officials were unaware of the impact of the
guarantee on rates, we applied a standard rate reduction of 2 percent.
This figure was near the middle of the range of the interest rate reduc
tions reported in our surveys.
A very few states provide a "loan subsidy" incentive. Although this
instrument is related to the loan guarantee, it operates in a different
manner. For example, in Michigan, one program makes interest pay
ments, for a limited period of time, on private sector loans negotiated
by a firm. Effectively, the firm receives two subsidies. On the one hand,
it receives a series of small grants the interest paid by the state. On
the other, because there is an implied guarantee that the state will make
the required payments, the private sector interest rate is likely to be
reduced. Our model treats "loan subsidies" as public loans but
decreases the loan repayment schedule appropriately (the annual inter
est payment being reduced by the amount of the annual subsidy). Inter
est rates are reduced by the standard 2 percent used in loan guarantee
programs with terms usual for specific assets classes in the private sec
tor.
"Linked-deposit" programs also closely resemble loan guarantees.
States or cities keep funds in specific financial institutions on the
understanding that the institutions will make below-market rate loans
to qualified firms. Thus, the "linked deposit" reduces the interest rate
charged to the firm. We treat linked deposits as loan guarantees: private
sector terms and fees are retained, and interest rates are decreased by
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an appropriate amount. The linked deposit loan is treated as though it
were a public sector loan.
Adding State and City Incentives
For the complete simulation of a state and local tax and incentive
regime, we first calculate a firm©s local (and in a few cases, state) prop
erty taxes, then state non-tax incentives, then city non-tax incentives
and TIFs, and finally add other local taxes, state taxes, and state and
local tax incentives. One result is that if a state and a city within a state
both offer a similar type of incentive, the state©s incentive will be
applied to the firm first. To illustrate, if a state and city both have a gen
eral-use loan program, the firm will have the state program applied to it
first. This method is employed in order to simplify some of the more
complex computational issues associated with the design of the model.
This method would only miscalculate the best potential package avail
able from a state and city in that state where the city and state loan pro
grams were both large enough to cover most of the debt requirements
of the firm and where the rate and term of the city loan were more
favorable than the rate and term of the state loan. 18 In the state and local
loan programs covered in this research, these conditions are never both
true.

LIMITATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS I: THE
ADMINISTRATION OF INCENTIVES ALTERS
THEIR WORTH
There is tremendous variability in the way a given category of
incentive is implemented at the state or local level. Insofar as the par
ticular financial arrangements allowed by a certain discretionary incen
tive are clear and explicit, their impact on business operating costs may
be calculated. Our general method for these calculations was presented
above. However, before progressing any further, we need to discuss
some of the broader empirical issues that the variability in program
administration poses for modeling the worth of non-tax business incen
tives to private firms. We focus on a single crucial issue that clearly
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illustrates the impact of program administration on incentive worth:
clawbacks.
Non-tax incentive programs usually come with a range of financial
and nonfinancial rules and regulations. Commonly imposed nonfinancial performance requirements include the following:
The recipient firm will create or retain a specified number of jobs.
The jobs created will pay above some stated level, such as 75 per
cent of the county median manufacturing wage.
The jobs created will not result in job cutbacks elsewhere in the
state or city.
These performance requirements often have associated sanctions to
encourage compliance from recipient firms. Such sanctions might
include the cancellation of a subsidy agreement or the recovery of all
or part of the incentive costs (Ledebur and Woodward 1990). These
sorts of sanctions are generically referred to as program clawbacks. In
most cases, the clawback operates in the following manner: a firm is
given an incentive for relocation or expansion on the written under
standing that it will either create or retain a certain number of jobs or
make some compensating payment to the state. Not only do many
major incentive programs impose clawbacks on recipient firms, they
administer the clawbacks in quite different ways. We will discuss only
two issues here: 1) defining performance and 2) monitoring perfor
mance.
Although much loved by politicians, job "creation" and "retention"
are notoriously ambiguous concepts. The theoretical issue lies in the
"counterfactual" problem faced by all attempts to measure the effec
tiveness of policy. Should all and any jobs created by a firm be counted
as new jobs, or only those jobs that would not exist "but for" policy
intervention? 19 How do we know what jobs would not exist "but for"
policy? A similar set of issues arises over the meaning of job retention.
There is also a range of more practical difficulties relating to job cre
ation and retention. For full-time equivalents, how long need a job exist
to count as new or retained? How long should a firm be given to create
a specified job level, and, once that level has been achieved, how long
need it last? Should a low-paying job count as much as a high-paying
one? Programs that have job creation and retention requirements must
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attempt to answer these definitional questions. Peters (1993) found that
major Midwestern loan and grant programs gave quite varied answers
to these questions. In one incentive program, recipient firms were
given two years to create jobs, in another program, three. Some pro
grams required that the jobs, once created, should continue to exist for
the life of the loan, while other programs left the period undefined.
Moreover, the actual monitoring of firm employment performance
varied, with rigorous evaluation by field officers in some programs but
not in others. Also, not all incentive programs reflected a willingness to
impose clawback penalties on underperforming firms. In some cases,
program directors felt the rigorous application of clawback penalties
was rendered impossible by the need to maintain an understanding atti
tude towards the risks of business. One program director reported that
he was concerned about the impact of rigorous enforcement on the
state©s perceived business climate.
It is clear that the day-to-day administration of incentives, particu
larly discretionary non-tax incentives, has direct financial conse
quences for a firm. Consider this example.20 A firm, in the final round
of its location search, is evaluating two industrial sites in two states.
Site A offers a direct cash grant of $1 million from the first state©s
incentive program X; site B also offers a direct cash grant (of similar
magnitude) from the second state©s program Y. Each program has a
stipulated maximum job/cost ratio of at least one new job for each
$10,000 of incentives received. Thus, both incentives require the cre
ation of 100 jobs. Both X and Y define job creation in the same way
and have similar clawback requirements. However, Y©s clawback
regime is much more rigorously enforced, having a historical record of
imposing clawback penalties in a higher proportion of cases than does
X. From the point of view of the firm, the two incentive programs offer
identical initial financial benefits and require identical performance.
However, in the medium to longer term, accepting an incentive from Y
is a much more risky proposition than accepting an incentive from X.
If the firm does not meet its job creation performance requirements, the
probability is that an incentive from Y will offer less financial benefit
than an incentive from X.
This example could be made much more involved. Suppose that
while X is less rigorous in imposing clawbacks, its definition of job
creation is much stricter than Y©s: X allows one year for job creation, Y
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two. A more difficult question then is, how the firm reacts to the admin
istrative complexities that are part and parcel of many, if not most, non
tax incentive offers. Theoretically, the firm could put a price on the risk
associated with the more rigorous clawback regime, using well-known
financial techniques. The costs associated with earlier rather than later
job creation could also be calculated, but in reality it is unlikely that
they ever are. The calculations would rely on too many unknowns
(both about the future economic climate and the behavior of program
administrators) to be of much practical use in making location deci
sions.
Although we have no scholarly evidence, we have yet to hear from
program directors that potential firms were interested in their clawback
rates. Certainly the survey-based location literature, contradictory as it
is on the issue of whether incentives in general influence location deci
sions, is completely silent on how executives deal with more practical
incentive matters, such as the specifics of job creation and clawback
requirements, in their investment behavior.21 Our model also ignores
these issues. It should nevertheless be clear that the real value of an
incentive, particularly a discretionary incentive, is mediated by the way
the incentive is administered.22 Firms may or may not deal with these
issues in a quantitatively sophisticated way. Our models assume (and
we believe) that they do not. On the other hand, it is quite possible that
even if firms do not evaluate quantitatively the risks and associated
potential costs of a particular administrative regime, investment and
location decisions may still be influenced by the regime. For instance,
rigorous clawback enforcement might be associated with a stormy
local business climate and thus raise doubts about the real worth of an
incentive package to a firm. In summary, business incentives have a
range of associated administrative rules and conditions that have
potential financial consequences for recipient firms. Whether firms
take these rules and conditions into account when making location
decisions, is unknown. TAIM ignores them.
This raises a much more general point. Colgan (1995) in a recent
review of the impact of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) on state and local business incentives, indicates that the agree
ment stipulates that incentives should be measured in a manner not too
different from ours, except that we focus on the after-tax impact on
cash flow, not on the before-tax comparison to sales. This latter point
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aside, the two methods are concerned essentially with differences in
the cost of debt (and equity) between public and private financing.
These differences are the basis for the calculation of the subsidy
amount. However, a number of European negotiators to GATT claimed
that this sort of measurement of public loans and loan guarantees fun
damentally overstates their worth. Their argument was complex but is
directly related to the issues surrounding clawbacks (and the worth of
incentives) that we have discussed. Essentially, the Europeans argued
that public loans and loan guarantees do cheapen the cost of debt for a
firm, but that the administrative conditions associated with public loans
(such as job creation and minimum wages) also impose significant and
simultaneous costs on the firm. On the whole, the size of the debt sub
sidy is likely to be close to these performance costs. If this is the case,
firms should on the whole be indifferent to public or private debt. For
clarity, we will call this the "subsidy indifference" argument.
If the subsidy indifference argument is correct, then the method we
have used to measure the worth of subsidies is entirely mistaken.
Indeed, if firms are essentially indifferent to public or private debt, then
the simulation of discretionary incentives is probably unnecessary. The
only job for public policy is to make sure that the subsidies given are as
close as possible in worth to the conditions applied.
However, the subsidy indifference argument is not correct. First, the
argument did not prevail in the latest GATT agreement; rather, the
method we have described did. Moreover, we know of no American
city or state that has explicitly maintained that the conditions it
imposes on subsidies are equal to, or even related to, the explicit finan
cial worth of the subsidy. In fact, states and cities specifically advertise
their incentives as reducing the costs of doing business. Also, busi
nesses seek out incentives (Owen 1990), implying that firms are not
indifferent to their use. It seems wholly inconceivable to us that states
and localities are duping businesses into receiving debt instruments
that only look as though they provide some public subsidy but actually
impose costs equal to that subsidy, and that the businesses have failed
to catch on. Nevertheless, we believe that public subsidies have condi
tions that probably do impose some costs on the firm. On balance,
given that businesses actively search for subsidies, we assume that the
costs are a small proportion of the subsidy itself. We know of no
research that has looked at this issue in any empirical detail, and thus
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our model entirely discounts the costs implied by subsidy conditions.
We believe that while our model probably overstates the worth of
incentives, the overstatement is slight and applies across all states.

LIMITATION OF THE ANALYSIS II: COMPLETENESS
OF THE NON-TAX PORTION OF TAIM
One central concern in a hypothetical firm simulation as large and
complex as this is that something will have been omitted. In the case of
taxes this is, of course, most unlikely. The tax code is part of local,
state, and federal law. The concern is really about the completeness of
and soundness of information on non-tax incentives. Unfortunately, a
casual perusal of the most complete directories of state incentives
(those published in Area Development, Site Selection, and by the
National Association of State Development Agencies [NASDA])
shows discrepancies. Partly, this is a matter of the definition of an eco
nomic development incentive; partly this is due to difficulty in getting
the correct information. It should be emphasized that none of these
publications provides the detailed financial data necessary for our sim
ulation: their discrepancies are over such "brute" facts as whether a
program actually exists or not. Thus, our data, being much more
detailed, may actually exaggerate this problem. Given the time, care,
and effort we put into the collection of data, we believe that this is not
the case; nevertheless, it would be foolhardy to claim complete accu
racy even at the state level.
At the city level, the situation is much worse. There exist no reason
ably reliable directories to guide the gathering of information. More
over, many cities do not have a single department or agency that
coordinates economic development. One result is that it is much less
clear at the city level that our information is complete. However, there
is a positive mitigating factor at the local level. It appears that the big
gest and most important incentives that cities provide are abatements;
we believe that our information on abatements is quite reliable, more
so than our information on city grants, loans, and loan guarantees. On
the whole, we found it difficult and time-consuming to obtain data on
city grants, loans, and loan guarantees.
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Still, some incentive programs are missing. Most federally and pri
vately capitalized programs have been excluded, and mall and very
infrequently used city and state programs have been ignored.23 We have
also left out what we call ad hoc programs those not part of a state©s
or city©s standard standing offer, but made with a particular investment
in mind. Our justification for these exclusions is provided in Chapter 2.
In addition, we have ignored some programs that could not be modeled
without introducing significant bias into our results. City infrastructure
programs have been left out, not because these are unimportant, but
because modeling them would distort our results. Only a few cities
have properly established economic development infrastructure setasides. Nevertheless, almost all cities in our sample reported that they
would provide some sort of help with infrastructure to a new invest
ment. This assistance would not come from an established program but
from a range of other ad hoc sources, such as general revenues and
works department resources. At this stage, we do not believe it is feasi
ble to model this type of help. Ignoring such aid while continuing to
model formally established city infrastructure programs would inap
propriately privilege the standing offer of some cities. As a result, we
decided to disregard all local infrastructure programs. Similar prob
lems arose with "payment in lieu of property taxes" incentives; these
too, were ignored.

LIMITATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS III: TARGETING
GEOGRAPHY
Many states and some cities have developed very complex targeting
geographies for their various programs. Sometimes, small geographic
regions in a state will be chosen for incentives (enterprise zones are an
example); sometimes the value of an incentive available throughout the
state will be increased in specified areas. There is tremendous variation
in the areas targeted. In Washington, one incentive program is directed
at almost the entire state but Seattle. In some Pennsylvania programs,
counties are used as the targeting unit, while in Georgia individual cen
sus tracts (about 4,000 people each) are targeted. Moreover, states
often have levels of targeting. A state may have a loan program that
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provides up to $1 million to a firm, at the prime rate plus 2 percentage
points throughout the state, at prime in targeted areas, and at prime
minus 2 percentage points in the most targeted areas. There is one fur
ther, very important complication in targeting geography. In Iowa, as in
many other states, the terms of the state©s major capital incentive pro
gram, the Community Economic Betterment Account (CEBA), do not
necessarily change in targeted areas, but the likelihood of a firm receiv
ing a loan is increased if the firm locates in a high-unemployment
county. TAIM takes into account broad state targeting and targeting
within enterprise and similar zones. At this stage TAIM does not cover
any fine-grained state targeting (to the tract level, for example), nor
does it take into account award probabilities such as those associated
with the CEBA program in Iowa.24

CONCLUSIONS
The hypothetical firm method, properly implemented, provides the
best measures of the burden of business taxes or the value of invest
ment incentives across different sites. Most of the criticisms of the
method are either misplaced or can be nullified by the appropriate use
of assumptions and model structure. Studies measuring the average tax
burden on a single-location firm for one year do not provide useful
indicators of competitiveness either for purposes of making state pol
icy or for purposes of conducting econometric analyses of the effects
of or determinants of state policy. While the few recent studies assess
ing the marginal tax effects rates of return on new investment by
multilocation firms do provide correct measures for the most part,
they have not always dealt satisfactorily with the sales destination
problem. Constructing a "median state" provides a simple way of mod
eling the destination of sales, with shares to taxing and non-taxing
states that reflect actual sales patterns of manufacturing firms.
Aggregation remains an unresolved problem. Results of previous
hypothetical firm studies, confirmed here, demonstrate convincingly
that comparisons of sites are firm-specific, or at least vary substantially
across industries. The value of incentive packages varies significantly
by the characteristics of the firms modeled, so that it becomes crucial
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to model a variety of firms, to model firm and plant sizes that are rele
vant, and to avoid aggregating results inappropriately.
Modeling the tax system and incentive programs for many states
and cities requires making numerous assumptions. We have discussed
the major critical assumptions regarding the hypothetical firm method
and the special and thorny problems peculiar to the modeling of discre
tionary incentives. A more detailed discussion of the operation of
TAIM and the assumptions that underlie it is contained in Appendixes
B and C.
NOTES
1. According to Ladd (1995), 17 states produce fairly comprehensive tax expenditure studies
on a regular basis, and another 13 produce partial or intermittent studies.
2. A more recent study by J. Papke using the AFTAX model (so named because it measures
the after-tax rate of return) is Papke (1995).
3. Researchers in Wisconsin, for example, by modeling six firms at the two-digit level, were
able to say that the six industries represented in the study accounted for 60 percent of manufactur
ing employment in the state (Wisconsin Department of Revenue 1990). On the other hand, in the
Massachusetts study (Brooks 1993), the five three-digit industries represented 20 percent of the
state©s manufacturing employment.
4. One can, of course, average a state©s ranking across the different firms, recognizing that
such an average ranking does not actually represent the competitive position of the state for an
average manufacturing firm.
5. For example, Alabama©s tax system favors domestic (Alabama-headquartered) over for
eign (out-of-state) corporations in two ways: 1) the percentage of federal income taxes deductible
is equal to income from Alabama operations divided by total firm income, which is 100 percent
for our single-state firm headquartered in Alabama, but a small fraction for most multistate firms;
and 2) domestic corporations are allowed a credit for income taxes paid to other states. Other fac
tors that favor single-state or multi-location firms include the weight given to sales in apportion
ment, throwback sales, and the ability of single-state firms to fully utilize income tax credits
(against a much higher state tax liability since most income is apportioned to that state), whereas
multistate firms get the same credit (since it is based on the same plant investment or new jobs)
but can apply it only against the small share of income apportioned to that state, the rest being
apportioned to the taxing states.
6. The early AFTAX model described by Papke and Papke (1984) handled initial locations in
up to three different states. The Wisconsin, Indiana, and Michigan studies assumed a single loca
tion for the firm.
7. Telephone conversation, Peter Fisher with Joe Malloy of the Wisconsin Department of
Revenue, 1993.
8. If one divides state total property taxes paid on industrial property by state total assessed
value of industrial property, the result is an average tax rate weighted by tax collections and indus
trial property value. A simple average of tax rates, on the other hand, weights the largest city and
the smallest rural community equally.
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9. This is accomplished by integrating a "knowledge base" (i.e., a set of computer-coded
rules) with the financial model of each incentive and each package of incentives. The technical
details of this are discussed in Peters and Fisher (1995).
10. However, we do not look at a related issue the extent to which loan guarantees encour
age "additional" or "additive" investment.
11. There are other reasons for not modeling the impact of incentives on investment decisions.
First, we acknowledge that with most big investments, the state and city incentive package will be
"negotiated" and an incentive "deal" will be struck; however, there is evidence that the investment
decision of the firm will be influenced by incentives the firm believes, prior to the deal being
struck, it will receive, or at least has a good chance of receiving (Owen 1990). The point is not
that the firm fixes its capital plans before it seeks public funds, although it may, but that the firm
will take into account "likely" subsidies when developing its original capital plans. Our own prac
tical knowledge of how deals are struck supports this idea: the firm brings an investment plan to
economic development officials, and based on that plan, the officials provide a package of incen
tives. From a theoretical standpoint this means that a firm will not always maximize its profits,
since, in order to do so, the firm should continue adding to its capital stock until the marginal effi
ciency of investment equals the interest rate, adjusted for taxes and subsidies. In practice, this
requirement may never be met. Work on the site selection process suggests that, because of data
complexity, and thus cost, location decisions are made sequentially at various spatial scales. A
firm will first choose a broad geographic region, then possibly a state within the region, a metro
politan area, and finally a site (see Blair and Premus 1987). Since lowest tax regions do not neces
sarily have the lowest tax industrial sites (and similar arguments can be made concerning inputs),
firms may not end up maximizing their profits. This is well understood in the location literature.
"A feasibility analysis must normally show that the proposed plan will earn a high enough [not
maximum] rate of return to justify construction costs" (Blair and Premus 1987, p. 75).
The British literature on the impact of incentives on investment decisions, although somewhat
dated, appears to support the argument made in the previous paragraph. Most of the British litera
ture concerns the way investment decisions were influenced by Regional Development Grants
(RDGs; entirely automatic regional subsidies available to all firms meeting certain basic require
ments equivalent to tax incentives in the United States) and Regional Selective Assistance
(RSH; negotiated discretionary regional grants equivalent to discretionary incentives in the
United States). Most of the evidence suggests that the automatic subsidy was more likely than the
discretionary subsidy to be incorporated into the investment decision, precisely because the
former was automatic and the amount of the subsidy was given by a simple formula; "the discre
tionary element of aid generates uncertainty which reduces the effectiveness of the grant. . . The
main reason for the non-inclusion of [the discretionary] RSA [as opposed to the automatic RDG]
was uncertainty over both whether an award would be made and also the size of the award"
(Swales 1989). For a review of this literature, see Begg and McDowall (1987); see also Alien et al.
(1986). There have been contrary findings (McGreevy and Thomson 1983).
We interpret these findings as supporting two of our claims. First, discretionary incentives are
probably less likely to affect investment decisions than are taxes and tax incentives. Second, ad
hoc or special discretionary incentives of the sort discussed earlier in this chapter will probably
have much less influence over the industrial location or the investment decision than will ordinary
discretionary incentives.
12. Where fiscal year 1992 was not available, we used calendar year 1992. For those states
with biennial budgets, we divided the data by two.
13. This same method is used with linked-deposits and loan guarantees.
14. TAIM does not optimize the choice of loan program on the basis of after-tax cash flow, but
on the basis of direct loan costs to the firm. See Rasmussen, Bendick, and Ledebur (1984) for jus-
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tification. We adopt this method for practical reasons. Optimizing on the basis of increments to
project returns would slow TAIM considerably. In almost all cases, optimizing on direct loan costs
rather than on increments to project returns has no impact on our results.
15. The reason for this is that such loans cause changes to the debt structure and thus to the
income and tax structure of the firm. TAIM optimizes incentive program choice on the basis of
loan costs, not after-tax income. Even if TAIM optimized awards on the basis of income, the debtstructure problem would remain, although it would probably be less visible. The text describes
our solution to this problem.
16. City-level CDBG-capitalized revolving loan funds (RLFs) are usually available in socalled "entitlement" cities, meaning that they have direct access to federal CDBG funds. Statelevel CDBG-capitalized RLFs are directed towards "non-entitlement" cities and are not available
in "entitlement" cities. There are, however, non-entitlement cities that have used CDBG funds
received through state government to set up local RLFs.
17. Since we are concerned with manufacturing, sales tax TIFs are not included.
18. More precisely, the model would only miscalculate the best package where prior use of the
"inferior" state debt instrument precluded full use (on any or all asset classes) of the "superior"
city instrument.
19. Howland (1990) provides a very useful discussion of these issues in a program evaluation
context.
20. The administrative rules in this illustration are based on rules culled from our sample of
state programs.
21. Schmenner©s (1982) survey work on locational incentives found that a very large propor
tion of firms were unaware of incentives for which they were eligible. If this is the case, it is
unsurprising that there should be even less knowledge of the details of incentive administration.
The situation in Europe may be somewhat different, with greater awareness of clawback regimes;
see, for example, Bachtler (1990).
22. This is not a problem for general use programs only: similar problems arise for other types
of incentives. Many states sponsor customized labor training programs that allow on-the-job train
ing provided at the plant site. A common problem with on-the-job training is that its supposed
beneficiaries, the firm©s workers, do not gain much in the way of skills enhancement. In other
words, the job training scheme acts as a disguised wage subsidy. Some states rigorously enforce
their job training schemes to ensure that skills are provided to workers, while other states have
much less stringent enforcement.
23. These are described in Chapter 2, note 6.
24. At this stage, TAIM merely has small databases on broad state targeting. However, it is
highly impractical to deal with tract and other small-area targeting using this system. Clearly,
there are thousands of tracts in most states, making the creation and maintenance of traditional
databases much too labor-intensive. Moreover, in many American states, counties are so small
that even the management of county-level information poses problems (Iowa, a state of fewer than
4 million, has 99 counties). An extension to TAIM deals with targeting geography by putting it
directly into a GIS. TAIM then queries the GIS to discern the level of incentive for which a firm is
eligible in the substate region.

4 Tax Systems and Incentive
Programs in States and Cities
Are the variations in economic development incentives across states
and cities large enough to make a difference? This has been a point of
contention between critics and supporters of competitive economic
development policy for many years. Critics have often pointed out that
the value of tax breaks and incentive programs to firms is diminished
by the income tax effects and that taxes, in particular, are a very small
part of business costs. Thus, incentives are unlikely to affect most loca
tion decisions. Economic development practitioners have generally
operated under the opposite assumption that every program is effec
tive for every location decision. The evidence from econometric stud
ies of tax effects on economic growth, and from previous studies of tax
differences using the hypothetical firm method, appears to support a
middle position: differences in rates of return due to taxes are signifi
cant enough to influence location decisions at the margin and hence to
affect rates of growth, even if the majority of location decisions are
unaffected.
Previous empirical studies, however, have not incorporated the full
range of tax incentives and so have not measured accurately actual
after-tax rates of return on new investment. Furthermore, non-tax
incentives have not been incorporated at all. This raises several ques
tions that can now be addressed by the present study. Do tax and other
incentives widen or narrow the differences among places in rates of
return on new investment? Are differences "large" or "small" using
various standards of comparison? Are non-tax incentives greater in
value than tax incentives? Are the variations in returns among cities
due more to the differences in state taxes and programs or to differ
ences in local taxes and incentives? How important are enterprise
zones and similar programs in changing the relative positions of cities
in the competition for jobs? Is there a type of state/local industrial pol
icy implied by the sectoral differences in rates of return? We explore
these and other questions in this chapter. We do not address the larger
issue of whether the tax and incentive variations measured by TAIM
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can explain the variation in state or local rates of growth; this must
await subsequent research.
We begin by describing the tax systems and tax incentive programs
in our selected states and cities, and we then explore the implications
of making arbitrary distinctions between basic features of the tax sys
tem on the one hand and "tax incentives" on the other. We then con
sider the importance of states versus cities in establishing the tax
parameters and incentive programs that affect rates of return. Next, we
describe the range of non-tax incentive programs available in the states
and cities in our study. We subsequently present the model results in
terms of the spatial variation in taxes and incentives, and we investigate
the issue of incentive size.

VARIATION IN TAXES AND TAX INCENTIVES
There was wide variation in 1992 among the 24 states in our study
with respect to the relative importance of income, net worth, sales, or
property taxes, and with respect to the definition of the base of each of
these taxes and the tax rate to be applied. All 24 states have a local
property tax that applies at least to business realty and a sales tax that
applies to some business purchases. All but two have a corporate
income tax; Michigan instead has a form of value-added tax called the
single business tax, and Washington taxes businesses based on their
gross receipts. 1 Both of these taxes are included in our analysis. Four of
the income-tax states actually have a combined income-net worth tax,
whereby the firm must calculate a tax liability based on income and a
tax liability based on net worth, stockholders© equity, intangible prop
erty, or some other definition of wealth. The firm then pays whichever
is greater, the income-base tax or the wealth-base tax. Another eight
states have a separate wealth tax that is always additive with the
income tax.
Sales Taxes
State sales tax rates vary from 4 percent in five states to a high of 6.5
percent in Washington and Illinois (see Table 4.1). These taxes apply to

Ill
Table 4.1 State Sales Taxes on Business Purchases as of 1992 (%)
General
rate

Manufacturing
machinery and
equipment

Electricity and
natural gas

Alabama

4.00

1.50

4.00

California

6.00

6.00

Exempt

Connecticut

6.00

Exempt

Exempt

Florida

6.00

Exempt

7.00

Georgia

4.00

Exempt

4.00

Illinois

6.50

Exempt

5.00 a

Indiana

5.00

Exempt

Exempt if used directly in
manufacturing

Iowa

5.00

Exempt

Exempt if used directly in
manufacturing

State

Kentucky

6.00

Exempt

6.00 b

Massachusetts

5.00

Exempt

Exempt if used directly in
manufacturing

Michigan

4.00

Exempt

Exempt if used directly in
manufacturing

Minnesota

6.00

Exempt

Exempt if used directly in
manufacturing

Missouri

4.60

Exempt

4.60

New Jersey

6.00

Exempt

Exempt

New York

4.00

Exempt

Exempt if used directly in
manufacturing

North Carolina

4.00

1.00

3.00 a

Ohio

5.00

Exempt

Exempt

Pennsylvania

6.00

Exempt

Exempt if used directly in
manufacturing

South Carolina

5.00

Exempt

Exempt

Tennessee

6.00

Exempt

Lower rate (1.50 ) if used
directly in manufacturing.

Texas

6.25

6.25

Exempt
(continued)
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Table 4.1 (continued)

State
Virginia

Washington
Wisconsin
Median state

4.50

Manufacturing
machinery and
equipment
Exempt

6.50
5.00
5.00

6.50
Exempt
Exempt

General
rate

Electricity and
natural gas
Natural gas exempt;
electricity exempt if used
directly in manufacturing
Exempt
5.00
Exempt if used directly in
manufacturing

SOURCE: Commerce Clearing House, State Tax Guide; American Bar Association 1993; Federa
tion of Tax Administrators, 1991.
NOTE: In all of these states, other items of capital equipment (non-manufacturing machinery, fur
niture and fixtures, computers) are taxed at the general sales tax rate except that computers are
exempt in Iowa. In several states, sales tax exemptions beyond those shown here apply in enter
prise zones; see Table 4.4.
a. Rates are lower than general sales tax rate for the state.
b. In Kentucky, expenses for energy and energy-producing fuels used in manufacturing are
exempt to the extent that such expenses exceed 3% of the cost of production.

purchases of furniture and fixtures, computers, and other non-manufac
turing machinery and equipment by manufacturers in all 24 states. 2
However, manufacturing machinery and equipment have been
excluded from the sales tax base in all but 5 of the 24 states, and only 6
states tax electricity and natural gas used by manufacturing firms at the
full rate. Three tax fuel and electricity at a lower rate, eight exempt the
portion of fuel and electricity used directly in the manufacturing pro
cess,3 and another seven exempt fuel and electricity altogether. The
exemptions for manufacturing machinery and equipment, as well as
the exemptions or preferential rates for fuel and electricity used
directly in manufacturing, could be viewed as tax incentives. They are
targeted at the manufacturing sector, as are the majority of economic
development incentives.

Industrial Incentives

113

Corporate Income Taxes and Credits
State corporate income taxes are imposed in 22 of the 24 states in
our study. The remaining two levy a value-added tax (Michigan) or a
gross receipts tax (Washington) instead. Among the 22 income tax
states, tax rates range from 4.5 percent in Texas to 12.25 percent in
Pennsylvania (Table 4.2). These are flat rates applied to all taxable
income; only 3 of the 24 states have a progressive rate structure, and
among these 3 the highest top-bracket rate was 12.0 percent in Iowa.
More significant than rate differences are variations in the definition of
taxable income and in the credits permitted. In most states, the corpo
ration©s determination of taxable income starts with federal taxable
income or with something practically equivalent to it. Federal taxable
income is net of deductions for federal depreciation, state and local
taxes on income, and property taxes, as well as other normal business
expenses. Three of the 24 states then permit deduction of all or part of
federal income taxes in arriving at state taxable income. Most states
require the firm to add back in to federal taxable income the deductions
for state income taxes. However, six states permit the deduction of cor
porate income taxes paid to other states (which in our model means the
deduction of median state income taxes), and two states do not require
the firm to add back their own state income taxes, in effect allowing the
deduction of their own state income taxes. All but Indiana allow deduc
tion of property taxes; California and New Jersey require use of depre
ciation schedules less accelerated than current federal law.
Once the taxable income of the corporation as a whole has been
determined, the portion of that income taxable in the particular state
must be calculated, assuming that the firm has operations in other
states as well. This is done according to the state©s rules for the alloca
tion and apportionment of income. Generally, nonbusiness income is
allocated (assigned) entirely to one state or another. Rental income is
allocated entirely to the state in which the rental property is located,
while dividends are usually allocated to the headquarters state.
Business income derived from the sale of the manufacturer©s goods
is apportioned. All but two of the income tax states use a three-factor
apportionment formula: payroll, property, and sales. Each factor is a
percentage: the firm©s payroll paid out in the taxing state divided by its
total payroll everywhere, property located in the state divided by prop-

Table 4.2 State Corporate Income and Net Worth Taxes as of 1992

Alabama
California
Connecticut
Florida
Georgia
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa

Deductions from Income
Income taxes
Other
Other
Federal state deductions
Yes*
See
credits
No
No
Pre-1981
depreciation
No
No
No
No
No
No
GA income
taxes ded.
No
Yes
No

Yes
(50%)
Kentucky
No
Massachusetts
No

No

Property
taxes not ded.

Apportionment of Income
Payroll Property
(%)
(%)
33.3
33.3

Income General credits
Net
Throwback tax rate against income worth
sales
tax
(%)
tax
Yes
5.00
Other state
Separate
income taxes*
Yes
9.30
No

33.3

33.3

33.3*

25.0
25.0
33.3

25.0*
25.0
33.3

50.0*
50.0
33.3

No
No
No

11.50
5.50
6.00

25.0

25.0

50.0

Yes

7.30*

33.3

33.3

33.3

Yes

7.75*

100.0

No

12.00*

50.0
50.0

No
Yes

8.25*
9.50

Yes
No
No

Sales
(%)
33.3

25.0
25.0

25.0
25.0

Integrated
No
Integrated
Investment
credit

Separate
No

New jobs credit

Investment
credit

No
Separate
Separate

30.0

30.0

40.0

Yes

2.35

15.0
33.3*

15.0
33.3*

70.0
33.3*

No
Yes

9.80
5.00

33.3

33.3*

33.3*

No

9.00

No

25.0

25.0*

50.0

No

9.00

No

No

25.0

25.0

50.0

No

7.75

Ohio

No

Yes

25.0

25.0

50.0

No

9.12*

Pennsylvania
South Carolina
Tennessee

No
No
No

No
No
Yes

33.3
33.3
33.3

33.3
33.3
33.3

33.3
33.3
33.3

No
No
No

12.25
5.00
6.00

Texas
Virginia
Washington*

No
No
No

Yes
No
No

33.3

33.3

100.0*
33.3
100.0

Yes
No
No

4.50
6.00
0.484*

Michigan*

No

No

Minnesota
Missouri

No
No

New Jersey

No
Yes
(100%)
No

Yes

New York

No

North Carolina

Capital
acquisition
cost

Pre-1981
depreciation

OH income
taxes ded.

No

Investment &
jobs credits

No
Separate
No

Investment
credit
Inventory
property tax*

Integrated
Separate
No

New jobs credit Separate
New jobs credit Separate
Investment
Separate
credit
Integrated
No
No
(continued)

Table 4.2 (continued)
Deductions from Income
Income taxes
Other
Other
Federal state deductions
Wisconsin
No
No
Median state

No

No

Apportionment of Income
Payroll Property
25.0

25.0

Sales
(%)
50.0

25.0

25.0

50.0

Income General credits
Throwback tax rate against income
sales
(%)
tax
7.90
Sales tax on fuel
Yes (50%)
and electricity*
7.00
No
None

Net
worth
tax
No
No

SOURCE: Commerce Clearing House, Multistate Corporate Income Tax Guide; state corporate income tax forms and instructions.
NOTE: * indicates an explanation is included in these notes. All states but two have corporate income taxes: MI single-business tax is a value-added tax,
WA has only a gross receipts tax. Except as noted, all states allowed depreciation on assets acquired in 1992 or later essentially similar to current Federal
MACRS depreciation, did not allow deduction of their own state income taxes, and did allow a deduction for property taxes. In AL, a percentage (income
from AL operations divided by total federal income) of federal income taxes are deductible. Apportionment percentages are the weights applied to the
firm©s in-state share of payroll, property, and sales. MO allows firms to substitute single-factor 100% sales formula. Definitions of payroll vary only slightly
among the states; property is defined as acquisition cost in most states, but CT, NJ, and NY use book value. Nonbusiness income is included in the sales
factor only in CA, CT, NJ, and TX. Non-business income is generally allocated entirely to the state where earned; i.e, the location of the property. We
assume dividends are allocated to headquarters state. However, nonbusiness income is apportioned in CT, MA, MN, and NJ, is not part of tax base in WA,
and is allocated by a separate formula in NY and TN. Rates in all but six states are flat rates applied to all taxable income; for the three states with a pro
gressive rate structure (IA, KY, and OH), the rate shown is the top bracket rate. In IL, IN, and OH, the rates shown are a combination of two tax rates (in
effect, combining a regular and supplemental tax.) In WA, the rate is appllied to gross recepits. General credits are those generally available to any corpo
ration; credits available only in enterprise zones or the like are described in a later table. AL allows domestic (AL) corporations a credit for income taxes
paid to other states. NC credit is for 40% of local property taxes on inventory of finished goods. WI allows credit for the sales tax on fuel and electricity
used directly in manufacturing. Net worth taxes include all taxes on capital, stockholders© equity, or assets; they either operate as a separate tax or are inte
grated, in which case the firm usually pays whichever is larger, the income tax or the net worth tax.
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erty owned everywhere, and sales destined for that state divided by
total sales. The apportionment percentage is a weighted average of
these three factor percentages. Ten states use equal weights; 11 weight
sales more heavily, including 9 that double-weight sales (so that the
payroll and property factors are weighted 25 percent each, sales 50 per
cent). Two states use single-factor apportionment, 100 percent based
on sales, while another allows this as an option. The popularity of the
apportionment formulas weighting sales more heavily is undoubtedly
due to the advantage this provides to the exporting firm. It creates a tax
incentive to locate a manufacturer©s plant (and hence payroll) in that
state when the majority of the goods will be sold in national or interna
tional markets.
Another important feature of the apportionment rules has to do with
sales to states in which the firm has no tax nexus. Offices for the solici
tation of sales are generally sufficient to establish a tax nexus that
makes the firm taxable in that state; production facilities need not be
located there. Nine of the 24 states require that sales to states in which
the firm is not subject to state income tax (or to the federal govern
ment) be "thrown back" to the state in question, raising the sales factor
and hence taxable income.4
Once taxable income has been determined the sum of nonbusiness
income allocated to the state and business income apportioned to the
state tax liability is found by multiplying the flat rate by taxable
income or by applying a progressive rate table to taxable income.
Credits may then be deducted to arrive at the final tax liability. We have
modeled the significant credits generally available to manufacturing
firms, and the investment or new jobs credits permitted statewide or in
places such as enterprise zones. Investment credits are usually a fixed
percentage of the acquisition cost of new property, plant, and equip
ment, sometimes subject to a minimum amount of new investment or a
minimum number of associated new jobs. Jobs credits are either a per
centage of the wages paid to new employees or a fixed dollar amount
per new job. Only 8 of the 24 states have investment or jobs credits that
apply statewide.

118

Tax Systems and Incentive Programs in States and Cities

Property Taxes
The property tax is primarily a local tax, although 3 of our 24 states
impose a small state property tax. The states play a significant role by
defining the property tax base, by sometimes imposing ceilings on
property tax rates, and by permitting or not permitting localities to pro
vide abatements of local property taxes on new industrial property. The
wide variation among states in the size of a manufacturer©s local prop
erty tax bill, compared to its state income and sales tax expense, is also
directly related to variation in the division of responsibilities between
the state and local governments for funding certain kinds of programs,
particularly the state share of education, health, and welfare programs.
Of the 24 states, 6 exclude all personal property from the property
tax base; at the other extreme, 2 tax all classes of personal property
fully (at the same assessment ratio as real property). The remaining 16
exempt some portion of personal property or require that it be assessed
at a lower rate than real (Table 4.3). For these states that do tax per
sonal property, exemptions for manufacturer©s inventories or for manu
facturing machinery and equipment could be viewed as tax
expenditures or development incentives. Twelve of the 16 exempt
inventories, and the other 4 tax only a portion of inventories or assess
them at a lower percentage. Of the 18 states that tax personal property,
however, only 2 (Kentucky and Wisconsin) exempt manufacturing
machinery and equipment; another 4 tax this category at a lower rate
than real property (Iowa, Ohio, and Tennessee) or provide a temporary
exemption (Connecticut). Seven of the 18 personal property states
exempt transportation equipment. Virginia is an oddity in that manu
facturing machinery and equipment and transportation equipment are
taxed, while other kinds of personal property are exempt.
Targeted Tax Incentives
Geographically targeted tax incentives have become nearly univer
sal; 20 of the 24 states have enabling legislation for the creation of
enterprise zones or development zones (generally areas smaller than a
city, created at the option of the city), and 3 states have designated
selected counties as distressed areas eligible for state development
incentives (Table 4.4). Eligibility as an enterprise zone or distressed
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area is usually determined primarily on the basis of the local unem
ployment rate and some measure of income or poverty.
Of the 22 states with enterprise zone laws and/or distressed coun
ties, 21 provide state income tax incentives and 7 offer sales tax incen
tives to firms locating in the zone or designated county. Ohio is the
only state that allows enterprise zones but provides no associated state
incentives, relying solely on local tax abatements to stimulate develop
ment. Four states provide investment tax credits (ITCs) only in enter
prise zones; another four have statewide ITCs but provide more
generous versions in zones. Fourteen states provide new jobs tax cred
its only in enterprise zones, while two provide more generous versions
of statewide jobs credits in zones. Three states, in lieu of investment or
jobs credits, simply exempt all or 50 percent of the income attributable
to zone operations from state income tax. Four states provide such
income exemptions in addition to credits. Tax incentives targeted to
areas of high unemployment are now nearly universal, are usually
much more generous than the statewide versions, and have all been
established since 1981 (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Devel
opment 1992).

BASIC TAX SYSTEMS VERSUS TAX INCENTIVES
Of the various features of the state tax systems described, only those
with clear and explicit economic development purpose are separated in
our analysis: the statewide investment and jobs credits and all the
enterprise zone tax incentives. Other elements, including heavier
weighting of sales in apportionment formulas and exemption of manu
facturing machinery or fuel and electricity from the sales tax, are part
of the state©s "basic tax system." To provide an understanding of the
relative importance of the major aspects of income, sales, and property
taxes, some of which may indeed have been liberalized in response to
state economic development concerns, Table 4.5 illustrates, for
selected hypothetical firms, the value of each tax feature.
The first step in producing Table 4.5 was to generate after-tax
returns from a new investment in a fictional high-tax state. This state is
a "worst case": it has the highest (7.25 percent) combined state/local

Table 4.3 Property Tax Base, Effective Property Tax Rates, and Abatements Offered, by State, 1992
State statutory assessment ratios and exemptions (%)

Effective property tax
rates (%)

Personal property
State

Real
property

Inventories

Mfg.
M&E

Trans.
equip.

Number of sample cities

With abatements

Local: real prop.
Other
M&E

State

Low

High

Total

With
EZs

1

0

City wide
1

23

6

NA

EZs
only

Alabama

20.0

Exempt

20.0

20.0

20.0

0.65

1.16

California

100.0

Exempt

100.0

Exempt

100.0

None

1.01

1.25

Connecticut

70.0

Exempt

70.0*

70.0

70.0

None

1.84

4.75

3

2

2

1

Florida

100.0

Exempt

100.0

Exempt

100.0

None

1.95

2.91

12

5

NA

NA

0
NA

Georgia

40.0

40.0*

40.0

40.0

40.0

0.025

0.76

2.44

4

1

1

1

Illinois

33.3

Exempt

Exempt

Exempt

Exempt

None

2.44

3.55

5

5

0

5

Indiana

33.3

Part exempt*

33.3

Part exempt*

33.3

None

3.72

4.39

3

2

3

0

Iowa

100.0

Exempt

30.0*

Exempt

Exempt*

None

4.23

4.68

2

NA

2

NA

Kentucky

Local var.

Part exempt*

Exempt*

Local var.

Local var.

0.184*

0.97

1

0

NA

0

Massachusetts

100.0

Exempt

Exempt

Exempt

Exempt

None

2.51

1

NA

NA

NA

Michigan

50.0

Exempt

50.0

Exempt

50.0

None

2.31

3.90

5

NA

3

NA

Minnesota

100.0

Exempt

Exempt

Exempt

Exempt

None

4.81

5.30

2

NA

NA

NA

Missouri

32.0

Exempt

33.3

33.3

33.3

2.68

3

3

1

2

Local var.

Exempt

Exempt

Exempt

Exempt

None
1.3*

1.68

New Jersey

2.30

3.46

5

2

2

0

New York

Local var.

Exempt

Exempt

Exempt

Exempt

None

1.78

3.66

3

2

2

0

100.0

Exempt

100.0

100.0

100.0

None

1.32

1.40

2

1

NA

0

North Carolina
Ohio
Pennsylvania

35.0

26.0

26.0

Exempt

26.0

None

1.45

2.31

3

1

1

1

Local var.

Exempt

Exempt

Exempt

Exempt

None

1.92

6.56

5

2

3

0

South Carolina

10.5

Exempt

10.5

10.5

10.5

None

2.93

3.03

2

0

2

0

1.15

2.33

3

0

NA

0

9

10

0

Tennessee

40.0

25.0

30.0

30.0

30.0

None

Texas

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

None

1.84

3.13

10

Virginia

100.0

Exempt

100.0

100.0

Exempt

None

0.50

1.45

5

1

NA

0

100.0

Exempt

100.0

None

1.21

1.83

5

0

NA

0

Washington

100.0

Exempt

0
100.0
Exempt
Exempt
Exempt
100.0
Wisconsin
0
0
0
1
2.40
None
100.0
Exempt
100.0
Exempt
100.0
Median state
SOURCE: Prentice-Hall, All States Tax Guide; Commerce Clearing House, State Tax Guide; state statutes; authors© survey data.
low
NOTE: "M&E" refers to machinery and equipment. "Effective property tax rates" are taxes as a percentage of market value; local rates shown are the
the
that
means
var."
"Local
incentives.
tax
with
areas
distressed
similar
or
zones
enterprise
to
refers
"EZs"
sample.
our
in
cities
the
among
est and highest
enterprise
active
an
have
not
does
state
the
because
either
applicable,
not
assessment ratio is not mandated by state law; it varies by locality. "NA" means
zone program or because state law does not permit localities to provide property tax abatements.
*Asterisked items by state:
Connecticut: Manufacturing M&E is exempt for the first four years after it is acquired.
Georgia: Localities may choose to exempt inventories.
Iowa: Manufacturing M&E and computers are assessed at 30% of acquisition cost.
are
Indiana: Inventories are valued at 65% of cost, then assessed at 33.3%; inventories of finished goods destined for out of state are exempt; vehicles
tons.
8
over
for
licensed
unless
exempt
Kentucky: State tax rate shown applies to real property; lower rates apply to manufacturing M&E and inventories of raw materials and goods in pro
cess, which are exempt from local tax. Inventories of finished goods are subject to local tax.
New Jersey: State tax applied in 1993 to 50% of acquisition cost of personal property (excluding inventories and vehicles) in use as of October 1992
but was repealed for subsequent years.
None

2.87

4.23

4

2

NA

Table 4.4 State Tax Incentives Available Statewide and in Enterprise Zones for Distressed Areas, 1992
Income tax credits
State

Targeted
program

Number
of zones Investment
12
EZs only

Alabama

EZs

California

EZs&
program
areas

34

Connecticut

EZs

11

Florida

EZs

None

Sales tax exemptions and credits

Jobs

EZ income
exemption

EZs only

Yes

EZs only

Mfg.
M&E

Fuel & elect.

All pers.
prop.

None

None

None

EZs only
(credit)

Statewide

None

Statewide

Statewide

None

None

None

None

EZs only*

Statewide

None

None

Statewide

None

None

None

EZs only

Statewide

None

None

None

Statewide

Statewide

Statewide

None

Statewide

EZs only

None

50.0%

30
Georgia

EZs

Georgia

Less
developed
counties

3

80

None

Illinois

EZs

90

EZ>SW

EZs only

Indiana

EZs

15

None

EZs only

Statewide

Statewide

None

Kentucky

EZs

10

None

EZs only

Statewide

Statewide*

None

Massachusetts

None

Statewide

None

Statewide

Statewide

None

Michigan*

EZs

None

None

Statewide

Statewide

EZs only

1

100.0%

Business
expense
deduction

EZs: elect.* EZs: 97% Credit for EZ
property taxes

Iowa

100.0%

Other tax
incentives

Minnesota*

EZs

Missouri

EZs

None

EZs only

EZ>SW

EZ>SW

50.0%*

Statewide

Statewide

None

Statewide

None

None
credits

50
North Carolina Distressed
counties

33

Urban EZs

10

New Jersey

None

EZs only

None

None

None

EZs only

EZs only

Statewide

Statewide

EZs only
None

EZ>SW

EZs only

Statewide

Statewide

227

None

None

Statewide

Statewide

None

45

EZs only

Statewide

Statewide

Statewide

None
None

Economic
devel. zones

19

Ohio

EZs

Pennsylvania

EZs

New York

South Carolina

EZs

3

None

EZ>SW

Statewide

Statewide

Tennessee

EZs

2

EZ>SW

None

Statewide

None

None

Texas

EZs

103

None

EZs only*

50.0%

*

Statewide

None

Virginia

EZs

18

None

None

100.0%

EZs only*

Statewide

EZs only*

Statewide

None

Statewide
(credit)

None

Washington

Wisconsin

Distressed
areas
(counties)

22

Development
zones

12

Credit for prop.
tax/interest*

None

EZs only

None

EZs only

EZs only

Statewide

(continued)

Table 4.4 (continued)
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 1992; authors© survey data; state enterprise zone reports; Commerce Clearing House,
Multistate Corporate Income Tax Guide; state corporate income tax forms and instructions.
NOTE: Income tax credits are credits against the corporate income and/or net worth tax and are generally either a percentage of the value of enterprise
zone investment or a jobs credit equal to a percentage of wages or a dollar amount per job. "EZ > S W" means that the credit available in enterprise zones
is more generous than one available statewide. The "EZ income exemption" column indicates the percentage of taxable income attributable to operations in
an enterprise zone that is exempt from state income tax. Sales tax preferences are exemptions unless noted as (credit), indicating an income tax credit.
"M&E" refers to machinery and equipment. "EZs" refers to enterprise zones or similar distressed areas.
*Asterisked items, by state:
Florida: Jobs credit applies only to employees earning $1,500 per month or less; exemption from sales tax on electricity is available only if the munic
ipality votes to exempt EZ firms from at least 50 percent of local public service tax.
Kentucky: Energy sales tax exemption only to extent that energy costs exceed 3 percent of production costs.
Michigan: EZ was allowed in only one city; purchases of machinery and equipment for use in an EZ are exempt from sales tax for the first 10 years.
Minnesota: As of 1992, "competitive zones" had been phased out; five small "border city" zones remained in cities bordering the Dakotas; credit is
allowed for EZ property taxes and interest on EZ facility debt.
Missouri: EZ income exemption is for 10 years.
Texas: Jobs credit is called a refund for sales taxes paid on manufacturing M&E, but the credit is equal to $2,200 per job. We treat the sales tax paid as
a ceiling on the jobs credit.
Virginia: All purchases are exempt from sales tax for the first 5 years that the firm is located in an EZ.

Table 4.5 Value to the Firm of Selected Features of State and Local Taxes: % Reduction in Tax Burden

Tax features
Sales tax: exemptions
Manufact. machinery & equipment
(M&E)
Fuel & electricity: direct
manufacturing use
Median sales tax
State corporate income tax
Federal depreciation allowed
Federal income taxes deductible
Other state income taxes deductible
Apportionment: double-weighted sales
Apportionment: throwback sales
eliminated
Apportionment: both features
Median flat tax rate
Median corporate income tax system
Local property taxes
Inventory exemption

#14:
Auto
$600

Median
#16:
state tax
Instruments
parameters
$180

#4:
Drugs
$470

#5:
Soaps
$20

#7:
Plastics
$5

11.7

9.7

11.0

13.5

17.0

9.4

Exempt

3.4

1.2

2.2

6.6

2.5

1.9

Exempt

15.5

11.3

13.6

20.8

20.1

11.9

6.0

0.0
9.7
2.2
2.9
1.5

0.1
16.2
3.5
6.0
3.0

0.1
13.8
3.1
2.1
1.1

0.2
4.7
0.9
2.4
1.2

0.0
4.2
1.0
0.3
0.2

0.1
11.2
2.4
4.8
2.5

Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes

5.2
5.6
9.8

10.5
9.5
17.9

3.8
7.8
10.8

4.2
3.0
6.4

0.5
2.2
2.6

8.5
6.8
13.7

Yes
8.0
*

16.5

8.6

15.3

16.0

13.9

17.5

Yes

Firm #2:
Furniture
$40a

(continued)

Table 4.5 (continued)

Tax features
Manufact. M&E exemption
Average personal property valuation
Median property tax rate
Median property tax system
Tax incentives
Typical investment tax credit
Typical jobs tax credit
Both tax credits
Typical property tax abatement

Firm #2:
Furniture
$40a
22.8
5.0
11.3
28.6

#4:
Drugs
$470
16.4
3.3
8.3
18.0

#5:
Soaps
$20
20.0
4.1
10.0
25.7

#7:
Plastics
$5
26.4
5.9
12.1
30.1

#14:
Auto
$600
34.8
7.3
13.8
31.0

5.0
17.5
20.7
32.0

4.7
3.3
7.0
20.3

4.7
14.0
17.4
28.9

5.1
17.3
20.3
36.5

6.2
5.0
8.7
33.2

#16:
Median
Instruments
state tax
parameters
$180
17.7
No
4.1
Yes
10.5
2.4
*
28.0
4.5
8.2
11.5
23.4

None
None
None
None

NOTE: This table shows the percentage reduction in state and local taxes (i.e., the present value over 20 years of taxes attributable to a new plant) as a
result of adopting each modification to a baseline tax system. The plant is located in a hypothetical city and state (population 6 million) where the baseline
tax system includes a 6.0 percent state plus 1.25 percent local sales tax rate that applies to machinery and equipment and to fuel and utilities; pre-1981
depreciation; no deductions for federal or state income taxes; equal-weighted three-factor apportionment with throwback of sales from non-taxing states;
and a flat 10 percent income tax rate. The 3 percent property tax rate applies to all real and per sonal property and employs a very slow depreciation sched
ule for the valuation of personal property. This represents the "worst" features of the 24 state tax systems and is approximately California©s state tax system
(with the addition of a sales tax on fuel and electricity), plus Alabama©s property tax system (with the addition of a tax on inventories and a higher tax
rate). Changes are taken one at a time. The investment tax credit is 2 percent of plant and equipment; the jobs tax credit is $1,000 per new job. Both are
nonrefundable, one-time credits but can be carried forward 10 years. The typical property tax abatement schedule reduced the following percentages of
local taxes for years 1 to 10: 100, 100, 100, 90, 75, 60 45, 30, 20, 10.
*The median tax system is defined by the parameters shown in the last column,
a. Headings for columns should be read as "Firm #2, furniture industry, plant size = $40 million."
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sales tax rate among our 24 states, with no exemption for manufactur
ing machinery or fuel and electricity; an income tax law that requires
pre-1981 depreciation (which is less accelerated than post-1986 rules);
no deductions for federal or other state income taxes; equal-weighted
three-factor apportionment with throwback sales; and a flat 10 percent
tax rate. (This state©s income and sales taxes are identical to Califor
nia©s with two exceptions: California does exempt fuel and electricity
from the sales tax, and the income tax rate is only 9.3 percent.) The
property tax applies to personal property, including inventories and
manufacturing machinery and equipment; the state guidelines for the
valuation of personal property are the least favorable among the 24
states (Alabama©s), applying the slowest depreciation rates; and the tax
rate is a relatively high 3 percent.
We assume that a multistate firm headquartered in our median state
builds a new plant in this mythical high-tax state. The project returns
after paying state and local taxes in this high-tax state are then com
pared with returns for the identical investment in the same state but
with all tax rates set to zero. The difference is the baseline state and
local tax burden on the investment in a new plant.
The model then modifies one feature of the tax system at a time and
recalculates net project returns and state/local taxes. Table 4.5 shows
the percentage decrease in state/local taxes that results from each tax
modification. This allows us to compare the relative value to the firm of
different conditions, such as a property tax versus a sales tax exemp
tion. The model also shows the tax reduction resulting from adopting
the median version of each tax; the median sales tax, for example, is a
5 percent state plus 1 percent local rate with exemptions for both man
ufacturing machinery and fuel and electricity. Median taxes are con
structed by using, for each feature or rate, the median value among our
24 states, shown in the right-hand column of the table. Results are
shown for six multistate firms that portray the diversity of characteris
tics underlying wide variation in tax burdens.
Somewhat surprisingly, the sales tax exemption for manufacturing
machinery is one of the most valuable incentives, in all six cases of
more value to the firm than double-weighting sales, and of much more
importance than the impact of allowing federal depreciation under the
state corporate income tax. Eliminating the throwback sales rule is
about half as valuable as double-weighting sales; changing both fea-
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tures of the apportionment rules to the median position saves the firm
from about 4 percent to 11 percent of its tax burden, except for firm
number 14. The two rules together are worth more than the sum of the
individual percentages because the double weighting of sales is more
advantageous when the factor does not include throwback sales.
Table 4.5 illustrates the importance of property taxes. Changing
even a relatively obscure feature of the property tax system substitut
ing the average state guidelines or rules for valuation of personal prop
erty in order to arrive at full value (before applying assessment ratios)
for Alabama©s rules turns out to be of more significance for these
firms than depreciation rules or state income tax deductibility under the
income tax.
The three most common incentives with explicit economic develop
ment purposes, and the only tax incentives that we model separately,
are included in Table 4.5 for comparison with the other tax features
that are less clearly for economic development and that are part of our
"basic tax system." The value of the "typical" investment tax credit (2
percent of plant and equipment) or jobs tax credit ($1,000 per new job)
is comparable to the benefit from such tax features as a total exemption
of manufacturing machinery and equipment from the sales tax or liber
alization of apportionment rules. The typical property tax abatement
program, on the other hand, is worth much more, about a fifth to a third
of the firm©s total state/local tax burden.
It is clear from Table 4.5 that a study of state and local incentive
competition must include a complete modeling of the state and local
taxes that fall directly on business, as well as of the explicit tax incen
tives. Two-thirds of the states in our sample have no statewide invest
ment or jobs tax credits, yet tax policy in these states may very well
have been driven by economic development concerns over the past two
decades as much as in the states with incentives. Those concerns may
have resulted in liberalized sales tax exemptions or apportionment
rales, or simply in reduced tax rates, rather than in tax credits.
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THE IMPORTANCE OF STATE VERSUS LOCAL TAXES
AND TAX INCENTIVES
Is variation in taxes and incentives among cities within a state more
significant than variations across states? There is reason to believe that
the state is more important than the locality. States play a very impor
tant role in setting the parameters of local taxation and in providing or
limiting the use of tax incentives. The level of local property taxation is
affected strongly by state policy regarding the functional responsibili
ties of the state versus local governments and by the share of local
spending on education, mental health, and other programs financed by
state grants or shared revenues. States also define the property tax base
and assessment rules; set limits on property tax rates on increases in
local spending, or on growth in assessments; limit local indebtedness;
and establish policies on bond approval. In addition, states determine
what nonproperty taxes are available to local governments (such as
sales and corporate income taxes) and often set limits on rates for such
taxes.
Our sample of cities is too small to determine the extent of variation
in returns across cities within each state. We can, however, examine
how states vary in terms of the relative importance of state versus local
taxes and in the relative magnitude of state versus local tax incentives.
We can also analyze the extent to which low state taxes (or large state
incentives) compensate for high local taxes (or small local incentives).
To accomplish these comparisons, we created 24 "representative cit
ies," one for each state, and gave each city the median or "typical"
sales tax rate, property tax rate, and property tax abatement schedule
among the cities in that state in our study.
It is important to note the limitations of this analysis; the median is
in most states defined by a small group of one to five cities. While the
city sample was drawn randomly, the sample for any one state (except
California, Florida, and Texas) is too small to produce a reliable esti
mate of the state median. For property taxes, this was deemed a serious
problem. As a result, we relied on other data sources to a large extent in
determining average property tax rates for each state. The data sources
and rates are described in Appendix A. There is no alternative data
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source for typical property tax abatement schedules; we were forced to
use a schedule typical of the cities in our sample.
Table 4.6 summarizes the results of the representative city analyses
for the 5 multistate firms that best illustrate the important firm differ
ences among cities and for the average of all 16 firms. Effective state
tax rates measure the reduction in project returns that results when
state income, net worth, and sales taxes are introduced into the analy
sis. Each firm©s project returns in a particular state, after state taxes but
no local taxes, are compared with project returns if the same firm
(headquartered in the median state) had built the new plant instead in a
hypothetical state having no taxes.5 State tax burdens are measured net
of the effects of federal deductibility. The effective tax rate is equal to
the state tax burden (measured as the reduction in the present value of
project cash flow) divided by the present value of income attributable
to the new plant before all taxes (federal, state, and local). Similarly,
the local tax burden is the further reduction in project returns (after
federal and state taxes) caused by introducing local sales, income, and
property taxes.
The range of effective tax rates is quite large, both at the state and
at the local level. As would be expected, the interstate variation in
combined state/local tax rates is less than the variation in either state
or local taxes considered separately; states with high state tax rates
tend to have below-average local tax rates, and vice versa. This is
reflected in the share of local taxes in the combined state-local tax bur
den, which varies greatly. (The highest local share would be about 60
percent instead of 98 percent were it not for one state with very low
corporate income taxes on multistate firms, due to single-factor appor
tionment with no throwback sales; this state has by far the lowest
effective state tax rate, but high property taxes.) The highest combined
state-local tax rate is generally about three times the lowest rate.
Differences across states are not reduced by tax incentives. One
might expect that state and local tax incentives are larger in places with
higher tax rates; that is, the incentives are compensating for high basic
taxes. This does not appear to be the case; the variation in combined
state-local effective tax rates is about the same with general (non-enter
prise zone) tax incentives included as it is with no tax incentives. When
enterprise zone incentives are added, the variation in tax rates actually
increases. Enterprise zone incentives are not offsetting higher basic
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Table 4.6 Effective Tax Rates in a Representative City in Each State (as a
Percentage of New Plant Income before Taxes)
Effective tax rates (%)
Taxes

Lowest

Mean

Highest

Coefficient
of
variation*

Basic state taxes
#2: Furniture

0.2

4.2

9.1

#5: Soaps

0.0

4.4

11.7

0.50

#7: Plastics

0.5

5.1

9.2

0.38

#14: Autos

0.2

5.3

12.9

0.57

0.41

#16: Instruments

0.2

3.4

6.6

0.38

Average: all 16 firms

0.2

4.6

10.5

0.45

#2: Furniture

1.3

3.9

8.3

0.48

Basic local taxes
#5: Soaps

0.9

2.8

6.0

0.50

#7: Plastics

2.2

7.0

14.5

0.48

#14: Autos

2.6

9.3

19.0

0.49

#16: Instruments

1.0

2.8

6.0

0.49

Average: all 16 firms

1.6

4.9

10.5

0.50

4.4

8.1

13.1

0.28

Basic state and local taxes
#2: Furniture
#5: Soaps

3.0

7.2

13.4

0.33

#7: Plastics

7.5

12.1

21.2

0.30

#14: Autos

7.0

14.7

26.5

0.39

#16: Instruments

3.1

6.2

9.8

0.25

Average: all 16 firms

5.0

9.5

16.6

0.31

96.5

0.38

Local taxes as a percentage
of state and local taxes
#2: Furniture

21.4

48.4

#5: Soaps

12.7

40.6

98.3

0.47

#7: Plastics

28.9

56.6

93.4

0.30

#14: Autos

31.3

62.6

97.8

0.28
(continued)
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Table 4.6 (continued)
Effective tax rates
Taxes
#16: Instruments
Average: all 16 firms
State and local taxes after
non-EZ tax incentives
#2: Furniture
#5: Soaps
#7: Plastics
#14: Autos
#16: Instruments
Average: all 16 firms
State and local taxes after all
tax incentives
#2: Furniture
#5: Soaps
#7: Plastics
#14: Autos
#16: Instruments
Average: all 16 firms

Lowest
20.2

Mean
45.6

Highest
95.1

Coefficient
of
variation*
0.40

21.1

49.3

96.4

0.38

2.8
1.7

7.5
6.7

11.6

0.27
0.34

6.1

11.2

6.9
2.1

13.2

17.0
23.9

5.8
8.7

8.3
14.7

6.1

0.36
0.34
0.47
0.29
0.35

3.6

13.4

2.8
1.7
4.9
4.1

5.6
9.4
11.1

9.6
10.2
15.9
23.8

2.1
3.2

4.9
7.3

7.2
13.2

0.25
0.35
0.25
0.30

0.31

NOTE: Data refer to multistate firms only. The basic tax rate is the difference between the present
value of new plant cash flow after all basic taxes and the present value of new plant cash flow in
the absence of taxes levied by the state and city in which the new plant is located, divided by the
present value of income attributable to the new plant before all federal, state, and local taxes. The
state and local tax rate after non-enterprise zone tax incentives is the effective tax rate after invest
ment and jobs tax credits available statewide and after local property tax abatements available
city-wide.
"Coefficient of variation = standard deviation/mean.
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taxes on average. There are also wide differences in tax rates across
firms, reflecting differences in profitability, the proportion of assets
subject to the sales tax or property tax, and other factors.
Effective tax incentive rates can be calculated in a similar fashion by
dividing the value of the incentive (that is, the present value of the
increment in cash flow caused by the incentive) by income before
taxes. Incentive rates could be interpreted as negative tax rates. Table
4.7 shows the average and highest incentive rate among the 24 repre
sentative cities and the variation in rates across cities.
Where the state provides enterprise zone tax credits, or allows cities
to do so, we have given the representative city an enterprise zone. How
ever, even though enterprise zones are fairly numerous in many states, it
does not appear that a significant portion of job growth occurs inside
enterprise zones in more than a few states. We computed annual average
net employment growth between 1980 and 1990 for each of our 24
states. From published data on jobs created in enterprise zones by state
and the number of years such zones existed (U.S. Department of Hous
ing and Urban Development 1992), we also calculated average annual
jobs created inside enterprise zones. We were then able to calculate the
ratio of jobs created in enterprise zones to total state job growth.
The results are suggestive but certainly not definitive. Data are miss
ing from the HUD study for Indiana and North Carolina, and the accu
racy of state-reported jobs data is quite doubtful. Illinois, for example,
reports having produced about 29,000 jobs in enterprise zones per year
over the first nine years of the program, while total state job growth has
averaged about 10,000 per year. The two numbers can be reconciled
only by assuming an average annual net loss of about 19,000 jobs from
areas of Illinois outside enterprise zones, either to Illinois enterprise
zones or to other states. Ohio claims that almost 14,000 jobs per year
have been created in enterprise zones, or about 27 percent of the aver
age annual job growth in 1980. Apart from Ohio and Illinois, enterprise
zone jobs appear to account for 4 percent to 9 percent of annual job
growth in six states: Connecticut, Florida, Kentucky, Missouri, New
Jersey, and Texas. In the remaining 10 states with data, the percentage
was about 2 percent or less, including 5 where it was under 0.5 percent.
These figures compare gross job creation in zones with net job growth
in the state; the significance of enterprise zones would appear even
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smaller if the numerator were net zone job creation or the denominator
were gross state job creation.
Arguably, the typical city for a particular state should include an
enterprise zone only if the majority of likely sites for industrial expan
sion in that state are located within enterprise zones. This is unlikely to
be the case in any state. For this reason, Table 4.7 includes a section
showing tax incentive rates among the 24 cities with all enterprise zone
incentives eliminated.
There is even wider variation in tax incentive rates, at the state and
at the local level, than in basic tax rates. Once again, however, the vari
ation across states is substantially reduced when one combines state
and local incentives. States where local tax incentives are limited tend
to offer larger state tax breaks, and vice versa. Interestingly, enterprise
zone incentives considerably decrease the differences across states.
The coefficient of variation for state/local tax incentives without enter
prise zones is about 1.6; this is reduced to about 0.75 with the introduc
tion of enterprise zone incentives. This suggests that enterprise zone
incentives are largest in the states with the smallest general tax incen
tives. Overall, state and local tax incentives represent a substantial por
tion of the state/local tax burden, averaging abut 23 percent but
reaching as high as 65 percent in some states for some firms.

NON-TAX INCENTIVE PROGRAMS AND THEIR VALUE
TO THE FIRM
As we argued in Chapter 1, a common mistake made by both popu
lar and academic analysts is to assume that the value of an incentive is
the nominal amount of a subsidy award. This ignores the impact of
taxes on non-tax awards and also has the effect of counting apples (a
$1 million grant) with oranges (a $1 million loan). The two central
aims of TAIM are to model different incentive awards appropriately
and then to capture the effects of federal, state, and local taxes on the
private benefits provided by non-tax subsidies.
The impact of taxes on non-tax incentives can be measured in a
number of ways. The simplest is provided by running the TAIM model,
but replacing actual state and local non-tax incentives with a standard
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Table 4.7 Effective Tax Incentive Rates in a Representative City in Each
State (as a Percentage of New Plant Income before Taxes)
Effective rate 1(%)
Tax incentive

Mean

Rate

Coefficient
of variation

State tax incentives
#2: Furniture

1.1

5.2

1.04

#5: Soaps

1.0

4.2

1.03

#7: Plastics

1.3

5.1

0.94

#14: Autos

1.2

4.8

1.08

#16: Instruments

0.6

2.4

0.92

Average: all 16 firms

1.0

4.3

1.00

Local tax incentives
#2: Furniture

0.9

4.2

1.27

#5: Soaps

0.6

2.3

1.23

#7: Plastics

1.4

6.1

1.31

#14: Autos

2.4

9.8

1.26

#16: Instruments

0.7

3.0

1.27

Average: all 16 firms

1.1

4.8

1.26

State and local tax incentives
#2: Furniture

2.0

5.2

0.72

#5: Soaps

1.6

5.2

0.76

#7: Plastics

2.7

6.8

0.74

#14: Autos

3.6

9.8

0.83

#16: Instruments

1.3

3.4

0.74

Average: all 16 firms

2.2

6.0

0.75

State and local tax incentives:
percentage of state/local taxes
#2: Furniture

24.1

56.7

0.64

#5: Soaps

21.9

59.6

0.68

#7: Plastics

22.1

54.8

0.68

#14: Autos

24.6

65.1

0.77

#16: Instruments

20.8

56.6

0.68

Average: all 16 firms

22.5

58.1

0.69
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Effective rate (%)
Tax incentive

Stateand local tax incentives:
no EZ incentives
#2: Furniture

Coefficient

Mean

Rate

of variation

0.6
0.5

3.3

1.50

#5: Soaps
#7: Plastics
#14: Autos

0.9
1.5

#16: Instruments

0.4

2.5
6.1
9.0
2.3
4.2

1.60
1.74
1.66
1.53

Average: all 16 firms
1.59
0.7
NOTE: Data refers to multistate firms only. Tax incentive rate is the difference between
the present value of new plant cash flow after taxes and incentives and the present value
of new plant cash flow after basic taxes only, divided by the present value of before-tax
income. In all cases, the minimum value is zero.

incentive scenario across all 112 locations. In this case, the standard
incentive is a $100,000 grant with no important threshold limits for the
16 firms under consideration. In effect, each investment is given
$100,000 in cash. For multistate firms, the cash grant of $100,000
improves 20-year cash flow by $61,318 on average; for single-location
firms, the figure is $60,494. In the case of multistate firms the range
around the mean is small ($1,896), but for single-location firms it is
roughly 10 times that amount ($18,154). On the whole, multistate
firms benefit by 60-62 cents per nominal award dollar, single-location
firms by 58-73 cents. Where does the rest of each award dollar go?
Indirectly, it is recaptured through federal, state, and local income
taxes. One obvious result is that a state©s or city©s subsidy to a firm
effectively transfers tax revenues to other taxing jurisdictions, includ
ing possibly neighboring or competing states and cities. Thus, non-tax
incentives produce the paradoxical result of subsidizing both private
investment and other jurisdictions.
There is minor variation in the worth of incentives across sectors. To
illustrate, the multistate small furniture and fixtures firm benefits by an
average increment to returns of $61,407 ($61,106, single-location)
with a range of $1,625 ($8,888, single-location). In the case of the
large drugs firm, the benefit average is $61,290 ($60,866, single-loca-
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tion), the range $546 ($8,567, single-location). The relative size of the
multistate range compared to the single-location firm range remains
constant and large across sectors. The reason for this is that, under the
single-location firm assumptions, states are better able to tax the pri
vate benefits provided by grants, loans, and so on, because firms have
all plant and employment in-state. Thus, differences among state tax
regimes show up much more visibly.
Of course, states and cities vary not only in the way their tax
regimes limit the benefits of non-tax incentives but also considerably in
the menu of non-tax incentives they offer. Table 4.8 summarizes the
non-tax state incentives modeled. It is important to emphasize again
that all the states had many more non-tax incentives than those listed in
the table. Table 4.8 covers only major programs that made awards to
more than just a couple of firms in 1992.
Almost all states offer a general customized training incentive, and,
of the two that do not, Massachusetts has a variety of other training
plans, including customized programs (all of which were occupationally or sectorally too specific to meet our inclusion criteria), and South
Carolina has noncustomized programs. In most cases, training is pro
vided in the form of a grant or grant equivalent. In Michigan, however,
the state makes interest payments on training loans. In both Iowa and
Missouri, one training grant is actually a variety of a tax increment
financing instrument. In most cases, infrastructure subsidies are pro
vided not by state departments of economic development but through
state departments of transportation. Usually subsidies are in the form
of a grant, and most states offer such programs. Few states offer gen
eral-use grants; mostly, general-use programs are loans, loan guaran
tees, linked deposits, or related instruments.
Table 4.8 should not be read as providing an indication of a state©s
overall development effort. First, the number of programs offered
within a class of program says nothing of the state©s generosity to busi
ness. Pennsylvania, as an example, has four quite distinct general-use
programs, but even when combined they are still less generous than
some single general-use programs. Second, Table 4.8 makes some
states look much less generous than they actually are. This is particu
larly true of Florida, Massachusetts, and Minnesota. In Florida, the
state disburses funds to regional Community Development Corpora
tions, which then award subsidies to clients. Since the state has limited

Table 4.8 State Non-Tax Incentive Programs That Were Simulated

State

General-use
grant

General-use
loan

General-use
loan
Infrastructure Infrastructure
guarantee3
grant
loan

Bab©

Georgia
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa

Missouri

2b

1

2

New Jersey

1

1

New York

2

North Carolina

1
1

Training
grant

Training
loan

Pennsylvania
South Carofeia
Tennessee
Texas
Virginia
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a. Including loan subsidies and linked deposits.
b. The Community Economic Betterment Account (CEBA) and Economic Development Set Aside (EDSA) are both loans convertible to grants.
c. One of these is a job-training tax increment financing instrument (TIP).
d. The Michigan Training Incentive Fund is a loan subsidy program.
e. The Texas capital program covers two related programs.
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control over these funds once they are disbursed, we count them as a
local program, and they do not appear in Table 4.8. Much the same is
true in Minnesota, where the state also awards funds to local agencies.
Third, the terms and administration of programs—even with a single
program class—vary enormously. Obviously, the benefits of loans and
other debt instruments are crucially dependent on the rates, terms, and
fees applied. Moreover, as we argued in Chapter 3, the administration
of programs by state officials can seriously affect the worth of a sub
sidy.
At the local level, almost all cities claimed that they would provide
infrastructure help (including site development) if needed, but in the
vast majority of cases, no separate infrastructure program had been
established. Almost no cities offered dedicated, customized industrial
training incentives. Loans were the most common formally established
non-tax subsidy at the local level (slightly under a third had such pro
grams), although a few cities offered grants, convertible loan/grants,
and loan guarantees. Most often, local general-use programs were cap
italized through CDBG funds. Numerous cities offered Small Business
Administration (SBA) financing through local 503/504 investment
companies; in fact, many displayed such financing prominently in their
economic development literature. As we indicated earlier, these pro
grams were not included in our analysis. Although a number of cities
offered some form of tax increment financing subsidy, in the majority
of cases these instruments were either reserved for retail development
or were less generous than the local property tax abatement subsidy. As
a result, TAIM simulates tax increment financing awards for only 10
cities in our sample.
Which are more significant, tax incentives or non-tax incentives? For
all 16 firms modeled, state non-tax incentives are vastly more important
than state tax incentives. In the most extreme case—the small multistate
furniture and fixtures firm—97 percent of the entire incentive package
derives from non-tax incentives. Of the 16 firms modeled, the largest
contribution of state tax incentives to the entire state incentive package
is only 18 percent (see the first two columns of Table 4.9). Proportion
ately, small plants benefit more from state non-tax incentives than do
large plants. Nevertheless, the limited contribution of state tax incen
tives to the entire state incentive package is quite startling. This is par
ticularly so if the state proportions are compared to those of the

Table 4.9 Composition of Incentives (Mean Increment to Cash Flow, %)
All state incentives
Firm

All state and city incentives

All state non-tax incentives

Tax

Non-tax

Infrastructure

Training

General-use

Small, furniture and fixtures

3

97

20

80

13

29

58

Large, furniture and fixtures

11

89

43

57

25

43

32

Small, drugs

10

90

46

54

29

38

34

Tax

Non-tax

Large, drugs

18

82

75

25

32

47

22

Small, soaps

10

90

41

59

21

35

44

Large, soaps

15

85

59

41

32

44

24

Small, plastics

4

96

25

75

12

27

60

Large, plastics

12

88

51

49

29

40

31

Small, industrial machinery

7

93

33

67

15

31

54

Large, industrial machinery

15

85

64

36

32

45

23

35

65

19

38

43

Small, electronics

9

91

Large, electronics

16

84

35

65

32

46

23

Small, autos

13

87

64

36

30

46

25

Large, autos

18

82

54

46

30

49

20

Small, instruments

5

95

75

25

13

34

54

Large, instruments

14

86

26

74

32

45

23

NOTE: Numbers in table do not always sum to 100% due to rounding.
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combined state and local incentive package (third and fourth columns
of Table 4.9), where tax incentives play a much more important role.
Indeed, for some firms (large drug firms, small instruments firms),
three-quarters of the entire state/local incentive package derives from
tax incentives. Of the four cases where the contribution of tax incen
tives to the entire package is little (a third or less), three involve plants
that are themselves mostly of very limited size— small furniture and
fixtures with only 67 employees, small plastics with 53, and small
industrial machinery with 84. The generosity of local property tax
abatements, the availability of certain targeted state tax incentives, and
the absence of large locally funded grant and loan programs accounts
for the importance of tax incentives at the local level.
At the state level, TAIM is able to distinguish the effects of the three
classes of non-tax incentives: infrastructure, training, and general-use.
As one would expect, infrastructure incentives are more important for
bigger plants, and such incentives never account for more than a third
of the entire non-tax state and local package. Training incentives are
much more important than infrastructure incentives; in the majority of
cases they are the most significant class of non-tax incentives. They
range from 27 percent of the entire non-tax package, in the case of
small plastics plants, to 49 percent in the case of large auto plants.
Mostly, for bigger plants (defined by employment size), training incen
tives are the leading non-tax incentive. For smaller plants (again
defined by employment size), general-use incentives are more signifi
cant. The relative size of the three classes of non-tax incentives is a
function of the operating ratios associated with the investment in ques
tion.

THE SPATIAL PATTERN OF TAXES AND INCENTIVES
Are tax and incentive differences substantively important? Are dif
ferences in taxes and incentives among sites large enough to influence
business investment and location decisions? As we indicated in the
introduction, we will not present any econometric or survey evidence
on this issue. We focus on the direct size of tax and incentive differen
tials across space. Our approach ignores spatial differentials in other
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factor costs, such as labor, energy, and transportation to markets. More
over, it ignores spatial differentials in the benefits firms receive from
state and local government, in other words, differences in what firms
receive from paying taxes. 6 Table 4.10 provides data on the mean
return after taxes and all incentives across sites (the average increment
to cash flow after the firm makes the new investment) and the range of
returns. All of the data in this table refer to multistate firms.7 The coef
ficient of variation (the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean) pro
vides some sense of the dispersion around that mean. That dispersion is
considerable in a few cases: the small furniture and fixtures plants, the
small industrial machinery plants, and the large auto/auto parts plant.
Here, the range of returns is considerably larger than the mean return.
In the case of the small industrial machinery plants, the mean return is
$356,586, but the range is over $1.2 million. In these situations it is
quite possible that taxes and incentives may have a decisive impact on
investment and location decisions. There are also cases with small
coefficients of variation and relatively small ranges of returns com
pared with means: the small and large drug plants, the small and large
soap plants, the large plastics plant, and the large instruments plant.
The major reasons for these differences across sectors (and to a lesser
extent, across firm sizes) are straightforward: 1) varying effective tax
rates due to, among other things, varying profitability across sectors
(and sizes) and 2) varying eligibility for tax and non-tax incentives due
to varying factor mixes and amounts across sectors (and sizes).
Are the differences among returns across the 112 cities in the analy
sis important? Consider the small furniture and fixtures firm. The mean
increment to cash flow generated by the new plant investment is actu
ally negative. However, if the firm decides to invest at one of the best
standing offer sites, then returns become positive. In the instance of the
large drug plant, the range is a relatively small fraction of the mean
return. Nevertheless, the difference in returns between the best and
worst site is a very significant $58 million on an initial investment of
$470 million. As far as improvements to the firm's internal rate of
return, a movement from the worst site to the best site rate represents
an increase of 5.3 percentage points.8
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Table 4.10 Project Returns after All Taxes and Incentives for 16
Multistate Firms Locating in 112 Cities

Firm
Small, furniture and
fixtures
Large, furniture and
fixtures
Small, drugs
Large, drugs
Small, soaps
Large, soaps
Small, plastics
Large, plastics
Small, industrial
machinery
Large, industrial
machinery
Small, electronics
Large, electronics
Small, autos
Large, autos
Small, instruments
Large, instruments

Mean
($)

Coefficient
of variation

Range
($)

Hourly,
per-employee
wage
equivalent of
range ($)

(18,434)

-9.03

883,219

0.72

9,346,248

0.11

5,461,309

0.48

18,592,101
272,501,918

0.05
0.04

5,237,500
58,097,457

0.95
1.82

8,613,846
53,803,767
320,545
20,141,723

0.05
0.05
0.48
0.08

2,363,827
13,344,649
789,037
9,111,314

0.94
0.82
0.84
0.90

356,586

0.80

1,266,732

0.86

24,464,584

0.21
0.43

23,877,858
2,425,336

0.66

0.53
0.18
1.35

20,631,480
16,897,421
57,782,121
1,017,677
15,861,121

1,135,210
7,951,177
15,742,613
9,189,576
2,024,889
58,935,884

0.12
0.05

0.66
0.76
0.70
0.81
0.58
0.65

NOTE: "Hourly, per-employee wage equivalent of range" assumes that each employee in the
plant works a 40-hour week over a 50-week year, for a 20-year period. The numbers reported are
the present value equivalents (discounted using the firm-specific discount rates) of the ranges.

In order to make greater intuitive sense of these data, the last column
of Table 4.10 presents the hourly wage rate equivalent of the range.
This is calculated by dividing the range by the number of employees at
the new plant, then taking the annual present value of this number. 9
Dividing by 2,000—that is, assuming a 40-hour work week over a 50-
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week year—gives the wage equivalent of the range. It measures the
range in terms of equivalent savings in wages. In the case of the small
furniture and fixtures plant, the saving is worth 72 cents per hour. In
other words, the difference between the best and worst sites is equiva
lent to paying all employees 72 cents an hour less, for each hour
worked over the 20-year life span of the plant. In most instances, the
wage equivalent data are in the 60 to 80 cents an hour range. Two cases
are lower than this and four—small and large drug firms, small soap
firms, and large plastics firms—higher. We now focus on these four
plants that have greater spatial differentials.
Figure 4.1 plots project returns after all taxes and incentives for multistate small drug firms in the 112 city locations. For most cities, a rank
position change of a few places makes little substantive difference. The
cities at the 50th and 51st best locations, for instance, are separated in
hourly wage equivalent amounts by much less than a penny. In such
cases, it seems highly unlikely that taxes and incentives are large
enough to overcome spatial differentials in factor costs such as labor,
energy, or transportation to markets. The exceptions to this are at the
extreme ends of the plot. Here, a rank order change of one place some
times makes a large difference, although seldom by more than 25 cents
in hourly wage equivalent terms. Figures 4.2 through 4.4 provide simi
lar plots for large drug, small soap, and large plastics manufacturing
firms. A pattern similar to that found with small drug firms is discern
ible. Overall, the difference between the best and worst sites is substan
tial, but, except at the extremes, small rank position changes do not
appear to matter much. Although the plots are not shown here, the
same is true of the other 12 firm types simulated.
This raises a much broader issue: To what extent do taxes and other
incentives increase (or decrease) a city's overall locational competi
tiveness? Figures 4.5 through 4.8 plot returns at the top 20 locations
with standing offers. Returns after basic taxes, after basic taxes and tax
incentives, and after basic taxes and all incentives are graphed. In the
case of the small drug plant, both tax and non-tax incentives do alter
substantially the competitive position of cites. The most competitive
city (listed as no. 1 in Figure 4.5) has a reasonably competitive basic
state and local tax position, roughly similar to that of cities 5, 6 and 7
in the figure. Tax incentives improve no. 1's competitiveness, but not as
much as they improve the competitiveness of cities 5, 6, and 7. How-
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ever, no. 5, 6, and 7 provide relatively meager non-tax incentives com
pared to no. 1. Thus, it is the particular combination of basic tax
structure and of tax and other incentives that gives city no. 1 its special
locational competitiveness.
Large plants benefit from non-tax incentives to a much lesser extent
than do small plants. The reason for this is that most non-tax incentives
have strict threshold limits (such as a maximum loan size of $0.5 mil
lion); large businesses come up against these limits much more swiftly
than small businesses. This is clear in Figure 4.6, the plot for large drug
firms. While tax incentives clearly improve returns, non-tax incentives
seldom raise significantly the competitiveness of a city. For small soap
plants (Figure 4.7), non-tax incentives are important. Both tax and non
tax incentives do enhance the competitiveness of the top 20 cities. For
large plastics plants, the situation is more complex. Although the firm
is categorized as large, non-tax incentives are nevertheless important;
this is because compared to the large drug plant, the large plastics plant
is quite small. The new large plastics plant employs 572 workers ver
sus the drug plant's 2,056. Thus, the "large" plastics plant is really a
medium-sized firm, and this explains the relative importance of non
tax incentives to it. On the whole, the results for the other 12 firm types
(again not presented here) confirm this analysis. Small- and mediumsized plants (defined in terms of their absolute size) benefit in terms of
rank position competitiveness from both tax and non-tax incentives.
Larger firms benefit more from tax incentives.
A comparison with the least competitive locations is instructive.
Figure 4.9 plots returns after taxes, tax incentives, and other incentives
for small soap firms. On the whole, the worst locations have a poor tax
structure and also provide poor incentives. There are a few exceptions
to this: in this figure, cities 3, 5, 12, 13, and 17. The exceptions tend to
provide reasonable tax incentives but not much in the way of non-tax
incentives. Although we do not present the data here, this pattern tends
to be generally true for all 16 firm types simulated.
We now examine more closely the impact of incentives on the com
petitiveness of locations. The focus is again on those sectors that show
greater spatial variation in project returns: small and large drug, small
soap, and large plastics firms. With the four plants, the range between
the best and worst city increases after tax incentives have been added to
basic taxes and after non-tax incentives have been added to taxes and
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tax incentives. This is also true for 10 of the other 12 firm types (large
soap and small plastics firms are the two exceptions). In other words,
the provision of state and city incentives does not, as some have
claimed, tend to make up for poor basic tax structure of a state and
city. 10 Rather, overall incentives actually accentuate rather than amelio
rate the spatial differentials in returns due to basic state and city tax
regimes. Incentives increase the differences in project returns between
the best and worst locations.
However, it is not true that states and cities with poor tax structures
generally offer poor incentives and that states and cities with good
basic structures offer good incentives. In order to better understand the
relationship between taxes, tax incentives, and discretionary incen
tives, we ran regressions for each industrial sector and firm size (that is,
for the 16 hypothetical firms). The increment in income due to non-tax
incentives was the dependent variable; income after taxes and the
increment in income due to tax incentives were the two independent
variables. The regressions tested for any linear relationship between
taxes, tax incentives, and non-tax incentives. In all instances, regres
sion R values were well below 10 percent, and most often close to 1
percent. F- and /-scores were almost never significant. These results
suggest no linear relationship between the three elements of the local
tax and incentive regime. So, while at the extremes (comparing cities at
the top and bottom of the range) incentives do tend to magnify the
competitiveness of local tax systems (as the discussion in the last para
graph illustrated), overall, the relationship between the generosity of
incentives offered and the generosity of the basic tax system appears to
be quite random. Certainly—and this does support the conclusion of
the previous paragraph—there is no evidence that non-tax incentives
tend to neutralize high state and local taxes.
The mean (over the 24 states and 112 cities) tax-incentive-derived
improvement to project returns for the small drug firm is just under
$0.5 million; the non-tax-incentive-derived increment is nearly $0.6
million (Table 4.11). Thus, tax incentives have an hourly wage equiva
lence of 9 cents (meaning the plant could absorb higher wages to the
extent of 9 cents an hour for all employees over the 20-year period).
Non-tax incentives are on average worth 11 cents an hour per worker.
The difference in project returns between the best and worst tax incen
tive package across the 112 cities amounts to just over $3 million, as
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does the difference between the best and worst non-tax incentive pack
age. This is equivalent to paying workers 55 cents an hour less due to
tax incentives and 57 cents an hour less due to non-tax incentives.
In the case of the large drug plant (Table 4.12), on average tax incen
tives increase returns by $4.4 million, non-tax incentives by only $1.5
million. All incentives together are worth an hourly wage equivalent of
19 cents. For small soap plants (Table 4.13), non-tax incentives are
more important than tax incentives, all incentives together adding
about $0.56 million to returns for the average city. For large plastics
firms (Table 4.14), tax incentives are only slightly more important than
non-tax incentives. Together, these add about $1.4 million to returns in
the average city. Most startling is how consistent the hourly wage
equivalents are across these four firm types. The average total incentive
package amounts to an equivalent of 20 cents an hour decline in wages
for the small drug firms, 19 cents for the large drug firms, 22 cents for
the small soap firms, and 14 cents for the large plastics firms. For all 16
firms, the smallest average incentive is worth the equivalent of 9 cents
an hour (for large industrial machinery firms), and the largest 24 cents
an hour (for small plastics and small industrial machinery firms).
In summary, spatial differentials across the American economy due
to basic taxes are large, but so are differentials due to tax and non-tax
incentives. Whether these differentials are large enough to really matter
depends, of course, on whether differentials in other factor costs are
greater, and also on the quantity and quality of goods and services pro
duced by state and local government. Not all firms experience the
incentive system equally. In general, larger firms gain less from non
tax incentives and more from tax incentives, whereas for small- and
medium-sized firms, non-tax incentives are often of greater signifi
cance. The relationship between the burdensomeness of the basic tax
regime and the generosity of tax and non-tax incentives is random,
except that, at the extremes, incentives tend to exaggerate differentials
in the basic tax structure of states and cities. States and cities with very
good basic tax structures tend also to offer very generous incentives.
Certainly, there is no evidence to suggest that incentives nullify differ
ences in basic tax loads.
Why don't incentives narrow the gap between the best states and the
worst states in relation to returns on investment? Why don't high-tax
places use large incentives to offset those high taxes, and low-tax
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Table 4.11 The Impact of Taxes and Incentives on Project Returns for
Small Drug Firms, 112 Cities

Project returns
After basic taxes
After tax incentives
After all incentives
Increment in project
returns due to
Tax incentives
Non-tax incentives
Hourly, per-employee
wage equivalent of
Tax incentives
Non-tax incentives

Mean
($)

Coefficient
of variation

Range
($)

Hourly, peremployee wage
equivalent of
range ($)

17,501,175
17,998,358
18,592,101

0.043
0.047
0.051

3,838,025
5,175,001
5,237,500

0.70
0.94
0.95

497,183
593,743

1.270
0.711

3,027,054
3,111,253

0.55
0.57

0.09
0.11

Table 4.12 The Impact of Taxes and Incentives on Project Returns for
Large Drug Firms, 112 Cities

Mean
($)
Project returns
After basic taxes
266,613,589
After tax incentives 271,023,541
After all incentives 272,501,918
Increment in project
returns due to
Tax incentives
4,409,952
1,478,377
Non-tax incentives
Hourly, per-employee
wage equivalent of
Tax incentives
0.14
0.05
Non-tax incentives

Coefficient
of variation

Range
($)

Hourly, peremployee wage
equivalent of
range ($)

0.032
0.036
0.037

46,054,414
56,128,561
58,097,457

1.45
1.76
1.82

1.357
1.043

25,842,961
7,896,833

0.81
0.25
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Table 4.13 The Impact of Taxes and Incentives on Project Returns for
Small Soap Firms, 112 Cities

Project returns
After basic taxes
After tax incentives
After all incentives
Increment in project
returns due to
Tax incentives
Non-tax incentives
Hourly, per-employee
wage equivalent of
Tax incentives
Non-tax incentives

Mean
($)

Coefficient
of variation

Range
($)

Hourly, peremployee wage
equivalent of
range ($)

8,054,323
8,284,947
8,613,846

0.038
0.046
0.054

1,518,079
2,053,569
2,363,827

0.60
0.82
0.94

230,624
328,899

1.261
0.690

1,232,605
1,232,187

0.49
0.50

0.09
0.13

Table 4.14 The Impact of Taxes and Incentives on Project Returns for
Large Plastics Firms, 112 Cities

Mean
($)

Coefficient
of variation

Range
($)

Hourly, peremployee wage
equivalent of
range ($)

18,703,065
19,436,782
20,141,723

0.068
0.070
0.076

6,571,132
6,607,726
9,111,314

0.65
0.65
0.90

733,717
704,942

1.237
0.768

4,577,488
4,370,217

Project returns

After basic taxes
After tax incentives
After all incentives
Increment in project
returns due to
Tax incentives
Non-tax incentives
Hourly, per-employee
wage equivalent of
Tax incentives
Non-tax incentives

0.07
0.07

0.45
0.43
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places forego incentives because they are unnecessary? After all, the
rationale for enacting incentives is usually couched in terms of the
need to "remain competitive." One plausible hypothesis is that the
competition for jobs is focused primarily on visible and explicit incen
tive programs and not on overall after-tax returns. States and cities
probably do not have good knowledge of the effective tax rates on var
ious kinds of firms to begin with, and, from descriptions of the battles
for particular firms, it does appear that states are trying to match other
states' incentive packages, not after-tax returns. The same approach
may well apply to the enactment of ongoing incentive programs, where
one state feels compelled to offer a loan program because its competi
tor states have one. In that case, a high-tax state and a low-tax state
would be expected to be equally likely to enact, for example, a $2,000
per job tax credit, and in so doing to believe that they are simply
matching each others' bids. The result of this process, repeated many
times in many states, would be a pattern of incentive offers that bears
no relation to basic tax burdens and that leaves the substantial variation
among states in after-tax returns little changed.
The importance of incentives in defining the generosity of local tax
and incentive regimes is contrary to other established results in the
hypothetical firm literature. In particular, in recent work using the
AFTAX model, J. Papke (1995, p. 1710) concludes that "the differen
tial cost imposed by these diverse [tax and tax incentive] systems is
surprisingly small." Why should the two hypothetical firm models pro
duce such different answers? The crude answer is that the two models
(TAIM and AFTAX) operate in different ways, and, in some regards,
make different assumptions about firm behavior. The crux of the
detailed answer is that the multistate version of the AFTAX model sim
ulates two states (or two locations) at a time, as it is mainly concerned
with cross-border competition, and that it imposes some restrictive
assumptions regarding the destination of sales (10 percent of sales are
destined for the home state) and headquarters location. TAIM distrib
utes sales across the United States in accordance with population size,
simultaneously taxing across multiple states (in fact, all of the states in
the model) and cities, and allows headquarters location both within and
outside the states under consideration. In fact, Papke's work suggests
that loosening the AFTAX assumptions results in greater differentials
among competing locations. Indeed, even the cross-border simulations
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of AFTAX indicate much greater spatial differentials than the singlestate (home-state expansion) simulations of the model.
We argued earlier that there is reason to believe that the state is more
important than the locality in defining a site's tax and tax incentive
regime. On average, firms pay a little more in state income and sales
taxes than they do in local taxes. Moreover, the states play a key role in
setting the parameters of local taxation and in providing or limiting the
use of tax incentives. The same argument may be applied to non-tax
incentives; usually, the states define what incentives should be allowed
at the local level and how these should be provided. Moreover, most
non-tax programs are provided through state, not local, government.
What limited evidence we have suggests that, with the important
exception of tax increment financing subsidies, the vast majority of
non-tax incentive program spending is also done by state rather than
local government. Here we return to a question brought up earlier in
this chapter, but we now raise it in the context of returns on investment
after all incentives: Is variation in returns among cities within a state
more significant than variation across states?
Despite the importance of states in local financing policy, there
remains substantial variation across cities within many of the states in
our study. If the 112 cities are ranked from lowest to highest by the
project returns after all state and local taxes and incentives, then, in
many states, the cities are generally spread across the rankings. At the
other extreme, in a few states, the cities are fairly tightly clustered in
the rankings. In some states, the particular locality matters a great deal
more than in other states. In many cases, it is the presence of an enter
prise zone that sets one or more cities well apart from others in the
same state. This is true in Georgia, Ohio, California (where the cities
are grouped in two tight clusters, one containing cities without enter
prise zones, the other with), and to an extent in Pennsylvania.
We used a simple one-way analysis of variance to explore the varia
tion of cities across and within states. States with only one city in our
sample (there were three of these) were excluded from the analysis.
For each of the 16 multistate hypothetical firms, project returns at the
109 city locations were the dependent variable, and the state in which
the city is located was the grouping factor. In all cases, F-scores were
significant at the 0.0005 probability level. In the main, then, states are
an important determinant of city rankings.
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Before proceeding any further, it is crucial to point out that, while
many of the following figures and maps identify directly the perfor
mance of individual states (and indirectly individual cities), the results
are for single hypothetical firms only. Best and worst cities (and states)
vary greatly by the hypothetical firm under consideration. As an illus
tration, for small drug firms, cities in New Jersey do not look competi
tive; however, for many other sectors modeled, some cities in New
Jersey perform very well. Thus, the data should not be interpreted as
providing a measure of the overall relative competitiveness of a state or
city.
Still, it is important not to minimize the level of variation within
states. Map 4.1 plots the 20 best and 20 worst city returns, after all
taxes and all incentives, for the small drug firm. A few states—Illinois,
Iowa, Missouri, New York, and Florida—have a number of cities in the
best 20 and none in the worst 20. Indiana, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Michigan, and Texas have more than one city in the worst 20 and none
in the best. Some states manage to have cities in both the top and bot
tom 20: California, Georgia, and Ohio. Figure 4.10, which plots returns
for the best and worst city in each of the 24 states for the small multistate drug firm, illustrates the wide variability in returns within some
individual states, particularly Georgia, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wis
consin. Other states are relatively tightly packed, in this case Illinois,
New Jersey, Virginia, and Washington (these are states with a number
of cities in our sample). Figure 4.11 plots similar information, but for
all the cities in a state, not just best and worst; Figure 4.11 gives some
sense of the distribution, and thus clustering, of returns within states.
Three elements are clearly visible:
• Many states are clustered into one group (for instance, New Jer
sey and Washington) or two (for instance, California, Pennsylva
nia, Virginia, and possibly Michigan).
• A few states show no signs of clustering (such as Georgia, Texas,
and Wisconsin). It is possible that the lack of any visible evidence
of clustering is a function of the small number of cities modeled
in some of these states (although this argument does not seem to
apply to Texas).
• Putting the clustering issue aside, there tends to be a tremendous
range in returns within individual states.

Map 4.1 Best and Worst Locations for Small Multistate Drug Firms

TAIM simulation of 20-year project returns
| Best 20 locations
n Worst 20 locations
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Figure 4.10 Range of Project Returns within States, Small Multistate Drug Firms
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Similar plots for the three other firms under consideration are provided
in Appendix D. They confirm these three points.
This raises a still more general question: which are the best and
worst locations for the small drug firm modeled? The best locations are
scattered quite widely across the nation. Moreover, there is little geo
graphic coherence to our results. Parts of the Midwest are clearly good
for small drug firms, but other parts are clearly not. Similarly, bits of
the Sunbelt (California, Georgia, Florida) are good for small drug
firms, but other spots are quite bad (Texas). In order to develop a better
sense of the regional coherence of project returns for small drug firms,
complete results (for 112 cities in 24 states) are presented in Map 4.2.
Here, project returns are plotted as contour relief using a triangulated
irregular network (TIN) digital elevation model (DEM). Essentially,
TIN structures are based on triangular elements with vertices at sample
elevations and are derived through a form of interpolation that assumes
the surface between three points to be a plane. In Map 4.2, vertices are
returns at each of the 112 sites. The map has some rather obvious limi
tations. There are only 112 vertices, with none, for example, between
western Iowa and eastern California. Nevertheless, the map provides a
sense of regional bunching not seen in Map 4.1. In particular, a highest
peak region in an area around parts of Iowa and Missouri is visible, and
a lowest trough region centered on the eastern Midwest is also clear.
Otherwise—and this is the important point—no clear regional pattern
of elevation contours emerges: the nation does not neatly divide itself
into broad sections generally good for or bad for small drug firms. This
same lack of regional patterning is apparent in similar TIN plots for the
other 15 firms modeled.
Some dramatic changes are visible if Map 4.1 is compared to equiv
alent maps for the other sectors (see Maps 4.3-4.5). California changes
from being a highly competitive state for small drug firms (Map 4.1) to
an uncompetitive one for large drug firms (Map 4.3); Florida moves
from being a competitive state for small drug firms to a middling state
for large drug firms; and the competitiveness of the western Midwest
improves substantially from small to large drug firms.
Compare small drug firms (Map 4.1) to small soap firms (Map 4.4).
Pennsylvania moves from being a state with a couple of cities in the
bottom 20 (small drug firms, Map 4.1) to a state with none in the bot
tom 20 and three in the top 20 (small soap firms, Map 4.4), and Wash-

Map 4.2 Small Multistate Drug Firms, TIN Digital Elevation Model of Project Returns
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Map 4.3 TAIM Simulation of Best and Worst Locations for Large Multistate Drug Firms
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Map 4.4 TAIM Simulation of Best and Worst 20 Locations for Small Multistate Soap Firms
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ington shifts from being a state with no cities in the top or bottom 20
(Map 4.1), to a state with three cities in the bottom 20 (Map 4.4). Com
paring large drug to large plastics firms, California changes from being
a highly uncompetitive state (large drug firms, Map 4.3) to a state with
no cities in the bottom 20 (large plastics firms, Map 4.5); Pennsylvania
moves from being highly uncompetitive, with a number of cities in the
bottom 20 (Map 4.3) to a highly competitive state with a number of cit
ies in the top 20 (Map 4.5).
In summary, some cities and states do consistently well, and some
consistently poorly, but mostly there is a large degree of variation
across sectors. Moreover, no obvious regional pattern of results is dis
cernible, even within a single sector. This conclusion provides no sup
port to those who have argued that states are involved in spiraling
intraregional wars over new investment. If individual states were copy
ing the incentives offered by their neighbors and making their overall
tax burdens no greater than that of neighboring states, one would
expect to see a regional pattern of standing offers. Furthermore, the
variation in spatial results across sectors suggests that whether policy
makers in states and cities have thought about it or not, they operate a
de facto industrial policy, favoring some sorts of manufacturing invest
ment and disfavoring others.

CONCLUSIONS
There are very wide differences in returns on investment after basic
taxes among states and cities. These differences tend to be exaggerated
if state taxes are considered alone because states with high state
income and sales taxes have tended to have lower local property and
sales taxes. The highest tax state placed a tax burden on manufacturers
that was typically about three times as large as that of the lowest tax
state. Eight states offered investment or jobs tax credits to firms any
where in the state; in 14 of the 24 states, local property tax abatements
are offered. These incentive packages ranged from zero to as high as 40
percent to 45 percent of the before-incentive state and local tax burden.
Tax incentives generally did not reduce the variation across states;
large investment or jobs credits, for example, were not used primarily

172

Tax Systems and Incentive Programs in States and Cities

to offset high basic taxes. While enterprise zone incentives tended to be
larger in states that offered less in the way of general incentives, the
effect of enterprise zones was to increase the variation in after-tax
returns across states, not to compensate for high basic taxes.
The discretionary incentives included infrastructure subsidies and
customized job training at the state level, and general purpose grants,
loans, and loan guarantees at both the state and local levels. Averaged
over the 16 firm types and 112 cities in 24 states, the mean package of
discretionary incentives, expressed in terms of present value wage
equivalence, was worth about 9 cents an hour per employee. By com
parison, tax incentives had a wage equivalence of 7 cents an hour. Non
tax incentives were a major part of a state's entire incentive package (in
fact, in some cases over 90 percent of state incentives derived from
non-tax programs), but when local incentives were combined with state
ones, the role of discretionary non-tax incentives within the overall
package of incentives declined markedly. The reasons for this include
the provision of very generous tax incentives—such as the property tax
abatement—at the local level, the availability of certain state tax incen
tives at the local level only, and the dearth of many large local non-tax
incentive programs.
For the handful of cities/states at the top or at the bottom of the
rankings for any particular firm type, there were quite substantial diver
gences in returns between one city/state and the next due to tax and
incentive differences. However, the inclusion of non-tax incentives
very often did little to change the majority of cities in the top or bottom
10. Mostly, cities that were highly competitive after taxes and tax
incentives were also highly competitive after the inclusion of non-tax
incentives. Overall, non-tax incentives did not ameliorate, but actually
accentuated, the tax differentials between the best and worst cities.
Our research has not looked at spatial differentials in other factor
costs (such as labor, energy, and transportation) or at the benefits firms
receive from taxes, so we are not able to say whether a state's and
city's tax and incentive regime could reasonably be expected to alter a
firm's location decisions. However, our results suggest that, for the
firm types simulated by TAIM, the range of results across all 112 cities
(and 24 states) is not trivial. It is of course quite possible that factor
cost differentials—in labor, energy, and transportation—could amount
to much more than tax and incentive differentials. It is possible that
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labor costs in a bottom-ranked city may be much lower than in a topranked city. However, if tax and incentive regimes were designed to
make up for locally high labor costs (or other factor costs), it would be
logical to suppose that states in the South would tend to have burden
some tax and incentive regimes, while California and states in the
Northeast and Midwest would tend to have much lighter loads. As the
maps in this chapter show, no regional pattern of taxes and incentives is
discernible. Spatial variation in the tax and incentive burden looks to
be quite random. Given that the severity of local tax and incentive
regimes does not appear to bear an inverse relationship to factor costs,
it seems reasonable to assume that in some cases tax and incentive dif
ferentials between top- and bottom-ranked locations could sway plant
location decisions.
NOTES
1. Texas is sometimes referred to as a no-income-tax state, but in fact the Texas franchise tax
is based in part on federal taxable income and so is rightly classified as an income tax.
2. Iowa, however, exempts computing equipment.
3. Manufacturing corporations filing income taxes in the state of Wisconsin are required to
report total sales tax paid on fuel and electricity, and the portion of the tax that applies to fuel and
electricity used directly in manufacturing. They then receive a credit for the latter portion of the
tax. According to the Wisconsin Department of Revenue, the average manufacturer reports that
about 82% of fuel and electricity purchases are used directly in manufacturing. We impute this
same percentage to the fuel and electricity purchases of the 16 firms in our model.
4. Without sales throwback, corporations selling in states where they have no tax nexus
would be taxed on less than 100% of their income, since a portion of their total U.S. income
would not be apportioned to any state for tax purposes. If all or most states applied the throwback
rule, on the other hand, the corporation could pay state taxes on more than 100% of its income,
since the sales to non-taxing states would become part of the numerator in the sales factor of
every state in which the firm is taxed so that the sum of the sales factors in the various states
would exceed 100%.
5. This hypothetical state had the same population as the state in question; this was necessary
because population affects the apportionment of income to the median state, which in turn affects
the firm's taxes paid to the median state.
6. Oakland and Testa (1996) have argued that it is crucial to measure not only the size of the
tax burden, but also the benefits firms derive from the state and local goods and services paid for
by business taxes. We agree; unfortunately the modeling of tax benefits is still in its infancy.
7. Our interpretation of the data for single-location firms is not much different to that of multistate firms.
8. From 29.3% in Washington, Pennsylvania to 34.6 in Des Moines, Iowa, for the multistate
simulation of firm #4 (large drugs) at level 6 (including all taxes and incentives).
9. Present value is calculated using firm-specific discount rates.
10. Eisinger (1988) argues that tax incentives often ameliorate burdensome basic taxes.

5

The Effects of Taxes and
Incentives on the Spatial
Distribution of Investment Returns
A central question posed at the beginning of this book was the fol
lowing: Are taxes lower, or incentives higher, in places with higher
rates of unemployment? Previous work in this area has focused only on
the incentive part of the question; further, the methods have been
flawed and the results somewhat contradictory. We have shown that a
proper analysis must include state and local tax systems as well as eco
nomic development programs for a variety of reasons: because incen
tives must be measured net of their state and federal income tax effects,
because larger incentives in some places may simply be offsetting
higher taxes, and because many exemptions and rules incorporated into
the tax code could themselves be viewed as incentives. We have also
made the case that the hypothetical firm approach provides a superior
method for measuring the magnitude of tax differences and financial
incentive programs.
The previous chapter established that incentives can be quite large
relative to tax burdens and that differences in taxes and incentives
across states and cities are substantial. While we do not test a causal
model in this study, the magnitude of differences in returns on invest
ment, before and after taxes and incentives, appears to be sufficient to
make a difference in business location decisions at the margin. The
question to be addressed in this chapter is a spatial one: How do taxes
and incentives alter the geographic pattern of returns on investment in
new manufacturing facilities? In particular, are the places that generate
the highest rates of return the locations that have experienced the high
est rates of unemployment and poverty or the lowest rates of job
growth? In other words, is the spatial pattern of returns such as to draw
investment towards the places where new jobs are most needed?
There are three ways in which the pattern of taxes and incentives
could come to favor higher unemployment locations:
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• States with higher average levels of unemployment may offer
lower taxes or larger state-funded incentives, on a statewide basis,
than do states with lower unemployment.
• Localities (cities and counties) with higher levels of unemploy
ment may offer lower taxes or larger local incentives, such as
property tax abatements or locally operated loan funds, than do
cities with lower unemployment.
• States may target incentives at high-unemployment places,
through enterprise zone programs and the like, so that statefunded incentives are larger in higher-unemployment cities.
We will examine how taxes and incentives—statewide, local, and
targeted—affect the spatial pattern of returns on investment. We con
sider the spatial effects at two geographic scales: among the 24 states
and among the 112 cities. At the state level, the role of local and tar
geted incentives can be examined only by developing an "average
locality" for each state, and each state is given equal weight in the cor
relation analyses. At the city level of analysis, each city is given equal
weight, and the contribution of a particular state's taxes and incentives
to overall correlation coefficients is governed by the number of cities
from that state that ended up in our sample. More populous states such
as California, Texas, and Florida have greater influence on the relation
ships calculated, as arguably they should.

THE PATTERN OF RETURNS AMONG STATES
To isolate the effects of state taxes and incentives, we first computed
returns on investment in each of the 24 states as if there were no local
tax system. We measured separately the effects of the basic state tax
system and of four kinds of state incentive programs. Basic state taxes
include all features of income and net worth taxes except investment
and jobs tax credits, plus state property taxes (if any) and state sales
taxes on manufacturing machinery and fuel and electricity. The value
of state tax incentives (investment and jobs tax credits) is defined as net
project returns after basic state taxes and tax incentives, less net returns
after basic taxes only. Non-tax incentives are grouped into three cate-
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gories: 1) infrastructure subsidies, 2) job training and wage subsidies,
and 3) general purpose grants, loans, and loan guarantees. Each of
these three types of incentives was evaluated separately by comparing
returns after taxes and tax incentives (taking tax incentive programs as
entitlements) with returns after taxes, tax incentives, and the non-tax
incentives of interest. The increment in returns provided the worth of
the incentive to the firm.
The 16 firms modeled represent large and small firms in 8 indus
tries. Each firm was further modeled as a multistate firm initially
located in the median state and as a single-location firm with all of its
operations (including the new plant) within the sample state. We
present results for 5 of the 16 firms, selected to display the range of
variation in project returns and the range of new plant sizes. 1 Table 5.1
shows how returns and incentives for these five firms correlated with
the state average unemployment rate in 1992. We also show the simple
average of the correlation rates for all 16 firms.
Returns after basic state taxes were strongly negatively correlated
with the state unemployment rate: the higher the unemployment rate,
the lower were returns on new investment in that state. State tax sys
tems, in other words, are "perverse" in their effects, tending to attract
jobs to the states that need them the least. State tax incentives, on the
other hand, were positively correlated with unemployment, but the cor
relations were quite weak, ranging from 0.06 to 0.14 for multistate
firms, 0.05 to 0.23 for single-location firms. Project returns after state
taxes and tax incentives remained negatively correlated with unem
ployment. These patterns held true for both location assumptions,
although the negative correlations were stronger for the multistate
firms.
The value of non-tax incentives is highly dependent on firm charac
teristics; in part, this is due to program eligibility standards and ceil
ings related to firm or plant size. As a result, there is more variability
in the unemployment correlations. Overall, non-tax incentives, for
both single-location and multistate firms, bear only a weak relation to
unemployment rates, although if anything they are lower in higherunemployment states. However, for job training subsidies and general
loans and grants, the results differ dramatically by plant size. For the
six smallest plant sizes, with assets of $5 million to $20 million, these
kinds of subsidies were very weakly but positively correlated with

Table 5.1 Correlation between State Average 1992 Unemployment Rate and Firm's Net Return on New Plant
Investment in Each State (State Taxes and Incentives Only)3
Net project returns
Firm
(plant size, in
millions)

After basic After tax After all
taxes
incentives incentives

Value of incentives
Infra
Tax
structure
incentives subsidies

General
Job
training financing
All
subsidies programs incentives

Multistate firms
#2: Furniture ($40)

(0.63)

(0.51)

(0.52)

0.08

(0.08)

(0.33)

(0.20)

(0.25)

#5: Soaps ($20)

(0.56)

(0.45)

(0.36)

0.11

(0.15)

0.08

(0.01)

0.04

#7: Plastics ($5)
#14 Autos ($600)

(0.63)

(0.58)

(0.18)

0.06

(0.24)

0.06

0.14

0.09

(0.51)

(0.39)

(0.48)

0.14

(0.19)

(0.50)

(0.20)

(0.26)

#16: Instruments
($180)

(0.61)

(0.54)

(0.57)

0.10

(0.13)

(0.45)

(0.19)

(0.27)

Average: 6 smallest
firms

(0.61)

(0.51)

(0.24)

0.11

(0.15)

0.07

0.09

0.09

Average: 7 largest
firms

(0.58)

(0.48)

(0.52)

0.12

(0.14)

(0.46)

(0.22)

(0.23)

Average: all 16 firms
Single-location firms

(0.60)

(0.50)

(0.42)

0.11

(0.14)

(0.22)

(0.10)

(0.11)

#2: Furniture ($40)

(0.34)

(0.23)

(0.34)

0.17

(0.07)

(0.34)

(0.21)

(0.19)

#5: Soaps ($20)

(0.27)

(0.18)

(0.17)

0.22

(0.14)

0.06

(0.02)

0.09

#7: Plastics ($5)

(0.44)

(0.36)

(0.11)

0.05

(0.23)

0.05

0.14

0.08

#14: Autos ($600)

(0.42)

(0.17)

(0.28)

0.23

(0.18)

(0.50)

(0.21)

(0.03)

#16: Instruments
($180)

(0.27)

(0.23)

(0.29)

0.06

(0.12)

(0.45)

(0.20)

(0.21)

Average: 6 smallest
firms

(0.36)

(0.27)

(0.12)

0.07

(0.15)

0.05

0.09

0.09

Average: 7 largest
firms

(0.34)

(0.20)

(0.29)

0.15

(0.13)

(0.46)

(0.23)

(0.11)

Average: all 16 firms

(0.34)

(0.23)

(0.23)

0.11

(0.14)

(0.23)

(0.11)

(0.04)

a. Negative correlations are shown in parentheses. Basic taxes include state corporate income and net worth taxes, state sales taxes on machinery anc
equipment and on fuel and utilities, and state property taxes. Tax incentives consist of state income or net worth tax investment and jobs credits. The value
of tax incentives is measured by the net project returns after taxes and tax incentives, less project returns after basic taxes only. The value of other incen
tives is measured by the net project returns after taxes, tax incentives, and the other incentives, minus net project returns after taxes and tax incentives only
The six smallest firms are numbers 1, 5, 7, 9, 11, and 15, with new plant assets of $5 million to $20 million. The seven largest firms are numbers 4, 6, 10
12, 13, 14, and 16, with new plant assets of $110 million to $600 million.

180

The Effects of Taxes and Incentives on the Spatial Distribution of Investment

unemployment. For the largest seven plants, on the other hand, with
assets of $110 million to $600 million, the correlation between unem
ployment and job subsidies was quite negative, ranging from -0.41 to
-0.50, and the correlation between unemployment and general loans
and grants ranged from -0.18 to -0.30. (These correlation figures
include single-location and multistate firms.) The job training and gen
eral programs in high-unemployment states apparently are targeted at
small firms or have low ceilings on the grant or loan amounts,
enabling those states to compete successfully (with low-unemploy
ment states) for small firms but not for large firms.
The end result, considering net project returns after taking all state
tax and other incentives into account, is that returns remain negatively
correlated with unemployment, statewide incentives offsetting only
slightly the perverse effects of state tax systems. To the extent that the
classification of some features of the tax system as "basic" rather than
as development incentives was arbitrary, the more important conclu
sion is probably not that certain incentives exhibited a slight tendency
to redistribute jobs to high-unemployment states: it is rather that the
state income and sales tax systems as a whole, including all incentives
whether explicit or not, had the opposite effect. This perverse effect is
much stronger for multistate firms, which are probably the more rele
vant for purposes of evaluating economic development competition
among the states. For 12 of the 16 multistate firms, the correlation was
-0.36 or stronger. Overall, it appears that, at the state level at least,
decades of interstate competition have not produced a pattern of
returns on investment that could plausibly contribute to a redistribution
of jobs to states in most need, but rather the opposite.
It is possible that these results are sensitive to our choice of year for
determining the state unemployment rate. We chose 1992 for obvious
reasons: the project returns calculated by the model reflect tax law and
incentive programs as of 1992, and we wished to test the hypothesis
that the pattern of returns in that year favored states that had higher
unemployment at that time. Nonetheless, it is worth testing an alterna
tive measure of unemployment; 1992, after all, was a recession year
when unemployment peaked. We calculated as an alternative the aver
age unemployment rate over the five-year period 1989 through 1993.
This included two years of relatively low unemployment (which
nationally averaged 5.3 percent and 5.5 percent in 1989 and 1990,
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respectively) and the two years surrounding the unemployment peak in
1992. The correlation for our 24 states between the 1992 rate and the
five-year average rate was quite high (0.88); in all but one state (Mis
souri), the 1992 rate was higher than the five-year average. For each of
the 16 multistate firms, we then correlated project returns and the value
of incentives in each state with this five-year average unemployment
rate. The results, shown in Appendix Table E.2, mirror the figures in
Table 5.1 quite closely, with the exception that the basic tax systems
were not as strongly negatively correlated with unemployment when
the five-year average was used (with correlations at about 75 percent of
the values in Table 5.1). The correlations with tax incentives, non-tax
incentives, and all incentives taken together were very similar, with
very comparable variation across firms as well.
Interestingly, the picture is quite different if we consider the rela
tionship between taxes and job growth, rather than unemployment
rates. We measured the percentage increase in state private nonfarm
employment between 1980 and 1990, two years that represented
approximately the same point in the business cycle. Although one
might expect higher job growth to be associated with lower unemploy
ment rates, this was not the case. The three states with the lowest
unemployment rates (below 5.2 percent) also had below average job
growth (from 11 to 23 percent). These were the Midwestern states of
Iowa, Minnesota, and Wisconsin, which basically stagnated, with pop
ulation growth occurring even slower than job growth, or the outmigration of people matching the out-migration of jobs. At the other
extreme were three states (New Jersey, California, and Florida) with
high 1992 unemployment rates (above 8.1 percent) despite high growth
rates in employment during the previous decade (from 28 to 55 per
cent).
As shown in Table 5.2, for multistate firms the value of incentives is
negatively correlated with job growth. In other words, there is a mild
tendency for state tax and other incentives to tilt the incentive surface
towards states that experienced slow job growth during the 1980s. This
effect is present both for tax incentives and for non-tax incentives;
given a basic tax system that is approximately neutral, this produces a
pattern of returns after taxes and incentives somewhat favoring slowgrowth states.

Table 5.2 Correlation between State Employment Growth and Poverty Rates and Firm's Net Return on New Plant
Investment in Each State in 1992 (State Taxes and Incentives Only, Multistate Firms Only)3
Value of incentives

Net project returns
After basic
taxes

After tax
incentives

After all
incentives

Tax
incentives

Other
incentives

All
incentives

#2: Furniture ($40)

(0.08)

(0.16)

(0.22)

(0.27)

(0.21)

(0.29)

#5: Soaps ($20)

(0.08)

(0.16)

(0.21)

(0.26)

(0.16)

(0.24)

#7: Plastics ($5)

(0.19)

(0.22)

(0.35)

(0.24)

(0.31)

(0.33)

#14: Autos ($600)

(0.14)

(0.23)

(0.25)

(0.31)

(0.20)

(0.33)

#16: Instruments ($180)

(0.01)

(0.08)

(0.12)

(0.28)

(0.19)

(0.29)

Average: all 16 firms

(0.08)

(0.15)

(0.21)

(0.27)

(0.20)

(0.28)

Firm (plant size in $ millions)
Correlation with job growth

Correlation with poverty rate
#2: Furniture ($40)

0.31

0.29

0.13

0.06

(0.11)

(0.08)

#5: Soaps ($20)

0.37

0.34

0.22

0.03

(0.09)

(0.06)

#7: Plastics ($5)

0.13

0.14

(0.01)

0.07

(0.09)

(0.08)

#14: Autos ($600)

0.13

0.12

0.13

0.01

0.13

0.09

#16: Instruments ($180)

0.33

0.32

0.30

0.05

0.14

0.13

0.25

0.16

0.04

0.01

0.01

Average: all 16 firms

0.27

a. Negative correlations are shown in parentheses. Job growth is the percentage increase in state employment between 1980 and 1990. Poverty rate is the
percentage of persons in poverty from the 1990 census (1989 income).
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The preceding results suggest two hypotheses (with opposite direc
tion of causality) for further research, beyond the scope of the current
project: 1) it is slow economic growth that drives states to adopt tax
and incentive policies more favorable towards business, and 2) the geo
graphic pattern of returns found in 1992 is similar to the pattern that
existed at the beginning of the 1980s, so that lower taxes (and hence
higher returns) on new investment helped cause greater state job
growth during the 1980s. The first hypothesis is consistent with argu
ments about "growth coalitions" and their effect on public policy at the
state and local level, and with the view that the constituency concerned
with growth is broader and more influential than the constituency con
cerned with the unemployed. This hypothesis could be tested using our
net project returns for 1992 as the dependent variable and with job
growth during some prior period as one of the independent variables.
The second hypothesis could be tested only by constructing a state
tax database for 1980 identical in structure to our 1992 database; this is
a monumental task, more arduous than constructing the 1992 database
because information on each state's tax laws as of 1980 is much more
difficult to come by now. On the other hand, our 1992 results could be
used in the future as the explanatory tax variable in a regression model
predicting job growth from 1992 to some later year.
The poverty rate (percentage of persons in poverty as of 1989, from
the 1990 census) is an alternative measure of economic distress. It is
interesting that there is a small positive correlation between returns
after basic taxes and the poverty rate: the higher a state's poverty rate,
the higher the return on new investment (see Table 5.2). State tax poli
cies may have the effect, then, of pulling new jobs towards states with
higher concentrations of the poor. There is virtually no relationship
between the value of tax or other incentives and poverty, however.
So far, we have considered the effects of state taxes and incentives
only. Most tax-burden studies conducted by states have focused on
states as the units of analysis rather than cities, but some have incorpo
rated statewide average local property tax burdens into their compari
sons. The problems entailed in doing so, and our imperfect solution,
were described in the previous chapter, where we presented a compari
son of effective state and local tax and tax incentive rates in the 24
states. This was accomplished by constructing a representative city in
each state, with a local tax system and property tax abatements typical
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of cities in that state. The representative cities were not given state or
local non-tax incentives; the results that follow thus incorporate only
the effects of state and local tax and tax incentive programs (including
enterprise zone tax credits). 2 The correlations between these various
tax rates (or incentive rates, which are like negative tax rates) and state
average unemployment rates are presented in Table 5.3. This simplified
table shows only the average correlation coefficient for the 16 multistate firms.
Effective tax rates are defined as the reduction in the present value
of project cash flow resulting from the introduction of state or local
taxes at the location of the new plant, divided by the present value of
income before all taxes. There is a very strong correlation between
basic state tax rates and unemployment (reinforcing the results of Table
5.1): the highest tax rates occur in the states with the highest unem
ployment rates. Because states with higher state taxes tend to have
lower local taxes, as shown in Chapter 4, the effective local tax rate is
negatively correlated with unemployment. The combined state plus
local tax rate, however, is working to draw investment towards the
lower-unemployment states.
With tax incentives, the meaning of the signs is reversed; that is, a
positive correlation indicates that the incentive is operating as we
might hope, with larger incentives in higher-unemployment states.
This is in fact the case, although it is primarily the state incentives that
produce this result (and rather weakly at that). Moreover, it appears
that this effect is largely attributable to the enterprise zone incentives
provided by the states. This effect, weak as it is, may not be particu
larly relevant. Since the representative cities are given enterprise zone
incentives wherever the state allows enterprise zones or the like, these
state comparisons grossly exaggerate the prevalence and importance
of such zones. In most states, a small minority of potential sites for
new industry will be located within an enterprise zone. Thus, the most
salient comparisons across states are those that exclude enterprise
zone incentives. Focusing on those numbers, we see that state and
local tax incentives together bear virtually no systematic relationship
to unemployment and do nothing to offset the strong perverse effects
of state tax systems. The effective state plus local tax rates calculated
after those tax incentives that are generally available (i.e., excluding
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Table 5.3 Correlations of Effective Tax and Incentive Rates in a
Representative City in Each State with State Unemployment,
Job Growth, and Poverty Rates
Tax and incentive rates

Basic tax rates before incentives
State
Local
Combined state and local
Tax incentives
State
Local
State and local: total
State and local: EZ incentives only
State and local: non-EZ incentives only
State and local tax rates after tax incentives
After non-EZ tax incentives only
After all tax incentives

Unemployment Job growth Poverty
rate
rate
rate

(0.13)
0.44

0.10
(0.15)

(0.17)
0.24

(0.05)

0.06

0.28
0.08
0.26
0.23
0.06

0.10
(0.26)
(0.15)
0.12
(0.40)

(0.08)
0.08
0.02

0.46
0.07

0.12
0.07

0.05
0.13

0.73

(0.03)
0.07

NOTE: EZ = enterprise zone. Negative correlations are shown in parentheses. See Tables 4.6 and
4.7 for definitions of effective tax and tax incentive rates. The correlations shown here are a sim
ple average of the correlation coefficients for each of the 16 multistate firms. The unemployment
rate is the state rate for 1992; the job growth rate is the percentage increase in employment
between 1980 and 1990; the poverty rate is the percentage of persons in poverty, 1989.

enterprise zone incentives) are strongly positively correlated with
unemployment.
The correlations between tax rates and job growth or poverty inci
dence are mixed, with most correlations very weak. The only exception
is the tendency for non-enterprise zone tax incentives at the state and
local level to be higher in states with lower job growth. Local incen
tives appear to be reinforcing this tendency found for state incentives
alone in Table 5.2.3
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THE PATTERN OF RETURNS AMONG CITIES
Business location decisions, in the end, are choices between particu
lar places, not entire states. Local taxes and tax incentives, which are
on average about equal in magnitude to state taxes and tax incentives,
exhibit considerable variation within states. Arguably, then, the best
test of the hypothesis that taxes and incentives redistribute jobs to high
unemployment places is conducted at the city level. Our sample of cit
ies was stratified into four city population size classes: 1) over 500,000,
2) 100,000 to 499,999, 3) 25,000 to 99,999, and 4) 10,000 to 24,999.
Since the sampling percentages and response rates varied by size class,
results are shown separately for each of the four classes, although an
average of the coefficients for the four classes is also computed. 4 The
cities in the sample are listed, by size class and then by state, in Appen
dix Table B.2, along with data on city population characteristics, tax
rates, and tax incentives.
At the state level of analysis, employing representative cities, state/
local effective tax rates exhibited a strong tendency to be higher in
higher-unemployment states. A similar, but less strong, relationship
occurs when we shift to the city level of analysis, as shown in Table
5.4: cities with higher unemployment rates tend to have higher state/
local tax rates (producing lower returns after basic taxes). Two factors
no doubt explain the difference in the strength of the correlation: the
use of city rather than statewide average unemployment rates, and the
fact that more populous states are represented at the city level by more
cities.
When we shift to the city level of analysis, tax incentives are much
more prevalent and of greater magnitude. At the state level, they
include only statewide investment and jobs credits, offered in just 8 of
the 24 states. In the city analysis, these incentives are included along
with state incentives targeted at enterprise zones or the like (where the
city contains such a zone) and local property tax abatements, in enter
prise zones or generally. Property tax abatements are allowed in 14 of
the 24 states, and 22 permit enterprise zones (although such zones are
so limited in two of the states that they play no significant role). State
tax incentives now include state-funded enterprise zone incentives in
43 of our 112 cities.5

Table 5.4 Correlation between City 1992 Unemployment Rate and Firm's Net Returns from New Plant Investment
in Each City (Multistate Firms)3
Net project returns
After basic After tax
Firm
incentives
taxes
(plant size, in millions)
Average for all city sizes
(0.02)
(0.23)
#2: Furniture ($40)
(0.21)
0.00b
#5: Soaps ($20)
(0.18)
(0.02)
#7: Plastics ($5)
(0.04)
(0.15)
#14 Autos ($600)
(0.04)
#16: Instruments ($180) (0.24)
Average of 16 firms by city size
(0.26)
(0.37)
500,000 or more
0.18
(0.09)
100,000 - 499,999
0.17
(0.09)
25,000 - 99,999
(0.34)
(0.35)
10,000 - 24,999
(0.03)
(0.20)
Average: all cities

Value of incentives
State and
Other
local tax
Local tax
incentives incentives incentives

All
incentives

After all
incentives

State tax
incentives

(0.05)
0.00b
0.04
(0.06)
(0.06)

0.18
0.19
0.22
0.23
0.21

0.21
0.21
0.22
0.17
0.20

0.27
0.28
0.27
0.24
0.28

(0.04)
(0.04)
0.03
(0.14)
(0.06)

0.21
0.22
0.18
0.19
0.24

(0.16)
0.10
0.10
(0.24)
(0.03)

(0.11)
0.16
0.40
0.10
0.21

0.32
0.35
0.23
0.02
0.20

0.20
0.30
0.44
0.17
.024

0.04
(0.17)
(0.10)
0.09
(0.04)

0.17
0.19
0.29
0.13
0.21

a. Negative correlations are shown in parentheses. Basic taxes include state and city corporate income and net worth taxes, state and local sales taxes on
machinery and equipment and fuel and utilities, and state and local property taxes. Tax incentives consist of state income/net worth tax investment and jobs
credits, sales tax exemptions or credits available only in enterprise zones, state property tax credits available only in enterprise zones, and local property
tax abatements. The value of incentives is measured by the net project returns after taxes and incentives, less project returns after basic taxes only. The
average correlation for all city sizes is a weighted average of the coefficients for the four city size classes; the weight for a size class is the U.S. population
living in cities of that size divided by the total U.S. population living in cities of 10,000 or more,
b. Value less than 0.005.

188

The Effects of Taxes and Incentives on the Spatial Distribution of Investment

As a result, state tax incentives are more strongly (and positively)
correlated with unemployment at the city level, and this pattern is rein
forced by local tax incentives. The net effect of state and local tax
incentives is to offset the perverse effects of basic state and local taxes.
This fundamental pattern is not altered by the addition of state and
local non-tax incentives, which bear no discernible relationship to
unemployment. (Infrastructure subsidies, job training subsidies, and
general-purpose grants and loans are not treated separately here
because of the paucity of such programs at the local level.) The com
bined effect of local taxes, local tax incentives, and targeted incentives
is to negate, but not reverse, the perverse pattern exhibited by returns
after statewide taxes and incentives. That is, returns no longer bear any
relationship to local unemployment rates; correlations are near zero.
The relationship between incentive size and the city unemployment
rate does vary substantially by city size class. For the largest and
smallest cities, the tax systems significantly favor low-unemployment
places, and incentives do not contribute as much to the alleviation of
this problem. For the middle two groups, on the other hand, there is
virtually no relationship between unemployment and returns after
basic taxes, but the tax incentives favor the high-unemployment cities
to a much larger degree. Returns after all incentives are negatively cor
related with unemployment for the largest and smallest cities, posi
tively correlated for the medium-size cities. This is the case for both
single-location and multistate firms. The results for the largest city
size class should be interpreted with caution. The number of cities is
small (12), and the correlations are heavily influenced by one outlier
city, Detroit, which has by far the highest unemployment rate (19.7
percent) but also has high state and local taxes, and so ends up near or
at the bottom of the large city group in project returns.
The overall conclusion is that the spatial pattern of state and local
taxes and incentives may well result in a spatial redistribution of jobs,
but this redistribution will not bear any consistent relationship with
local employment conditions. The winning cities will include those
with high unemployment and those with low unemployment; the same
will be true of the cities losing jobs.
Do taxes and incentives tend to draw investment to cities with
higher poverty rates? Once again, the answer depends on the city size
(see Table 5.5). Among the middle two size classes (cities with popula-

Table 5.5 Correlation between City 1990 Poverty Rate and Firm's Net Returns from New Plant Investment in Each
City: Multistate Firms Only3
Value of incentives

Net project returns
After basic
taxes

After tax
incentives

After all
incentives

Tax
incentives

Other
incentives

All
incentives

#2: Furniture ($40)

(0.04)

0.18

0.17

0.31

0.03

0.29

#5: Soaps ($20)

(0.01)

0.24

0.24

0.35

0.02

0.31

#7: Plastics ($5)

(0.04)

0.18

0.21

0.35

0.10

0.28

#14: Autos ($600)

0.01

0.15

0.15

0.28

0.01

0.26

(0.05)

0.16

0.15

0.32

0.05

0.32

500,000 or more

(0.35)

(0.32)

(0.16)

0.04

0.12

0.14

100,000 - 499,999

(0.01)

0.33

0.28

0.42

0.00b

0.35

25,000 - 99,999

0.07

0.30

0.23

0.42

(0.05)

0.29

10,000 - 24,999

(0.09)

(0.03)

0.06

0.15

0.17

0.22

Average: all cities

(0.03)

0.18

0.17

0.32

0.04

0.29

Firm (plant size, in millions)
Average for all city sizes

#16: Instruments ($180)
Average of 16 firms by city size

a. Negative correlations are shown in parentheses. Poverty rate is based on the 1990 census (1989 income). See also notes to Table 5.4.
b. Value less than 0.005.
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tions between 25,000 and 499,999) there is a significant tendency for
investment returns to favor higher-poverty cities, and this is due
entirely to the effects of tax incentives. For the largest and smallest cit
ies, the results are quite ambiguous. (There is a small negative correla
tion for the largest class, but, again, the small number of cities in this
class and the effect of Detroit, with a very high poverty rate, lead one
to interpret the correlations for this size class with caution.)

THE EFFECTS OF ENTERPRISE ZONES
While the employment data cited have suggested that only a small
share of job growth occurs within enterprise zones, our sample of cities
included 44 that contained enterprise zones or were located in a highunemployment county that qualified for special state tax incentives.
This group represented nearly 40 percent of the cities in our sample.
This is not necessarily inconsistent with the jobs data; it could be that
much job growth occurs in rural areas, smaller cities, and in enterprise
zone cities but not within the zones themselves. Nonetheless, the prev
alence of enterprise zones, particularly in the larger cities that also tend
to have higher unemployment and poverty rates, suggests that further
exploration is needed of the effects of zone incentives on the spatial
distribution of investment returns.
We divided each city size class into cities without enterprise zones
and cities with enterprise zones or similar designations (which include
cities in distressed counties). For the three smaller size classes, and for
all cities pooled, the enterprise zone cities had substantially higher con
centrations of the unemployed, the poor, and blacks (see Table 5.6).
This was not the case in the largest city size class, again due in part to
the effect of Detroit, which was one of only two non-enterprise zone
cities in the largest class. (The other is Seattle, with an unemployment
rate of only 4.9 percent.) Enterprise zones are clearly concentrated in
larger cities.
Table 5.7 compares cities of 25,000 population or more with and
without enterprise zones. (There were enterprise zones in only 2 of the
21 cities of 10,000 to 24,999 population.) The enterprise zone cities
provided returns on investment after basic state and local taxes that
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Table 5.6 Characteristics of Cities with and without Enterprise Zones,
1992"

Characteristics

500,000
or more

City population
10,000100,000- 25,00099,999
24,999
499,999

All

Cities without enterprise zones
Number of cities

2

27

20

19

68

Average unemployment
rate (%)

12.3

6.3

5.9

6.0

6.2

Average poverty rate (%)

22.4

13.2

11.0

13.6

12.7

Average black pop. (%)

42.9

14.8

10.4

6.9

11.7

Cities with enterprise zones
Number of cities
Average unemployment
rate (%)

10

21

11

2

44

8.0

8.1

7.3

8.4

7.9

Average poverty rate (%)

18.1

18.7

17.0

25.4

18.4

Average black pop. (%)

20.6

25.3

12.1

38.6

21.6

All cities
Number of cities

12

41

38

21

112

Average unemployment
rate (%)

8.7

7.2

6.3

6.2

6.9

Average poverty rate (%)

18.8

16.0

12.7

14.7

14.9

Average black pop. (%)

24.3

20.2

10.9

9.9

15.6

Cities with enterprise
zone (%)

83.3

51.2

28.9

9.5

39.3

Ratio: EZ cities/non-EZ cities
Average unemployment
rate (%)

0.65

1.28

1.24

1.40

1.27

Average poverty rate (%)

0.81

1.42

1.54

1.87

1.45

Average black pop. (%)

0.48

1.71

1.16

5.57

1.84

a. The term "enterprise zones" is used here to include programs in three states that provide state
incentives in selected distressed counties. EZ = enterprise zone.
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were slightly lower than returns in the other cities. Interestingly, the
enterprise zone cities provided far more regular tax incentives (not lim
ited to enterprise zones) as well as generous enterprise zone incentives.
The total tax incentive package in the enterprise zone cities was on
average 6 to 10 times as large as the tax incentives offered in the other
cities. Other (non-tax) incentives were comparable in the cities with
and without enterprise zones. The result of the more generous tax
incentives was that returns on investment after all taxes and incentives
were from 4 to 136 percent greater (considering the five firms in Table
5.7) in the enterprise zone cities than in the other cities.
State-funded tax incentives provided only to firms locating in enter
prise zones (investment and jobs credits for the most part, but also sales
tax exemptions) account for most (about 80 percent on average) of the
total state/local enterprise zone benefits. Furthermore, in cities with
enterprise zones, the enterprise zone incentives account for 29 to 51
percent of the total incentive package, including loans and grants. Thus
it is due in part to the state-funded targeted incentives that the tax
incentives overall are able to largely offset the perverse effects of state/
local taxes. Table 5.8 shows that, for all city sizes on average, enter
prise zone incentives are positively correlated with the unemployment
rate. This is hardly surprising, given that an above-average local unem
ployment rate is generally one of the criteria for enterprise zone eligi
bility. It is surprising, actually, that the correlation is not higher. This is
due to the fact that some high-unemployment places have no enterprise
zones, while some states permit enterprise zones in cities with unem
ployment rates that are only average (at least among our sample). Inter
estingly, non-enterprise zone tax incentives are also positively
correlated with unemployment, and the relationship is more consistent
across city sizes.
Thus, while property tax abatement is by no means limited to enter
prise zones, the prevalence of additional state tax incentives in such
zones appears to be enough to give zone cities a competitive edge
(other things equal) that helps tilt the investment return surface towards
higher-unemployment places. The exception appears to be the large
city class, but once again the average unemployment rate figure is
skewed by Detroit, one of only two large cities without an enterprise
zone but with a very high unemployment rate. 6 More important is the
fact that the 10 large cities with enterprise zones have unemployment

Table 5.7 The Importance of Enterprise Zone (EZ) Incentives: Average Value among Cities of 25,000 or More for
Selected Multistate Firms9
#7, Plastics
#5, Soap
$5
$20
Cities with enterprise zones

#2, Furniture
$40b
Project returns ($)
After basic taxes only
After all incentives
Value of incentives ($)
State EZ tax incentives
Local EZ tax incentives
Total EZ package
Non-EZ tax incentives
Total tax incentive package
Non-tax incentives
Total incentive package
Percentages
State EZ incentives/total EZ pkg.
EZ tax incentives/all tax incentives
EZ tax incentives/total incentive pkg.
Project returns ($)
After basic taxes only

#14, Auto
$600

#16, Instruments
$180

8,178,094
9,883,505

8,044,876
8,873,916

81,864
390,703

1,692,898
13,359,831

56,067,884
60,418,974

588,014
155,697
743,711
306,551
1,050,262
655,149
1,705,411

302,579
63,926
366,505
136,328
502,833
326,207
829,040

71,339
17,429
88,768
31,560
120,327
188,512
308,840

3,667,208
2,255,746
5,922,955
4,176,537
10,099,492
1,567,440
11,666,932

1,582,707
613,479
2,196,186
1,119,438
3,315,624
1,035,466
4,351,090

80.4
73.8
28.7

61.9
58.6
50.8

72.1
66.2
50.5

103,904

2,331,201

56,614,836

82.6
79.1
72.9
70.8
44.2
43.6
Cities without enterprise zones
8,253,901

8,065,024

(continued)

Table 5.7 (continued)
#2, Furniture
$40b
After all incentives
Value of incentives ($)
Total tax incentive package
Non-tax incentives
Total incentive package
Project returns
After basic taxes only
After all incentives
Value of incentives
Non-EZ tax incentives
Total tax incentive package
Non-tax incentives
Total incentive package

9,053,221

#5, Soap
$20
8,463,266

#7, Plastics
$5
267,499

109,933
53,659
11,858
689,387
344,583
151,737
799,320
398,242
163,595
Ratios: EZ cities to non-EZ cities

#14, Auto
$600
5,666,855

#16, Instruments
$180
58,090,749

1,592,400
1,743,254
3,335,654

384,845
1,091,068
1,475,913

0.99
1.09

1.00
1.05

0.79
1.46

0.73
2.36

0.99
1.04

2.79
9.55
0.95
2.13

2.54
9.37
0.95
2.08

2.66
10.15
1.24
1.89

2.62
6.34
0.90
3.50

2.91
8.62
0.95
2.95

a. EZ = enterprise zone. Because only 2 of the 21 cities under 25,000 population had enterprise zones, we confined the analysis to cities of 25,000 or more.
The value of state enterprise zone incentives is measured by the difference between the present value of new plant cash flow after all tax incentives and the
present value of new plant cash flow given all tax incentives except state enterprise zone incentives. The value of the total enterprise zone package is the
difference between the present value of new plant cash flow after all taxes and tax incentives and the present value of new plant cash flow after all taxes
and non-enterprise zone tax incentives. The value of local enterprise zone incentives is the difference between the value of the total enterprise zone pack
age and the value of state enterprise zone incentives. The total incentive package includes job training, infrastructure, and general financing programs.
Items may not add to total due to rounding.
b. Firm size in millions of dollars.

Table 5.8 Correlation between City Unemployment Rate and Value of Incentives: Enterprise Zone versus Other
Incentives (Multistate Firms)
Value of enterprise zone
tax incentives

Value of state and local
non-EZ incentives

Returns without
EZ incentives

State

State
and local

Tax
incentives

All
incentives

After tax
incentives

After all
incentives

#2: Furniture ($40)

0.22

0.22

0.18

0.08

(0.15)

(0.16)

#5: Soaps ($20)

0.25

0.24

0.16

0.07

(0.13)

(0.12)

#7: Plastics ($5)

0.15

0.17

0.21

0.10

(0.11)

(0.03)

(0.08)

(0.10)

Firm (plant size in millions)
Average for all city sizes

#14: Autos ($600)

0.09

0.07

0.20

0.14

#16: Instruments ($180)

0.23

0.20

0.20

0.12

(0.16)

(0.17)

(0.37)

(0.33)

0.45

0.38

(0.12)

(0.05)
(0.02)

Average of 16 firms by city size
500,000 or more
100,000 - 499,999

0.17

0.20

0.25

0.06

0.04

25,000 - 99,999

0.45

0.36

0.24

0.08

0.01

(0.04)

10,000 - 24,999

0.00a

0.00a

0.06

0.12

(0.36)

(0.25)

Average: all cities

0.19

0.18

0.19

0.11

(0.13)

(0.11)

Note: For definitions, see notes to previous tables,
a. Value less than 0.005.
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and poverty rates similar to those of the smaller cities with zones and
higher than most cities without zones; these large zone cities also pro
vide project returns that on average are higher than returns in the
smaller nonzone cities. Consequently, then, the large cities as a group,
excluding Detroit, reinforce the preceding conclusions that enterprise
zone incentives, if effective, would tend to pull jobs towards highunemployment places.
Nonetheless, the targeting of tax incentives alone is not sufficient to
produce a pattern of returns on investment, after all taxes and incen
tives, that favors higher-unemployment places, as we showed earlier. A
comparison of Table 5.4 and Table 5.8 is instructive. The last column in
Table 5.8 shows that, in the absence of enterprise zone incentives,
returns on investment would be negatively correlated with unemploy
ment rates, although the correlations are quite weak. An examination
of the third column in Table 5.4, showing project returns with enter
prise zone incentives included, reveals that the effect of enterprise
zones is to offset, but not reverse, the perverse distributional pattern of
returns (though, again, this is true on average for all cities but not the
largest size class).
Remember that, in those 42 cities where the enterprise zone is just a
part of the city, we have allowed the incentives that apply to firms
locating within the zones to represent the incentive package for the
entire city; this exaggerates the role of enterprise zones. (For the two
enterprise zone cities that are actually part of a distressed county, the
"zone" incentives do apply throughout the city.) At the same time, the
distributional effects are muted by the use of city wide unemployment
rates, which are presumably lower than rates within the zones. This
seems a reasonable procedure on the grounds that the labor market
effects will be felt well beyond the zone itself, even if direct hiring by
the new enterprise zone firm is concentrated on zone residents due to
statutory restrictions. Nonetheless, if only a small share of job growth
occurs within enterprise zones, the correlations that include enterprise
zone effects in 40 percent of our cities do exaggerate the role of enter
prise zone incentives. The pattern of returns shown in the last two col
umns of Table 5.8 may more accurately reflect the overall pattern.
Figure 5.1 illustrates the lack of any consistent pattern by focusing
on a firm typical in terms of the correlation of taxes and incentives with
unemployment—the instruments manufacturer building a $180 million

Figure 5.1 Rate of Return on New Plant Investment in Top 25 Cities: Multistate Instruments Manufacturer, $180
Million Plant
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plant. We show only the top 25 cities (those with the highest internal
rate of return for this plant after taking into account all taxes and incen
tives), ordered by unemployment rate. For each city, the graph displays
the rate of return after basic taxes and how this rate of return is bettered
through the provision of enterprise zone incentives and other (tax and
non-tax) incentives. Some cities that ranked poorly after basic taxes
improved their position dramatically though non-enterprise zone
incentives; others did so through enterprise zone credits. Certain cities,
including some with relatively low unemployment, were very competi
tive without incentives and enhanced their position further through
incentives. In other words, incentives are not primarily compensating
for high basic taxes, nor are they able to offset the tax disadvantage of
high-unemployment cities.
The link between job growth in an area and the incidence of poverty
is undoubtedly complex, given the interrelationships between poverty
and the factors that contribute to it—unemployment, low-wage
employment, wage discrimination, occupational segregation by race
and gender, residential segregation, lack of human capital, and mis
matches between jobs available and the skills or location of the poor.
The attraction of new investment to poverty areas or poorer cities may
well be an important part of an effective antipoverty strategy and is cer
tainly part of the rationale for enterprise zones. Are enterprise zone
incentives advantaging cities with high rates of poverty? Are the incen
tives large enough to plausibly make a difference?
Not surprisingly, enterprise zone incentives are noticeably larger in
cities with higher poverty rates, and this effect is amplified by the addi
tion of local incentives to the more generous state incentives (see Table
5.9). A comparison of the third and fourth columns of Table 5.9 (the
value of non-enterprise zone incentives) and the fourth and sixth col
umns of Table 5.5 (which combines enterprise zone and non-enterprise
zone incentives) shows that tax incentives, and all incentives taken
together, favor high poverty places to a substantially larger degree
when enterprise zone incentives are included in the analysis. Without
enterprise zones, project returns bear no consistent relationship to pov
erty rates; with enterprise zones, the pattern of returns after all incen
tives favors poorer cities to a degree.

Table 5.9 Correlation between City Poverty Rate and Value of Incentives: Enterprise Zone versus Other Incentives
(Multistate Firms)
Value of enterprise zone
tax incentives

Value of state and local
non-EZ incentives

Returns without
EZ incentives

State

State
and local

Tax
incentives

All
incentives

After tax
incentives

After all
incentives

#2: Furniture ($40)

0.27

0.30

0.17

0.12

0.05

0.04

#5: Soaps ($20)

0.35

0.36

0.15

0.11

0.07

0.09

0.05

0.11

Firm (plant size in millions)
Average for all city sizes

#7: Plastics ($5)

0.20

0.25

0.21

0.17

#14: Autos ($600)

0.04

0.05

0.21

0.20

0.11

0.11

#16: Instruments ($180)

0.26

0.27

0.18

0.17

0.04

0.03

(0.42)

(0.39)

0.36

0.38

(0.14)

(0.02)

100,000 - 499,999

0.20

0.36

0.23

0.14

0.10

0.08

25,000 - 99,999

0.47

0.35

0.22

0.10

0.18

0.11

10,000 - 24,999

0.04

0.04

0.10

0.19

(0.05)

0.05

0.19

0.15

0.06

0.07

Average of 16 firms by city size
500,000 or more

Average: all cities

0.22

Note: For definitions, see notes to previous tables.

0.24
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CONCLUSIONS
State tax systems exhibit a strong tendency to skew returns on new
industrial investment in a perverse direction, producing higher after-tax
returns in states with lower unemployment rates, other things equal.
This perverse pattern is largely offset by state tax credits and by local
taxes and tax incentives, which tend to be more favorable in states and
cities with higher unemployment. Non-tax incentives, on the other
hand, vary dramatically with firm characteristics; for large plants, such
incentives at the state level very clearly favor low-unemployment cit
ies, while for smaller plants the relationship is nonexistent. The large
versus small distinction fails to hold up at the city level of analysis,
however. The end result is a spatial pattern of returns on new invest
ment that has little or no bearing to the spatial pattern of unemploy
ment among cities.
The explicit development incentives are indeed laid out so as to
make investment more attractive in the places most in need of jobs. It
may be that, in the absence of state and local concern with develop
ment, such incentives would not have been adopted and the state and
local tax system overall would have remained perverse in its effects.
We could then conclude that incentive competition has produced a neu
tral (or random) spatial distribution of returns, which at least is better
than what would have prevailed in the absence of incentives. However,
that is the most we could say. Furthermore, to the extent that much of
the focus of state level policy has been on features of the tax system
that we have included in the "basic" tax, rather than as incentives, it is
not clear that even this much can be said. The only firm conclusion is
that, after at least a decade and a half of intense competition for invest
ment and jobs, and the widespread adoption of pro-development tax
policies and incentives, states and cities have produced a tax and incen
tive system that provides no clear inducement for firms to invest in
higher-unemployment places.
These results are consistent with the thesis that state and local eco
nomic development incentives are adopted for a variety of reasons—
high unemployment being but one, simple imitation of other states
being another—and that such incentives are likely to persist even if
state economic performance (and state unemployment rates) improve.
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Furthermore, to the extent that slow economic growth is the driving
force, the relationship between incentives and unemployment will be a
weak one, because slow growth, at least as measured by net job gains,
is not clearly associated with high unemployment rates.
NOTES
1. From the 16 firms, we selected 5 that represent prototypes with distinct characteristics,
such as size, profitability, and capital intensity. Each of the five is representative of a set of firms
whose after-tax returns across states are highly correlated (0.9 or better). Firm 2, the large furni
ture manufacturer, is a good proxy for firms 8, 10, 11, and 13. Firm 5, the small soap and toiletries
firm, is a good proxy for firms 6,9, 11, and 15. Firm 7 (plastics, small) is a stand-in for firms 1
and 9. Firm 14 (the large automobile manufacturer) is a proxy for 8, 10, 12, and 13; and firm 16
(instruments, large) is a proxy for 3,4, 6, and 12.
2. Given the small number of cities in our sample in many states, and given the substantial
variation across cities in the use of non-tax incentive programs, there was no way to establish with
any confidence a representative package of local non-tax incentives for each state. While a state
non-tax incentive package could obviously have been specified in the representative city analyses,
this would not have provided us any additional information beyond the state-level analysis already
conducted with state taxes and incentives only.
3. The positive correlation of 0.10 between state tax incentives and job growth in Table 5.3
seems to be at odds with the negative correlation of-0.27 in Table 5.2. The apparent discrepancy
is due to the inclusion of state enterprise zone incentives in Table 5.3.
4. In order to summarize the results across city size classes, we computed an average of the
correlation coefficients for each size class. (An overall correlation coefficient for all of the cities
pooled would not be valid because of the different sampling rates.) If the importance of the results
for a city size class is a function of the portion of the U.S. population living in cities of that size,
then the logical weights are population proportions. This is the method we chose: to compute a
weighted average of the four correlation coefficients, where the weight is the total U.S. population
in that city size class divided by the total U.S. population in the four city size classes together.
5. Enterprise zones existed in 44 of the cities, but the Ohio city with an enterprise zone does
not benefit from any state enterprise zone incentives.
6. After 1992, Detroit won federal Empowerment Zone status.

6

Incentive Competition
and Public Policy

State and local economic development policy has been the subject
of much debate in the press in recent years, with most of the criticism
focused on the large subsidy packages resulting from interstate bidding
wars for major plants. It is important to remember that these bidding
wars have been occurring against a backdrop of state and local tax pol
icies and ongoing incentive programs that have been on the books for
many years, themselves subject to escalation as a result of competitive
pressures. The Urban Institute and the National Association of State
Development Agencies first published their Directory of Incentives for
Business Investment and Development in the United States in 1981; it
catalogued the major tax incentives, loan and grant programs, loan
guarantees, customized job training, and other programs offered rou
tinely by the states. It is these kinds of programs, both at the state and
at the local level, that have been the subject of our research, along with
the overall effects of state and local tax regimes.
In this chapter, we review the major findings of our study and their
implications for public policy at the local, state, and national level. Are
the tax and incentive differences across locations significant enough
that they should even be a concern of policy makers? Do the results of
this study shed any light on the debate over the effects of incentive
competition on the efficiency of industrial location and hence on
national productivity? What have we learned about the possible
national benefits of state and local competition as a result of the redis
tribution of jobs? Should Congress intervene to limit competition, and
how could this be done?

ARE TAX AND INCENTIVE DIFFERENCES IMPORTANT?

Most of the programs and policies that we call explicit economic
development incentives—investment and jobs tax credits, property tax
abatements, infrastructure subsidies, customized job training pro-
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grams, business loans, grants, and loan guarantees—have become
widespread only in the past 20 years, as states and cities have
attempted to respond to a more uncertain and competitive economic
environment. These incentives operate against a backdrop of state and
local taxes that themselves have been changed in response to those
same economic pressures, but in ways that are much more difficult to
identify. We have chosen to define a basic state and local tax system—
including income, net worth, sales, and property taxes—that initially
determines the competitiveness of a site for new business investment,
by establishing the after-tax return on investment available at that site,
given a particular firm and plant size and a particular technology and
set of input prices. We then determine how the various explicit incen
tives offered by states and localities alter that after-tax return and affect
the relative profitability of different kinds of locations.
When we examined returns on investment at the starting point of our
analysis—after basic taxes only—we found very wide differences
among states and cities. The divergences were exaggerated when we
examined state taxes only, for the simple reason that states with high
state income and sales taxes tend to have lower local property and sales
taxes. However, even when we looked at the results after paying all
state and local taxes (but before receiving any incentives) we found
very large differences between the returns available at the "best" loca
tions and those available at the "worst" locations. Tax differences have
very substantial effects on the spatial pattern of returns. Even when we
ignored variation within states (by focusing on a representative city in
each state), we found effective state/local tax rates on new investment
that ranged, for example, from 3 percent to 13 percent for a small but
profitable manufacturer of soaps and toiletries, and from 7 percent to
27 percent for a large but low-profit automobile manufacturer (Table
4.6). The highest tax state placed a tax burden on manufacturers that
was typically about three times as large as the lowest tax state. When
we looked at particular localities, the differences were more extreme.
Eight states offered investment or jobs tax credits to firms anywhere
in the state (Table 4.4); in 14 of the 24 states, local property tax abate
ments were offered (Table 4.3). Together, these defined the explicit tax
incentives generally available as entitlements (although in a minority
of places with abatements, they were discretionary); these incentive
packages ranged from zero to as high as 40 percent to 45 percent of the
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before-incentive state and local tax burden. When enterprise zone
incentives were added to the picture, an even larger share of state and
local taxes (as high as 65 percent) was forgiven as an economic devel
opment incentive in the cities with enterprise zones or similar pro
grams.
Tax incentives generally do not reduce the variation across states;
large investment or jobs credits, for example, are not used primarily to
offset high basic taxes. Enterprise zone incentives tend to be larger in
states that offer less in the way of general incentives. Nonetheless, the
effect of enterprise zones is to increase the variation in after-tax returns
across states, not to compensate for high basic taxes.
Many of the features of what we call the basic tax system have in
fact been listed as tax incentives in the Directory of Incentives for Busi
ness Investment and Development and have no doubt been enacted in
some states for economic development purposes. To a firm building a
new plant, some of these tax features, such as the exemption of manu
facturing machinery and equipment from the sales tax, the exemption
of inventories from the property tax, or the double-weighting of sales
in the income tax apportionment formula, provide benefits comparable
in size to the benefits from explicit incentives such as a new jobs tax
credit.
The non-tax incentives included infrastructure subsidies and cus
tomized job training at the state level and general purpose grants,
loans, and loan guarantees at both the state and local levels. Averaged
over the 16 firm types and 112 cities in 24 states, non-tax incentives,
expressed in terms of present value wage equivalence, were worth
about 9 cents an hour per employee, for each of 40 hours a week, for
50 weeks a year, for 20 years. In other words, state and local non-tax
incentives were worth the equivalent of paying all workers in the new
plant 9 cents an hour less over the life of the plant. By comparison,
non-tax incentives had a wage equivalence of 7 cents an hour. On the
whole, discretionary incentives were larger for small plants (a wage
equivalence of 13 cents an hour) than for large plants (5 cents an hour).
Non-tax incentives were a major part of a state's entire incentive
package (in fact, in some cases over 90 percent of state incentives
derived from non-tax programs). Overall, infrastructure and training
programs were of less importance to smaller firms than were generaluse subsidies (see Table 4.14). In the case of large firms, infrastructure
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and training incentives were typically worth more than general-use
incentives; in fact, for big firms, training incentives alone were often
more substantial than general-use incentives. When local incentives
were combined with state ones, the role of discretionary non-tax incen
tives declined markedly. The combined package of state and local tax
incentives was often as large as the combined package of non-tax dis
cretionary incentives. The reasons for this include the provision of very
generous tax incentives (such as the property tax abatement) at the
local level and the dearth of many large local non-tax incentive pro
grams. 1
At the local level and averaged over all 16 firm types, 48 percent of
the increment in income due to incentives derived from tax incentives,
52 percent derived from non-tax incentives. However, there was sub
stantial variation by firm size. For small firms, non-tax incentives were
much more important, making up 65 percent of the incentive offer. In
the case of big firms, discretionary incentives were much less signifi
cant; only 39 percent of the increment to income derived from non-tax
incentives.
Do discretionary incentives change the competitive positions of
states and cities? While there were a few notable cases where very
large general purpose incentives produced great changes in state or city
ranking on the basis of investment returns, overall the answer to this
question is "not much." For the handful of cities/states at the top or at
the bottom of the rankings, there were very substantial differences in
returns between one city or state and the next due to tax and incentive
variations; still, the inclusion of incentives very often did little to
change the identity of the majority of cities in the top 10 or bottom 10.
Mostly, cities that were highly competitive after taxes and tax incen
tives were also highly competitive after the inclusion of non-tax incen
tives. Moreover, the majority of cities/states in the middle of the
rankings were often separated by very little, at any level of analysis, so
that adding or deleting a particular program from the analysis could
produce substantial shifts in rankings—but shifts that were of little sig
nificance because the size of the differences in income between cities/
states was small.
In general, the range (that is, the difference between the best and the
worst cities) was greater after the inclusion of non-tax incentives than
after basic taxes or basic taxes and tax incentives. Averaged over the 16
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firm types, the range after the inclusion of non-tax incentives was 1.4
times that after basic taxes and 1.3 times that after taxes and tax incen
tives. So non-tax incentives did not ameliorate, but actually accentu
ated, the differential between the best and worst cities. Also, the degree
of accentuation appeared to be greater for small firms than for big
firms. However, statistically there was no apparent relationship
between the generosity of a particular city/state's non-tax incentive
package and the burdensomeness of its taxes. In other words, non-tax
incentives exaggerated, at the extremes, spatial disparities in taxes, but
for most cities the connection between taxes and non-tax incentives
was somewhat random.
Is it reasonable to claim that a city's and state's tax and incentive
regime could influence location decisions? Our research has not looked
at spatial differentials in other factor costs (such as labor, energy, and
transportation) or in the benefits firms receive from taxes, so we are not
in a position to give an unequivocal answer to the question. However,
our results suggest that, for the firm types simulated by TAIM, the
range of results across all 112 cities (and 24 states) is not trivial. Large
income differences separated the best and worst locations. In the most
extreme case, a hourly wage equivalence of $1.82 divided the top- and
bottom-ranked cities (this was for the large drug plant simulation; see
Table 4.9). There is a likelihood, of course, that factor cost differen
tials—in labor, energy, and transportation—could amount to much
more than $1.82 an hour. Specifically, it is quite possible that labor
costs in our bottom-ranked city could be more than $1.82 an hour
lower than in our top-ranked city. As it turns out, they are not. More
over, if tax and incentive regimes were developed to compensate for
locally high labor costs (or other input costs), one would logically
expect burdensome tax and incentive regimes in southern states, with
much lighter loads in California and states in the Northeast and Mid
west. However, the maps in Chapter 4 indicate no regional pattern of
taxes and incentives. Since the severity of local tax and incentive
regimes does not appear to be inversely related to factor costs, tax and
incentive differentials between top- and bottom-ranked locations could
reasonably be expected to influence plant location decisions in some
situations.
Obviously, most cities are not at the very top or the very bottom of
the range, but in the broad middle, where not much separates most
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locations' tax and incentive regimes. In these cases, tax and incentive
differentials may or may not have a decisive impact on plant location
decisions; it will all depend on the other factor costs at the various sites
competing for the investment. More generally, we are inclined to
believe that, unless they have some special factor cost advantage, cities
and states with severe tax and incentive regimes will tend to be elimi
nated from location searches. In other words, the greatest impact of tax
and incentive regimes may be to exclude at the outset some cities and
states from the game—from competing for a new investment opportu
nity.
Another way to assess the size of tax and incentive differences is to
compare the value of the standing offer in a particular state—the set of
such factors as tax incentives, loans, grants, and infrastructure subsi
dies routinely available to new manufacturing plants—with the incen
tive packages offered as one-time deals for certain facilities. Since auto
plants have frequently been the target of bidding wars by states and cit
ies, we will focus on the recent and much publicized subsidy package
offered to Mercedes-Benz for locating a new plant in Vance, Alabama.
Table 6.1 shows the nominal value of the initial subsidies and future
tax abatements. It is these nominal figures that are promulgated by
development officials and subsidy critics and that become the focus of
debate. The up-front subsidies equaled $118 million, while the annual
tax abatements of $3.1 million totaled $55 million over the first 25
years of the plant's existence. Thus, the entire subsidy package was
allegedly worth about $173 million.2
For purposes of comparison with the results of this study showing
the value to the firm of standing incentive offers, there are two prob
lems with the publicized numbers for the Mercedes plant and with sim
ilar figures for incentive deals in other places: 1) the figures show the
gross cost of the subsidies to the state and local governments, not the
net after-tax value of the subsidies to the firm; 2) future tax subsidies
are simply added up instead of discounted. To determine the value of
the subsidy package with these problems corrected, we created a new
firm to be simulated using TAIM. The new firm is the large multistate
auto manufacturer (firm no. 14), but with actual data on the Mercedes
plant substituted for our average plant data (in particular, the value of
land, infrastructure, plant, machinery and equipment, sales, and
employment). Then we created an incentive package in an Alabama
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Table 6.1 The Subsidy Package for the Mercedes-Benz Auto Assembly
Plant: Gross Value versus Value to the Firm in Alternative
Locations8
Incentives

Value
($ millions)

Gross undiscounted value of incentives in Vance, Alabama
Initial subsidies
Infrastructure

32.0

Site acquisition

17.4

Job training

60.0

Sales tax exemptions
Miscellaneous
Subtotal

8.2
0.7
118.2

Tax exemptions
Property tax abatement: $1.5 million/year for 10 years

15.0

Corporate income tax reduction: $1.6 milion/year for 25 years

40.0

Subtotal

55.0

Total value of subsidy package

173.2

After-tax present value to the firm of the actual subsidy package
Initial subsidies

71.6

Tax exemptions

14.3

Total

85.9

After-tax discounted value/gross undiscounted value

49.6%

After-tax present value to the firm of the standing incentive offers
provided by selected other cities
Abilene, Texas

34.0

Atlanta, Georgia

53.5

Bedford, Indiana

42.5

Des Moines, Iowa

29.9

Detroit, Michigan

40.5

Fairfield, Ohio

26.1
(continued)
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Table 6.1 (continued)
Huntsville, Alabama

10.9

Joliet, Illinois

33.2

Milwaukee, Wisconsin

16.3

St. Joseph, Missouri

32.9

Syracuse, New York

42.8

a. The figures for the gross undiscounted value of the subsidies are from Ken Blum, The Mercedes
Bern Subsidy Package—Whose Benefits? Whose Losses? All estimates of the after-tax present
value to the firm of the subsidy package or of standing incentive offers were generated by TAIM.
The firm simulated was the large, multistate auto plant (no. 14) but with actual data on the value
of new plant and equipment and new plant sales and employment for the Mercedes plant (as
shown in the cited report) substituted for the average plant data in the usual model runs. Items
may not sum to total due to rounding.

city to match the actual package, treating the initial subsidies as grants
except for the sales tax exemptions (which were modeled as actual
exemptions). The property tax and income tax abatements were treated
as annual tax credits of $1.5 million for 10 years and $1.6 million for
25 years, respectively. The value of these subsidies is then measured by
TAIM net of the federal and Alabama state income tax effects, and dis
counted to the present (1992).
The value to the firm of the $173 million nominal package was esti
mated by TAIM at $86 million, or only about half of its nominal value.
This figure can then be compared to the after-tax present value of the
standing incentive packages offered in other cities. We selected 11 cit
ies that offered the most generous incentives to large auto plants or that
were among the top locations for such plants when cities were ranked
by returns after all incentives, and simulated the value of their incen
tives for the same Mercedes plant. As can be seen in Table 6.1, the best
examples of these incentive packages represent about half of the spe
cial deal offered in Vance, Alabama (over 60 percent in the case of
Atlanta). Still, if Alabama's tax system were relatively burdensome to
begin with, the packages in some of the other cities could have been
sufficient to make those locations comparable, in terms of after-tax
return on investment, to the Alabama site. The important points here
are that 1) discussions of incentive packages in the press do not present
accurate measures of their true worth to the firm, 2) standing incentive
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offers are not trivial in comparison with the much publicized one-time
deals, and 3) incentive packages must be judged in the context of the
basic state and local tax system. It is also important to note that the big
deals usually are put together in a fashion to make them appear most
attractive to the firms and usually include as part of the package the
routine incentives that have been the focus of this study.

THE SPATIAL PATTERN OF INCENTIVES AND THE
NATIONAL BENEFITS OF COMPETITIVE ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT POLICY

If the competition among states and cities for jobs is to produce net
gains for the nation as a whole, it must be the case that the overall level
of investment is greater as a result (because the competition has raised
average after-tax returns on investment and thereby drawn capital from
overseas or has increased the nation's rate of savings and capital for
mation), and/or the redistribution of jobs must be such as to increase
employment in the places where it provides the most benefit. Because
reservation wages tend to be lower in high-unemployment places, the
net benefits of a job (the wage paid minus the reservation wage) are
more there. We have been investigating the latter hypothesis, namely
that incentives are greater in places of high unemployment, opening up
the possibility that incentives redistribute jobs from low-unemploy
ment to high-unemployment states and cities.
The explicit tax incentives that have been the focus of our research
do indeed exhibit some tendency to make investment more attractive in
the places most in need of jobs. State tax incentives are positively, but
very weakly, correlated with state unemployment rates (Table 5.1), and
combined state and city tax incentives are positively correlated with
city unemployment rates (Table 5.4). For state non-tax incentives, the
picture is mixed. For large firms, higher-unemployment states provided
smaller incentive packages, for most of the firms in our study, but for
small firms the relationship was virtually nonexistent. At the city level
of analysis, results are also mixed, but the general conclusion is that
state and local non-tax incentives exhibit no discernible relation to city
unemployment rates.
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The results for tax and non-tax incentives together lend only weak
support to the hypothesis that incentive competition produces a spatial
pattern of returns favoring places with more severe unemployment; the
value of all incentives combined is mildly positively correlated with
city unemployment rates (Table 5.4). However, this conclusion is tem
pered, if not negated, by considering the overall pattern of after-tax
returns. State tax systems exhibit a strong tendency to skew returns on
new industrial investment in a perverse direction, producing higher
after-tax returns in states with lower unemployment rates, other things
equal (Table 5.1). This perverse pattern is offset to a degree by local
taxes, which tend to be more favorable in states and cities with higher
unemployment (Table 5.3). Nevertheless, the incentives taken in the
aggregate are still not enough to clearly offset the effects of state taxes.
The end result is a spatial pattern of returns on new investment that
bears little or no relationship to the spatial pattern of unemployment. It
appears that, after at least a decade and a half of intense competition
for investment and jobs, and the widespread adoption of pro-develop
ment tax policies and development programs, states and cities have
produced a system of taxes and incentives with no clear inducement for
firms to invest in higher-unemployment places.
These results are consistent with the following two arguments
(although they certainly cannot be taken as proof of either one): 1)
state and local economic development incentives are adopted for a
variety of reasons, including high unemployment, but, more impor
tantly, slow growth and simple imitation of other states; and 2) even
where economic distress, as measured by high unemployment, pro
vided the original political impetus to incentive adoption, incentives
are likely to persist in spite of improvement in state economic perfor
mance. The latter point is corroborated by recent experience in Iowa,
which has remained a low-unemployment state but which has contin
ued, in the three years since our analysis was conducted, to further
enhance its already very competitive position by abolishing property
taxes on manufacturing machinery and equipment.
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TAXES, INCENTIVES, AND EFFICIENCY
Recent critiques of incentive competition by academic economists
have focused on the issue of efficiency in the location of economic
activity. The arguments are aimed primarily or exclusively at firm-spe
cific deals on the grounds that they distort the location decision, induc
ing businesses to choose a site that would otherwise not be the leastcost location and producing a geographic pattern of plant locations that
is less efficient for the national economy (Burstein and Rolnick 1995).
The conclusion is that competition is a negative-sum game.
These economists begin with the assumption that incentives do
make a difference, no doubt in part because they argue from a theoreti
cal perspective that tells them that the decisions of profit-maximizing
firms will be affected at the margin by differences in cost. The econo
mists appear to be on reasonably solid empirical grounds in this case.
Those who have reviewed the very extensive literature on the effective
ness of tax policy or of incentive competition have concluded that the
bulk of the evidence now appears to support the thesis that differences
in tax levels do measurably affect rates of economic growth (Bartik
1991b).
Unlike many of the labor and other activists who have been broadly
critical of incentives, however, economists may in fact argue that state
and local competition for business that focuses on broad tax and fiscal
policies is actually beneficial and can increase efficiency in business
location. Gates and Schwab (1991), for example, extend the Tiebout
hypothesis to business location, arguing that having a variety of locali
ties offering different bundles of taxes and public services will permit a
business to choose the optimal tax-service bundle for that firm. Fur
thermore, competition among governments will force them to be more
efficient in providing services and to reduce general taxes on business,
eliminating any fiscal surplus derived from the business tax base.
Therefore, business taxes will come to approximate prices for each
locality's bundle of public services, and efficiency in business location
will be enhanced since all inputs will then be priced on the basis of
marginal cost. According to such economic models, tax competition is
good as long as it is not specific to a firm or sector. Tax prices should
reflect only costs, not local preferences for particular kinds of firms,
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preferences that are often implicit in subsidy programs. The arguments
against firm- or sector-specific tax policies are the same as the main
stream economists' arguments against state industrial policy.
This line of thinking has led economists to call for federal interven
tion to reduce incentive competition. In 1995, for example, a group of
over 100 economists and others issued a press release calling for an
end to "targeted business incentive programs" (Heartland Institute
1995) but favoring statewide business tax relief. Others have proposed
banning the use of federal funds to underwrite competition. There have
been frequent calls for states to enact truces, and multistate agreements
to cease bidding for firms have actually been reached, although the
results so far have not been promising (Council of State Governments
1994).
In reality, the world of industrial incentives runs on a continuum,
from the one-time deals tailored to a particular firm that is the object of
a bidding war, to such broad-scale tax policies as an across-the-board
reduction in the corporate income tax rate. In between is a wide range
of policies and programs that are targeted in one sense or another but
are available on the same terms to more than one particular firm. These
strategies include tax incentives that are actually entitlements: that is,
investment tax credits and new jobs tax credits; sales tax exemptions
for machinery and equipment, or for fuel and electricity used in manu
facturing; and property tax abatements for all new industrial construc
tion. The sectoral targeting here is generally quite broad, including all
of manufacturing plus, in some states, categories such as warehousing,
research and development, or corporate headquarters. However, the
approach is more targeted than a general rate reduction, inducing more
investment in areas such as manufacturing and drawing capital from
others, such as services. Further, by applying only to income from new
investment, the programs introduce additional distortions, lowering the
cost of replacement capital relative to the implicit cost of keeping old
capital.
Equally important, sectoral and industry targeting is implicit in
many state and local tax systems and incentive programs. There is sub
stantial variation among firms even within the manufacturing sector
with respect to asset composition (the relative importance of working
capital, plant and land, machinery and equipment, and inventories) and
cost structure (for example, the share of costs accounted for by wages
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or energy, or the average wage level). As a result, there is wide varia
tion in tax burdens across industries for any given location. States that
rely heavily on local property tax financing for provision of local ser
vices will have lighter corporate income and sales tax burdens, which
will advantage firms with high profit rates and disadvantage firms with
a high proportion of real property (plant and equipment) in their asset
base. Similarly, a sales tax exemption for fuel and electricity could be
worth several times as much to an energy-intensive operation as to the
average manufacturing establishment. Table 4.5 illustrated these
effects: the exemption of machinery and equipment from the sales tax
represented a savings of 17 percent of total state/local taxes for the auto
firm, but only 9.4 percent for the instrument manufacturer, while the
exemption of fuel and electricity was worth 1.2 percent of taxes for the
large drug firm but 6.6 percent for the small plastics company. Exemp
tion of inventories from the property tax was worth twice as much to
the large instruments manufacturer as to the large drug firm, and a sim
ilar disparity in value applied to the exemption of manufacturing
machinery and equipment, when comparing the instruments and auto
firms. In states where real property is taxed but all personal property is
exempt by statute and always has been, a firm will benefit from a
higher after-tax return on investment than would occur in a city in
another state that taxes personal property but that advertises a local
exemption for machinery and equipment.
Incentives are never neutral, by sector, by factor of production, by
type of capital, by new versus old investment, and certainly not by
location. The important point is that state and local tax systems are
never neutral either. Thus, the basic premise of Burstein and Rolnick
(1996)—that state and local tax systems would exercise a neutral influ
ence on the location of economic activity and the composition of
investment in the absence of firm-specific incentives—is faulty.
Reschovsky (1991) delineates some problems with the Tiebout model
applied to business location; he argues that the prevalence of collective
goods makes it difficult to achieve equality between business tax bur
dens and business service bundles. Our research points up another
problem: tax burdens will vary from one firm to another for reasons
that probably have little bearing on the service needs of those busi
nesses.

216

Incentive Competition and Public Policy

The sectoral patterns that emerge from an examination of state and
local taxes and incentives are surely not deliberate on the part of poli
cy makers. It is unlikely that the impacts of particular tax policies or
programs on different industrial sectors are even considered, even less
that the end result can be taken as the expression of some well-thoughtout industrial policy. There is probably as little rhyme or reason to the
spatial preferences for different industries embodied in the pattern of
returns after taxes and incentives in 1992 as there was in the pattern of
these returns in 1972. It is difficult to argue that two decades of compe
tition has produced a more efficient pattern of location inducements.
Furthermore, since states and localities appear to engage in incentive
competition to provide jobs and benefits to workers and residents at
least as much as to gain tax base, there is some reason to believe that
incentive competition will proceed beyond the point of efficiency that
has been described, with states and cities providing subsidies to busi
ness in the interest of job creation even if the long-term fiscal effects
are negative. Tax and incentive competition will in all likelihood pro
duce a pattern where a sizable fiscal surplus remains in some places
that have sufficient inherent locational advantages to offset a poor taxservice bundle, while other places establish incentives so large that
they create a fiscal deficit. The argument that tax burdens (after incen
tives) will come to represent prices for public services seems optimis
tic, at best.
If the federal government were to succeed in ending the firm-spe
cific deals, would the outcome be more efficient location patterns, as
Burstein and Rolnick maintain? There is reason to be skeptical. States
and localities are very likely to respond to such prohibitions by exercis
ing their ingenuity in devising other ways of providing indirect subsi
dies to particular firms; the provision of free infrastructure and services
would very likely become commonplace. It would be very difficult to
monitor such activities or to define a practice that could feasibly be
prohibited, since much infrastructure is already provided free in many
places.
Secondly, states may respond to such restrictions by granting tax
breaks to all firms instead of only to certain ones. This has already been
happening. A major tax concession, granted in the heat of battle to one
firm, becomes a politically contentious issue when other firms, long
time fixtures in the local economic landscape, demand equal treatment.
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The solution is to extend the tax concession to all manufacturers. The
firm-specific distortion has been exchanged for a sector-wide distor
tion. This process could be accelerated if firm-specific deals were
ended. If so, the loss of state revenues and the erosion of financial sup
port for schools and infrastructure and social services would end up
being much greater than it would have been if we had let the states
make deals with individual firms.
The other possibility, of course, is that by outlawing firm-specific
competition, the mega-deals would be reduced, and the subsequent
pressure from other businesses to make the special deal a general enti
tlement would not develop. It is difficult to say which scenario is the
more likely.
Interestingly, one of the arguments made by some critics is that
incentives are inefficient because they are given to many firms whose
location decisions are unaffected by the incentive. They propose that
state and local economic development policy, to be more cost-effec
tive, should be directed at particular firms—those whose decisions are
likely to hinge on tax burdens. Programs should be negotiated on a
firm-by-firm basis, not be made as entitlements to a broad class of
firms. Similarly, since an investment tax credit (ITC) targets new
investment, an ITC is preferable to an across-the-board cut in tax rates;
the rate cut would affect all firms, whether investing or not, and would
have to entail a much larger loss in state revenues in order to influence
the investment decision of the same extent as an ITC.
Others take a public balance sheet approach that leads to similar
kinds of policies. A cost-benefit analysis of economic development
programs should be conducted, with the public weighing the public
benefits against the public costs. Public funds should be used, accord
ing to these advocates, only for projects or firms that satisfy publicinterest performance standards regarding labor practices, workplace
safety, environmental record, wage levels, or the provision of health
insurance ("responsible employer" legislation). Again, this implies
greater targeting and a balancing of objectives, requiring something
more like a negotiation process and less like an automatic entitlement
such as an ITC.
Could it be that cost-effective use of public funds from a local per
spective is exactly the opposite from what economists see as desirable
from the standpoint of national economic efficiency? The apparent par-
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adox, of course, is just the age-old problem of the appropriate account
ing region in benefit-cost analysis. As long as state and local
governments are making decisions based on benefits and costs to their
own state or to their own locality, they will devote public resources to
projects that produce net benefits statewide or locally but merely redis
tribute benefits when a broader accounting region is used. The federal
government could certainly prohibit the use of federal funds to subsi
dize these types of projects (while allowing them, perhaps, for such
programs as job training, research and development, or technology
transfer, which appear to enhance productivity instead of shifting the
location of production).

INCENTIVE COMPETITION AND EQUITY
To the extent that tax incentives, considered in isolation, are redistributive in the desired direction, it is in substantial measure due to the
prevalence of incentives targeted at high-unemployment areas, either
enterprise zones or distressed counties. Almost all those who have been
critical of incentive competition have allowed that the least harmful, or
perhaps even beneficial, component of it is the redistributive element.
The efficiency argument here is that there are immobilities of labor or
other barriers that prevent capital from shifting so as to equalize levels
of unemployment; subsidies to high-unemployment locations would
therefore be justified. The equity argument is that high-unemployment
places tend also to be ghetto areas, concentrations of African Ameri
cans and of the poor. Such population groups face restrictions on
mobility. Subsidization via enterprise zones is justified on just such
grounds.
Interestingly, the states have been doing far more than the federal
government to address distributional issues through economic develop
ment policy. While the federal government finally passed a limited
enterprise zone program focused on a small number of cities, states
over the past decade have established numerous similar programs.
States, in other words, have shown themselves quite ready to fund geo
graphically targeted economic development programs.
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This raises the question: Should states and localities be prohibited
from using Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) or other
federal monies to subsidize businesses even if those subsidies are
restricted to high-unemployment or high-poverty areas? To the extent
that states are using the state CDBG allocations to underwrite local
revolving loan funds for business support, and are targeting those funds
at poorer communities, such a use of federal funds appears to be com
plementing state targeting policies and the federal empowerment zone
program. However, many of the CDBG-capitalized revolving loan
funds we came across were not explicitly concerned with targeting
localized areas of distress. Certainly, the federal government's ability
to enforce targeting has been seriously eroded over the past two
decades.

CAN AND SHOULD INCENTIVE COMPETITION
BE CURBED?

To the degree that tax and incentive competition results in a redistri
bution of jobs, our research lends little or no support to the argument
that this redistribution has beneficial effects for the nation as a whole,
shifting jobs from places with low unemployment to places with high
unemployment. We also cannot say that it is clearly harmful, providing
inducements to redistribute jobs in the opposite direction. Of course,
one can only speculate as to what might otherwise have occurred; i.e.,
what the spatial pattern of returns on investment in 1992 would have
looked like had states and cities never undertaken to influence their
economic fortunes by offering inducements to industry in competition
with one another. If this pattern would have been distinctly counterpro
ductive, with higher returns in lower-unemployment places, then one
could conclude that competition has at least nullified such effects.
While the arguments that tax and incentive competition in general
enhances national welfare appear to us ill-supported, on redistributive
grounds, neither are we persuaded that incentive competition improves
locational efficiency. Although our study has not directly addressed
this issue, it seems apparent from the magnitude of firm differences in
returns that neither the basic tax system, nor the tax system with the
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standard package of incentives included, is likely to bear any system
atic relationship to actual public resource costs associated with differ
ent industries at different sites. Is there any reason to expect that the
cost of providing services to an auto plant is twice as high in South
Carolina as it is in Massachusetts, while the cost of providing services
to a small soap manufacturer is higher in Massachusetts than in South
Carolina? Or that in Texas, the average public service bundle for an
auto plant is four times the service bundle provided a large drug manu
facturer?3 These are the relationships that one would expect if effective
state/local tax rates reflect differences in service costs. The effective
tax rates on these various kinds of firms in these locations are quite dif
ferent, and it is difficult to imagine that they represent "tax prices" for
services. Further, it is not clear why one would anticipate the pattern to
be more related to costs in the absence of incentive competition. Since
few places appear to conduct any systematic study of fiscal effects, and
since these effects are difficult to measure and far from obvious, it
seems very unlikely that competition produces a set of after-tax returns
more in line with public service cost differences.
It is interesting to note that a recent national conference on "the eco
nomic war between the states" was attended by many who had gone on
record in opposition to incentive wars and had argued that the federal
government should intervene to end such competition.4 Nevertheless,
there were few concrete proposals on how that could be accomplished,
beyond the federal government prohibiting the use of federal funds for
industrial recruitment. How could the federal government intervene to
prevent states and cities from using their own funds for such purposes?
The practical difficulties in defining a competitive incentive that is to
be prohibited seem insurmountable. If Iowa were to be precluded from
enacting a property tax exemption to attract a new steel plant (as it
did), would it also be prevented from making the same property tax
exemption available to all steel manufacturers, or to all manufacturers,
or to all corporations (including insurance companies using comput
ers)? If so, would we then require Pennsylvania, which by state law
defines the property tax as a tax only on real property, to start mandat
ing that local governments also tax machinery and equipment and other
personal property, so that Pennsylvania localities do not have a com
petitive advantage?
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Cooperative agreements among states seem to be the only possibili
ties for reducing incentive wars, and the history here is not cause for
optimism. An important step in that direction, however, is simply to
undertake efforts to improve the information on which economic
development policy is based, so that policymakers in states and cities
have a better understanding of the true costs of incentives and of the
long-term fiscal and employment effects.
NOTES
1. The exception here is tax increment financing.
2. For this comparison, we used the estimates of the incentive package cost contained in the
report by Blum (1995), which was critical of the incentive deal. These figures are actually more
conservative than those reported in the Council of State Governments (1994).
3. Our representative city analysis showed the following effective state/local tax rates on new
investment after all tax incentives: for firm 14 (the large auto plant), 7.8 percent in Massachusetts,
13.3 percent in South Carolina, 21.2 percent in Texas; for firm 5 (soaps), 5.6 percent in Massachu
setts, 4.7 percent in South Carolina; for firm 4 (drugs)—5.6 percent in Texas.
4. Papers presented at this conference, held at the National Academy of Sciences, Washing
ton, DC, were printed in a special issues of The Region (June 1995), published by the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
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Table A.I Characteristics of the 24 Sample States

State
Alabama

Population,
1990

Percentage
oflLS.
manufacturing
employment,
1990

Employment
change,
1980-1990

Employment
change

Unemployment
rate, 1992

Percentage
of persons in
poverty, 1989

4,040,587

2.0

269,987

25.2

7.3

18.3

29,760,021

11.2

3,043,206

36.8

9.1

12.5

3,287,116

1.8

226,398

18.0

7.5

6.8

12,937,926

2.6

1,632,070

54.9

8.2

12.7

Georgia

6,478,216

3.0

781,275

45.5

6.9

14.7

Illinois

11,430,602

5.4

459,463

11.0

7.5

11.9

Indiana

5,544,159

3.3

349,316

19.4

6.5

10.7

Iowa

2,776,755

1.2

101,527

11.2

4.6

11.5

California
Connecticut
Florida

Kentucky

3,685,296

1.5

224,827

23.4

6.9

19.0

Massachusetts

6,016,425

2.8

480,835

21.0

8.5

8.9

Michigan

9,295,297

4.9

525,261

18.2

8.8

13.1

Minnesota

4,375,099

2.1

337,476

22.6

5.1

10.2

Missouri

5,117,073

2.2

345,050

20.7

5.7

13.3

New Jersey

7,730,188

3.3

708,345

28.2

8.4

7.6

New York

17,990,455

6.1

1,035,833

17.2

8.5

13.0

Table A.I ( continued)

State
North Carolina

Population,
1990

N)
NJ

ON

Percentage
of U.S.
manufacturing
employment,
1990

Employment
change,
1980-1990

Employment
change
(%)

Unemployment
rate, 1992
(%)

Percentage
of persons in
poverty, 1989

35.8

5.9

13.0

6,628,637

4.4

706,194

Ohio

10,847,115

5.8

515,021

13.8

7.2

12.5

Pennsylvania

11,881,643

5.4

553,381

13.7

7.5

11.1

South Carolina

3,486,703

2.0

298,622

30.9

6.2

15.4

Tennessee

4,877,185

2.7

428,403

29.7

6.4

15.7

16,986,510

5.0

953,894

19.4

7.5

18.1

Virginia

6,187,358

2.2

750,543

47.8

6.4

10.2

Washington

4,866,692

2.0

482,769

37.7

7.5

10.9

Wisconsin

4,891,769

2.9

338,741

21.0

5.1

10.7

201,118,827

85.6

15,548,437

6,101,892

2.9

481,802

21.8

7.25

12.5

Texas

Total3
Median

SOURCE: Population, unemployment rates, and poverty rates: Bernan Press, County and City Extra 1994; change in total employment:: U.S. Bureau of
the Census 1982 and 1993, County Business Patterns 1980 and 1990; "manufacturing employment in 1990: U.S. Bureau of the Census 1992a, 7990
Annual Survey of Manufactures.
a. Columns may not sum to total due to rounding.

Table A.2 City Sample: Demographic Characteristics and Taxes

City
San Diego, CA

Population, Size
1990
class
1,110,549

Unemploy
ment rate,
1992

Effective
Poverty
Enterprise property Property Local sales
Black
tax
tax rate
tax rate
rate, 1989 pop., 1990 zone in
abatement
1992

1

6.2

13.4

9.3

Yes

1.05

No

1.25

San Francisco, CA

723,959

1

6.3

12.7

10.9

Yes

1.12

No

1.25

Jacksonville, FL

672,971

1

5.7

13.0

25.3

Yes

2.19

No

0.50

2,783,726

1

11.3

21.6

39.0

Yes

3.16

Yes

2.50

741,952

1

5.6

12.5

22.5

Yes

3.72

Yes

0.00
0.00

Chicago, IL
Indianapolis, IN
Detroit, MI

1,027,974

1

19.7

32.4

75.7

No

4.63

Yes

New York City, NY

7,322,564

1

9.0

19.3

28.8

Yes

1.78

Yes

4.25

Dallas, TX

1,006,877

1

7.4

18.0

29.5

Yes

2.10

Yes

2.00

515,342

1

10.3

25.3

3.4

Yes

2.81

Yes

2.00
1.50

El Paso, TX
San Antonio, TX

935,933

1

9.2

22.6

7.0

Yes

2.94

Yes

Seattle, WA

516,259

1

4.9

12.4

10.0

No

1.21

No

1.70

Milwaukee, WI

628,088

1

8.9

22.2

30.5

Yes

3.67

No

0.50

Huntsville, AL

159,789

2

5.6

11.6

24.4

No

1.16

Yes

3.00
1.25

Bakersfield, CA

174,820

2

7.1

15.0

9.4

Yes

1.10

No

Fullerton, CA

114,144

2

4.7

9.8

1.9

No

1.01

No

1.25

Oakland, CA

372,242

2

9.5

18.8

43.9

No

1.24

No

1.25

Table A.2 (continued)

City

Population, Size
1990
class

Unemploy
ment rate,
1992

Effective
Poverty
Black
Enterprise property Property Local sales
rate, 1989 pop., 1990 zone in
tax
tax rate
tax rate
1992
abatement
(%)

Riverside, CA

226,505

2

6.9

11.9

7.4

Yes

1.03

No

1.25

Sacramento, CA

369,365

2

7.6

17.2

15.3

Yes

1.02

No

1.25

Salinas, CA

108,777

2

11.0

15.6

3.0

No

1.00

No

1.25

Santa Ana, CA

293,742

2

8.5

18.1

2.6

No

1.02

No

1.25

No

1.14

No

1.25

Simi Valley, CA

100,217

2

4.1

3.6

1.6

Sunnyvale, CA

117,229

2

4.0

4.7

3.4

No

1.04

No

1.25

Thousand Oaks, CA

104,352

2

4.0

4.2

1.3

No

1.05

No

1.25

Bridgeport, CT

141,686

2

10.6

17.1

26.6

Yes

4.75

Yes

0.00

2

10.7

27.5

38.9

Yes

2.69

Yes

0.00

Hartford, CT

139,739

Hollywood, FL

121,697

2

6.1

11.0

8.4

No

2.69

No

0.00

St. Petersburg, FL

238,629

2

5.2

13.6

19.5

Yes

2.61

No

0.00

Tallahassee, FL

124,773

2

5.6

22.3

29.1

Yes

2.29

No

1.00

Tampa, FL

280,015

2

6.7

19.4

25.0

Yes

2.65

No

0.50

Atlanta, GA

394,017

2

9.2

27.3

67.1

Yes

2.33

Yes

2.00

Savannah, GA

137,560

2

8.3

22.6

51.3

No

1.31

Yes

2.00

Des Moines, IA

193,187

2

5.0

12.9

7.1

No

4.23

Yes

0.00

Rockford, IL

139,426

2

6.1

13.4

14.8

Yes

3.40

Yes

0.00

Lowell, MA

103,439

2

10.7

18.0

2.2

No

2.51

No

0.00

Ann Arbor, MI

109,592

2

3.8

16.1

8.9

No

3.17

No

0.00

Springfield, MO

140,494

2

5.7

17.8

2.4

Yes

1.68

Yes

1.50

St. Louis, MO

396,685

2

11.0

24.6

47.4

Yes

2.68

Yes

0.50

Greensboro, NC

183,521

2

4.5

11.6

34.0

No

1.32

No

2.00

Elizabeth, NJ

110,002

2

9.9

16.1

19.9

Yes

2.57

No

0.00

Newark, NJ

275,221

2

14.7

26.3

58.5

Yes

3.46

Yes

0.00

Syracuse, NY

163,860

2

8.2

22.7

20.2

Yes

3.33

Yes

4.00

Yes

2.82

Yes

0.00

Erie, PA

108,718

2

8.9

19.3

12.2

Knoxville, TN

165,121

2

7.1

20.8

15.6

No

2.33

No

2.25

Abilene, TX

106,654

2

6.9

15.3

7.0

Yes

2.57

Yes

2.00

Beaumont, TX

114,323

2

7.9

21.1

41.2

Yes

1.84

Yes

2.00

22.0

Yes

2.91

Yes

1.50

Fort Worth, TX

447,619

2

7.5

17.4

Garland, TX

180,650

2

4.9

7.8

9.0

Yes

2.46

Yes

2.00

Piano, TX

128,713

2

2.9

3.3

4.0

No

2.34

Yes

2.00

Norfolk,VA

261,229

2

8.8

19.3

39.1

Yes

1.38

No

1.00

Richmond, VA

203,056

2

6.4

20.9

55.4

No

1.45

No

1.00

Virginia Beach,VA

393,069

2

4.7

5.9

13.9

No

1.09

No

1.00

Spokane, WA

177,196

2

8.2

17.3

1.9

No

1.55

No

1.50
(continued)
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Table A.2 (continued)

City

Population, Size
1990
class

Unemploy
ment rate,
1992
(%)

Effective
Poverty
Enterprise property Property Local sales
Black
tax rate
tax rate
tax
rate, 1989 pop., 1990 zone in
abatement
(%)
1992
(%)
(%)
(%)

176,664

2

7.4

16.8

11.4

No

1.83

No

1.40

Beverly Hills, CA

31,971

3

3.8

6.6

1.4

No

1.20

No

1.25

Camarillo, CA

52,303

3

3.8

4.4

1.7

No

1.04

No

1.25

Campbell, CA

36,048

3

3.4

5.8

2.1

No

1.08

No

1.25

Cerritos, CA

53,240

3

3.7

4.0

7.4

No

1.15

No

1.25

Colton, CA

40,213

3

9.8

15.6

9.0

No

1.14

No

1.25

Napa, CA

61,842

3

4.8

7.7

0.2

No

1.25

No

1.25

Novato, CA

47,585

3

3.1

4.2

2.7

No

1.06

No

1.25

Porterville, CA

29,563

3

12.8

26.8

1.2

Yes

1.01

No

1.25

Redding, CA

66,462

3

8.8

14.3

1.0

No

1.05

No

1.25

Redlands, CA

60,394

3

4.9

9.0

3.9

No

1.13

No

1.25

No

1.05

No

1.25

Tacoma, WA

Visalia, CA

75,636

3

6.8

17.6

1.5

Bristol, CT

60,640

3

5.3

4.4

1.7

No

1.84

Yes

0.00

Cape Coral, FL

74,991

3

4.4

5.9

0.8

No

2.17

No

0.00

Largo, FL

65,674

3

3.9

7.4

0.8

No

2.00

No

1.00

No

1.95

No

0.00

Melbourne, FL

59,646

3

6.5

12.8

9.4

Palm Bay, FL

62,632

3

5.9

8.7

7.5

No

2.02

No

0.00

Riviera Beach, FL

27,639

3

9.1

22.6

69.8

No

2.54

No

0.00

Sunrise, FL

64,407

3

4.9

6.5

7.4

No

2.91

No

1.00

West Palm Beach, FL

67,643

3

6.5

16.2

32.6

Yes

2.67

No

0.00

LaGrange, GA

25,597

3

8.9

21.3

42.3

No

0.76

No

2.00

Waterloo, IA

66,467

3

7.2

16.9

12.2

No

4.68

Yes

1.00

Champaign, IL

63,502

3

4.9

22.7

14.2

Yes

2.44

Yes

1.00

Joliet, IL

76,836

3

7.8

13.0

21.5

Yes

3.02

Yes

1.50

Rock Island, IL

40,552

3

7.8

19.3

17.2

Yes

3.55

Yes

0.50

Anderson, IN

59,459

3

8.2

18.0

14.3

Yes

4.34

Yes

0.00

Midland, MI

38,053

3

5.2

9.5

1.6

No

2.31

Yes

0.00

Westland, MI

84,724

3

6.3

7.1

3.3

No

3.45

No

0.00

St. Joseph, MO

71,852

3

8.4

16.7

3.7

Yes

1.82

Yes

1.85

Hoboken, NJ

33,397

3

6.2

16.4

5.5

No

2.35

No

0.00

New Brunswick, NJ

41,711

3

8.9

22.0

29.6

No

2.73

Yes

0.00

Mt. Vernon, NY

67,153

3

7.4

11.8

55.6

No

3.66

No

4.25

Fairfield, OH

39,729

3

3.7

3.8

3.6

Yes

1.45

Yes

0.00

Lancaster, PA

55,551

3

6.5

20.9

12.2

Yes

2.12

Yes

0.00

Baytown, TX

63,850

3

7.9

16.1

12.1

Yes

3.13

Yes

1.00

No

1.52

No

1.40

Olympia, WA

33,840

3

6.8

13.0

1.2

(continued)

Table A.2 (continued)

City

Population, Size
class
1990

Unemploy
ment rate,
1992
(%)

Effective
Enterprise property Property Local sales
Black
Poverty
tax rate
tax
tax rate
rate, 1989 pop., 1990 zone in
(%)
1992
abatement
(%)
(%)
(%)

Eau Claire, WI

56,856

3

5.9

18.6

0.6

No

2.87

No

0.50

Green Bay, WI

96,466

3

5.4

13.4

0.6

Yes

3.87

No

0.50

Wauwatosa, WI

49,366

3

2.3

3.3

1.2

No

4.23

No

0.50

Dalton, GA

21,761

4

5.8

14.8

10.7

No

1.43

No

2.00

Bedford, IN

13,817

4

5.9

11.4

0.9

No

4.39

Yes

0.00

Danville, KY

12,420

4

7.9

20.0

15.6

No

0.97

No

0.00

Hamtramck, MI

18,372

4

16.5

28.5

14.0

No

3.90

No

0.00

Marshall, MN

12,023

4

4.4

13.0

0.3

No

4.81

No

0.50

Willmar, MN

17,531

4

5.2

18.1

0.4

No

5.30

No

1.75

Henderson, NC

15,655

4

7.9

24.1

52.9

Yes

1.40

No

2.00

Oakland, NJ

11,997

4

3.0

1.5

1.2

No

2.30

No

0.00

Dublin, OH

16,366

4

1.3

1.0

1.5

No

2.31

No

0.75

Wilmington, OH

11,199

4

6.6

15.1

5.8

No

1.70

Yes

1.00

No

1.92

Yes

0.00

Butler, PA

15,714

4

7.4

23.2

1.3

Carlisle, PA

18,419

4

3.6

9.9

5.4

No

4.21

No

0.00

Washington, PA

15,864

4

11.5

25.5

13.1

No

6.56

No

0.00

Cayce, SC

11,163

4

4.9

9.3

19.4

No

2.93

Yes

0.00

9.8

17.8

No

3.03

Yes

0.00

Summerville, SC

22,519

4

4.7

Cookeville, TN

21,744

4

6.6

18.9

2.5

No

1.15

No

2.25

Tullahoma, TN

16,761

4

5.5

14.2

6.3

No

2.13

No

2.25

Jacksonville, TX

12,765

4

8.8

26.7

24.3

Yes

2.31

Yes

1.50

4.4

No

1.18

No

1.00

Salem, VA

23,756

4

2.4

5.2

Winchester, VA

21,947

4

4.8

11.3

10.0

No

0.50

No

1.00

Puyallup, WA

23,875

4

5.7

7.0

1.1

No

1.70

No

1.40

SOURCE: Population, unemployment rate, poverty rates, and percentage of population black: Bernan press, County and City Extra 1994; enterprise zone
and property tax data: authors' survey; local sales tax rates: Prentice-Hall, State and Local Taxes: All States Tax Guide, Commerce Clearing House, State
Tax Guide, and authors' survey.
NOTE: Poverty rate is percentage of persons in poverty from 1990 Census. Effective property tax rate is the nominal combined rate (city, county, and
school) times the assessment ratio. Project returns are the present value of 20-year returns from investment by an out-of-state firm in a new plant in each
city, after state and local taxes and tax incentives. Local corporate income taxes existed in the following cities (rates in parentheses): Detroit (2 percent) and
Hamtramch (1 percent), Michigan; New York City (8.85 percent); and Dublin (2 percent), Fairfield (1.5 percent), and Wilmington (1 percent), Ohio. Local
gross receipts taxes were imposed in the following Washington cities: Olympia (0.1 percent), Seattle (0.215 percent), and Tacoma (0.11 percent).

Table A.3 Average Effective Local Property Tax Rates by State3
Our sample data

ACIR: selected cities

Local tax rates, 1992

Local tax rates, 1990
W

State

Cities

Low

Median

High

Cities

Low

Median

High

1.09

1.82

aiaiewiae
effective Median city
rate. 1992 rate used
(%)
(%)

Alabama

1

14

0.62

California

23

1.01

1.05

1.25

43

1.01

1.05

1.27

1.09
1.05

3

1.84

2.69

4.75

35

1.24

2.77

6.11

2.77

Florida

12

1.95

2.41

2.91

28

1.63

2.18

2.61

Georgia

4

0.76

1.45

2.44

10

0.80

2.80

3.28

Illinois

5

2.44

3.16

3.55

61

1.05

2.90

5.19

2.57

2.57

Indiana

3

3.72

4.34

4.39

28

1.98

3.63

8.23

3.27

3.27

Iowa

2

4.23

4.45

4.68

17

2.71

3.57

4.50

3.10

3.10

12

0.34

0.98

1.21

Connecticut

1.16

1.75

1.75
1.45

Kentucky

1

0.97

Massachusetts

1

2.51

Michigan

3

2.31

3.45

3.90

33

2.39

3.26

3.50

Minnesota

2

4.81

5.06

5.30

11

4.81

5.20

7.14

4.62

4.62

1.69

2.24

2.17

2.17

2.00

4.73

78

Inadequate data

Missouri

3

1.68

1.82

2.68

13

1.19

New Jersey

5

2.30

2.57

3.46

32

1.30

New York

3

1.78

3.33

3.66

31

North Carolina

2

1.32

1.36

1.40

23

2.48

Inadequate data
0.39

1.22

0.98
2.48
3.26

2.57
3.33

1.69

1.36

Ohio

3

1.45

1.70

2.31

54

Pennsylvania

5

1.92

2.82

6.56

20

Inadequate data

2.82

South Carolina

3

2.93

2.98

3.03

7

Inadequate data

2.98

Tennesssee

1.55

2.40

2.40

5.41

2

1.15

2.13

2.33

15

1.04

2.15

2.89

2.15

10

1.84

2.51

3.13

43

0.41

1.94

2.42

2.51

Virginia

5

0.50

1.18

1.45

44

0.29

0.76

2.38

1.18

Washington

5

1.21

1.55

1.83

19

1.19

1.49

1.76

1.55

Wisconsin

4

2.87

3.77

4.23

21

2.34

3.31

4.22

Texas

3.40

3.40

a. Where assessment ratios or tax rates vary by class of property, we show the effective rate for real property. Rates are the sum of city, county, and school
district tax rates, plus other minor special district taxes in many states. Effective rate is the nominal rate times the assessment ratio.
The property tax rates for the representative cities were determined in three ways. In eight states, it was possible to compute a statewide average effective
property tax rate on industrial property. This is simply the total property taxes collected on industrial property divided by the total value of industrial prop
erty in the state, where value is equal to assessed value divided by the assessment ratio. In the case of Massachusetts, however, the "statewide average" is
actually the unweighted average of the industrial tax rates in the 23 cities that had in excess of $200 million in industrial valuation in fiscal year 1994, as
calculated by the authors.
Unfortunately, none of the other 16 states report data on property taxes collected by class of property. For these 16 states, we compared our rates with
those for chosen cities reported in Selected Features of Fiscal Federalism (U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations [ACIR]1992). The
ACIR table, in turn, was based on tax rates published in the Commerce Clearing House (CCH) State Tax Reporter 1991. The CCH cities represent a nonrandom selection of cities of 20,000 population or more. There are problems with the CCH data for 3 of the 16 states. These three states are New York
(where nominal rates only were shown, with the erroneous statement that assessment ratios are uniform statewide when in fact there is large variation),
Pennsylvania (where some data that could be corroborated were erroneous and produced effective rates as high as 20 percent, and South Carolina (where
effective rates appeared far too low). For the remaining 13, the range of tax rates and the median rates corroborate our sample and the validity of our median
rates, for the most part. Where there are significant differences, we have substituted the ACIR medians for our own if our sample of cities was quite small.

Appendix B
The Hypothetical Firm Model:
Assumptions and Details of Operation
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Appendix B
The Hypothetical Firm Model:
Assumptions and Details of Operation
THE FIRM'S FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
AND NEW PLANT FINANCING
In order to focus on the effects of incentives on returns from a new invest
ment, we assume that each hypothetical firm would have been in a "steady
state" but for the expansion. That is, each year the gross value of the deprecia
ble assets in place on January 1, 1992, is maintained by undertaking replace
ment investment equal to retirements. With straight-line depreciation, annual
depreciation of these assets is constant, and therefore accumulated depreciation
and the net value of these assets also remain'constant. Replacement investment
is financed by rolling over long-term debt, so that total long-term debt and in
terest expense for existing assets remain constant. The result is that the simu
lation of firm operations in the absence of new plant investment produces a
constant net income after taxes each year for the 20-year period; net income is
also equal to cash flow. This becomes the baseline cash flow for purposes of
computing the addition to cash flow each year attributable to the new plant in
vestment, which is simply the firm's total net cash flow with the new invest
ment less the baseline cash flow.
The model includes one spreadsheet that contains the formulas for calculat
ing the basic financial reports—an income statement, a balance sheet, and a
statement of cash flows—for 20 years, as well as supporting statements for cal
culating the amortization of long-term debt, depreciation, replacement invest
ment, federal income taxes, median state income taxes, and sample state
income taxes. The financial statement spreadsheet draws information from
four database spreadsheets: 1) a firm database, showing, for each of the 16 hy
pothetical firms, balance sheet and income statement data for the original firm
and the new plant, codes indicating the depreciation schedules appropriate to
that industry, and private loan rate assumptions by asset category; 2) a table of
federal tax depreciation schedules and straight-line (book) depreciation sched
ules; 3) a state tax database, including tax rates and other parameter values for
all relevant features of state sales and income taxes, including investment and
jobs credits (statewide and for enterprise zones only); and 4) a local tax data
base, including the parameters of the state property tax system (assessment ra
tios by property class and depreciation schedules applied to personal property
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valuation), local property tax rates and abatement schedules, an enterprise zone
existence variable, and local sales tax rates.
The Excel spreadsheet model begins by constructing a complete set of fi
nancial statements for one of the 16 prototype firms. The initial balance sheet
is for January 1, 1992; the firm then builds a new establishment, with the plant
placed in service on July 1, 1992. Short-term assets and liabilities (inventories,
accounts payable and receivable, etc.) are increased proportionately as a result
of the expansion. New property, plant, and equipment are added in the same
proportions to total assets as for the existing firm. Additional net working cap
ital (current assets minus current liabilities) necessitated by new plant and the
new plant fixed assets are financed by a combination of additional long-term
debt, retained earnings, and the sale of common stock, in such a way as to
maintain the same ratio of debt to equity. Retained earnings generated during
1992 (i.e., net income after taxes) are used first; if additional equity is required,
the firm issues common stock. The proportion of debt used to finance the ex
pansion is larger than the proportion of debt in the existing firm's balance
sheet, but, as the new debt is retired, the average debt ratio over the 20 years
will be equal to the existing debt ratio. That is, we assume that the average cap
ital structure of the firms in the Compustat database for that industry is also the
target or ideal capital structure that the firm seeks to maintain in the long run.
The cost of equity varies by firm. Data from ValueLine were used to deter
mine an average beta value (a measure of risk, or stock price volatility relative
to the market) for firms in each industry. The cost of common stock for an in
dustry was then computed according to standard portfolio theory as the indus
try beta value times the average market risk premium for common stock of 7
percent plus the risk-free rate of return in 1992 (estimated at 7 percent). An ad
justment was made for the use of preferred stock, which was assumed to carry
an interest rate of one percentage point above the firm's cost of long-term debt;
this made very little difference, as the ratio of preferred stock to common stock
was very small for the firms in our study (based on the Compustat data). Table
B.I shows the resultant weighted cost of equity for each of our firms. From this
was deducted an assumed inflation premium of 4.0 percent to arrive at the real
discount rate for each firm. This was then used to discount the additional cash
flow available to equity investors attributable to the new plant to arrive at the
present value of project returns.
New plant private debt financing terms vary by asset class and loan size.
(Because of the small-issue industrial revenue bond [IRB] size limits, we do
not simulate the use of IRB financing for any of our firms.) The interest rate
assumptions are shown in Table B.2. The long-term rates (applied to financing
land, plant, and infrastructure) are based on corporate A-rated bond rates for
1992; the short-term rates (3-4 years, for financing short-lived equipment and
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Table B.I Assumed Cost of Equity for Hypothetical Firms
Firm

Industry

Cost of equity (%)

#1,2

Furniture & fixtures

13.4

#3,4

Drugs

16.2

#5,6

Soap, cleaners, toiletries

14.6

#7,8

Miscellaneous plastic products

14.0

Industrial machinery

13.9

#9, 10
#11,12

Electronic components

15.0

#13

Motor vehicles & parts

14.1

#14

Motor vehicles & parts

15.8

Instruments

14.5

#15, 16

NOTE: Cost of equity is the same for both firm sizes in an industry because data on beta coeffi
cients by industry did not allow size distinctions. However, for firm number 13 we used the beta
for auto parts and supplies; for firm number 14, we used the beta for automobile manufacturers.

working capital) are based on Federal Reserve data on commercial and indus
trial fixed-rate bank loans in 1992, with interest rates declining substantially as
loan size increases. Interpolation was used to derive rates for intermediate-term
loans (for equipment lasting 7-12 years).
The new property plant and equipment are depreciated for tax purposes ac
cording to the Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System (MACRS) sched
ule that applies to buildings (31.5 years, straight-line), infrastructure (15 years,
150 percent declining balance), and machinery and equipment (200 percent de
clining balance, over a period of 5 or 7 years depending on the industry). The
depreciable basis of each asset is its acquisition cost (from the database of firm
financial characteristics) plus state and local sales taxes on machinery and
equipment, where applicable. Depreciable assets are assumed to have zero sal
vage value and to be replaced at the end of the appropriate class life (20 years
for infrastructure, 40 years for buildings, 5 to 15 years for machinery and
equipment). Since we are using a 20-year time horizon, replacement schedules
are modeled only for machinery and equipment. Assets are depreciated on the
books according to the appropriate Alternative Depreciation System (ADS)
straight-line schedule (20 years for infrastructure, 40 years for buildings, 5 to
15 years for machinery and equipment).

Table B.2 Interest Rate and Loan Term Assumptions

Loan
characteristics
Term (years)

Working
capital

Computers
and other
nonmanufacturing
equipment

Furniture and
fixtures

3

4

8

Manufacturing
machinery and
equipment
7-10

Plant, land, and
infrastructure
20

Interest rate (%)
Loan size
Under $1 million

8.00

8.00

10.00

10.00

11.70

$1 to $5 million

7.00

7.00

8.75

8.75

10.25

Over $5 million

6.00

6.00

7.50

7.50

8.80

NOTE: Corporate A-rated bonds carried an interest rate of 8.8 percent on average during the first half of 1992 (Survey of Current Business, January 1993),
p. S-16). Commercial and industrial bank loans with terms of 3-4 years during the first half of 1992 carried interest notes of 5.9 percent for loans over $1
million, 7.7 percent for loans of $500,000 to $1 million, and 8.8 percent for loans under $500,000 (U.S. Federal Reserve Board 1993 and 1994, Table 19).

243

INCOME TAXES AND APPORTIONMENT
Using the income statement, federal income taxes are calculated as follows:
from income before income taxes, deduct the excess of tax over book depreci
ation and state income taxes paid. The remainder is federal taxable income; the
progressive federal rate structure is applied to this amount. The calculation of
state income taxes also begins with net income before income taxes. The ex
cess of state tax depreciation (which in some instances is different from the fed
eral) over book depreciation is then deducted, along with income taxes paid to
other states (in a few states) and federal income taxes (in three states). Nonbusiness income is then deducted, and the remaining taxable income of the firm is
apportioned to the hypothetical median state and the sample state (one of the
24 actual states in our study) according to those states' apportionment formulas
(based on some combination of payroll, property, and sales). Income appor
tioned to the sample state plus any nonbusiness income allocated to that state
are then taxed according to that state's schedule (generally a flat rate in the 24
states). In most states, nonbusiness income, which we assume consists entirely
of corporate bond interest, is allocated entirely to the headquarters state (the
median state for our multistate firms and the sample state for our single-state
firms). From state taxes, we then deduct any state credits for new investment
or job creation, carrying them forward to apply against future taxes (as state
law allows) if they cannot all be used in 1992.
We assume that income taxes are paid concurrently, that is, that corpora
tions file and remit taxes quarterly and end up paying exactly what they owe
each year, so that the income tax actually paid during 1992 exactly equals in
come tax liability for 1992. Net worth taxes, on the other hand, are usually
based on the end-of-year balance sheet and are generally paid only when the
corporation files its return in the spring of the following year. Thus, the firm's
1992 income tax payment reflects income and costs from its new plant, which
was in operation during the latter half of 1992, but the net worth tax it pays in
1992 is based on the January 1, 1992, balance sheet, before any new plant as
sets and liabilities were acquired.
Apportionment is based on the shares of the firm's payroll and property lo
cated in the sample state and in the median state, and on the destination of sales.
For the single-state firm, all payroll and property, before and after the new
plant is opened, are located entirely in the sample state. For the multistate firm,
all payroll and property of the existing firm are located in the median state,
while the new plant payroll and property are located in the sample state.
We assume that the firm is selling in national markets, with sales to each
state in proportion to the state's population. All firms have a tax nexus in the
sample state and in the median state. The single-state firm has sales offices in
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the median state that make it taxable there; some of its income will be appor
tioned to the median state because the sales factor for the median state is posi
tive, even though the payroll and property factors are zero. The multistate firm
would pay a small amount of taxes to the sample state even in the absence of
the new plant, for the same reason.
All firms are assumed to have 20 percent of their sales destined for the "oth
er" states, in which they are not taxed. A portion of these sales may be thrown
back to the sample state if the sample state has a throwback rule. (The median
state does not require throwback.) Our assumption is that sales to the sample
state come first from production facilities in the sample state. If production
there is less than sales to the sample state (which depends on the state's popu
lation), goods are exported to the sample state (and to the other non-taxing
states) from the firm's median state facilities. In that case, there is no throwback to the sample state because the plant in the sample state is not producing
any goods destined for out of state. If sample state production exceeds local
sales, the excess is exported to the median state and to the other states in pro
portion to the assumed populations, with the goods produced in the sample
state and exported to the "other" non-taxing states subject to throwback.
The median state and the sample state combined always have 80 percent of
the population (approximately the share of the 24 states in our study) and 80
percent of the sales; the larger the sample state population, the smaller the me
dian state population. This has the effect of accentuating the importance of the
income tax in the larger states, since more of the firm's income will be appor
tioned there, but reducing the impact of throwback rules in the larger states
(which are more likely to absorb all of the new plant's production). Both effects
seem realistic and follow from the assumption that firms will find it profitable
to maintain sales offices only in states where there is a substantial market; the
26 smaller states account for only 20 percent of total sales. The assumption is
also consistent with data from Wisconsin income tax returns showing that, for
apportioning corporations, only about 16 percent of sales were to non-taxing
states and therefore subject to throwback.
CALCULATION OF PROPERTY TAXES
Property taxes are paid in one calendar year based on the value of property
at the end of the previous calendar year. The multistate firm pays the same prop
erty taxes to the median state each year, based on the original firm's constant
assets, and begins paying property taxes to the sample state in 1993, based on
new plant assets that first appear on the balance sheet at the end of 1992. The
calculation of property taxes paid in the sample state begins with the valuation
of taxable classes of property. Inventory and land values are constant from 1993
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onward, since neither asset depreciates and we assume no inflation. (Both items
increase from 1992 to 1993, reflecting the new plant.) Three states tax inven
tories of raw materials, goods in process, and finished goods differently. We
follow the Wisconsin tax study (1990) in assuming that 40 percent of invento
ries are finished goods; we assume that 25 percent are raw materials, and that
35 percent are goods in process. Plant and infrastructure are valued at book val
ue, which reflects straight-line depreciation over 40 and 20 years, respectively.
Each category of personal property other than inventories is valued accord
ing to the state's guidelines for depreciating machinery and equipment, which
are usually by category (furniture and fixtures, transportation equipment) and
industry (for manufacturing machinery and equipment), just as federal depre
ciation schedules are. Of the 18 sample states that tax at least some kinds of
personal property, 14 publish state depreciation guidelines to be used by local
assessors. The other four (Connecticut, Kentucky, Missouri, and Virginia) al
low assessors to use whatever guidelines they think appropriate; for these 4
states, we assumed depreciation schedules representing the average of the other
states. In the average state, a piece of machinery and equipment will be valued
at 48 to 51 percent of acquisition cost on average over the life of the equipment.
This figure is as high as 62 to 65 percent in Alabama, and as low as 28 to 35
percent in Indiana, reflecting differences in how rapidly the equipment is de
preciated and in the minimum percentage allowed as long as equipment re
mains in use.
Once property has been valued, the assessment ratio appropriate for each as
set category is applied, which may be mandated by state statute or left to local
discretion. The assessed value is then multiplied by the local property tax rate.
The consolidated local property tax rate is the sum of rates for the city, the
school district (if independent of the city), the county in which a majority of the
city is located (where counties exist and levy taxes), and other special districts
overlying the city. Where the city includes within it more than one school dis
trict or other special district, the district rates that apply are the rates in the area
of the city representing the most likely location for new industry, where local
officials were able to identify such an area, or the average for the city, where
such areas could not be identified.
HOW INCENTIVES ARE INCORPORATED INTO FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS
Public capital grants lower the portion of the acquisition cost of assets that
must be financed from equity; this increases cash and net income in 1992. Pub
lic loans at below-market rates, or loan guarantees that reduce interest rates,
lower annual interest expense on the income statement, which increases cash
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flow; public loans do not increase overall long-term debt (the public debt sub
stituting for higher-cost private debt). The availability of job training or of
wage subsidies lowers operating costs during 1992 and thus increases net in
come after taxes. Sales taxes on purchases of machinery and equipment in
crease the acquisition cost of assets and hence the amount of debt and equity
that must be raised to finance the new plant. (For tax purposes, sales taxes can
not be deducted in the year paid but must be capitalized into the cost of the asset
and then depreciated.) This occurs in 1992 and in subsequent replacement
years. If the state has a sales tax that applies to fuel and utilities, this will in
crease fuel and utility expense each year.
JOBS CREDITS AND EMPLOYEE ELIGIBILITY
In order to model jobs credits generally and enterprise zone credits in par
ticular, it was necessary to make some assumptions about how many of a firm's
new hires met each state's eligibility criteria for these credits. These eligibility
criteria relate sometimes to place of residence, sometimes to unemployment
status, sometimes to both. Table B.3 shows the assumptions made, based in
part on research by Bartik (1991b, p. 95). Bartik found that new establishment
hires consisted of 6-7 percent local residents previously unemployed and 16
percent local residents previously not in the labor force. If all such individuals
were considered "unemployed" for enterprise zone incentive purposes, then an
average expectation would be that about 25 percent of new hires would be local
(city) residents who were previously unemployed. We assume that 60 percent
of those unemployed had been unemployed 90 days or more, that new hires are
disproportionately from the enterprise zone because of proximity, and that the
zone accounts for a disproportionate share of the city's unemployed (since high
unemployment is a criterion for establishing a zone). One further assumption
was required to complete the table: either that 50 percent of new hires are from
within the city (regardless of employment status) or that 50 percent of new
hires are unemployed (except within the zone).
Table B.3 Unemployment and Residence Assumptions for Enterprise
Zone Incentives (New Plant Employees in Each
Category, %)
Residence at time of hiring

iinpmninvmpnt «*»*.,*

Anywhere

City

Zone

All

100

50

30

Unemployed

50

25

20

Unemployed 90 days or more

30

15

12

at time of hiring
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Appendix C
Computational Structure of TAIM
Models of operating ratios, balance sheets, and tax and income statements
were built in a single Microsoft Excel workbook (the INCOME workbook), the
details of which are provided in Appendix B. These models reference descrip
tive databases held elsewhere containing information such as firm operating ra
tios, federal and state tax codes, and the various state asset-depreciation
schedules. In order for the INCOME workbook to carry out its various calcu
lations, it must receive information on what state, industrial sector, firm size,
spatial structure, and incentive type level are to be modeled. It receives this in
struction from a series of Visual Basic procedures (the PROGRAM). Once IN
COME has this information, it runs through the spreadsheet model, building a
set of operating ratios and calculating balance sheets and income and tax state
ments for the firm. Finally, INCOME produces a series of output numbers, in
cluding the present value of the annual increments to after-tax cash flow over
20 years, the internal rate of return on the incremental cash flow, the present
value of taxes paid to federal and various state and local governments, and the
nominal value of incentives awarded. PROGRAM then reads the results (after
tax cash flow and so on) of INCOME'S calculations into a series of variables
and deposits these into a RESULTS file.
The preceding description is true only for simulations of tax regimes with
out any discretionary incentives. The modeling of discretionary incentives in
volves some important modifications. As indicated earlier, states have laws and
administrative rules that govern the way in which discretionary incentives are
dispersed. In order to be eligible for an incentive, a firm must meet certain cri
teria. Moreover, the amount of discretionary incentives provided to a firm will
depend on the sort of investment the firm intends to make. Thus, once IN
COME has created the operating ratios and balance sheets for a new invest
ment, this information needs to be made available to a rule-based expert system
(the NON-TAX-INCENTIVE-SYSTEM), which determines, for example, the
discretionary incentives for which the investment is eligible. Each program,
each state, and each city has its own expert system. Information is transferred
between INCOME and the NON-TAX-INCENTIVE-SYSTEM by PRO
GRAM. Based on information it has received, the NON-TAX-INCENTIVESYSTEM checks the incentives for which the investment qualifies, calculates
a likely incentive amount from each incentive program based on historical ra
tios for that type of benefit, and then compiles the best (using an algorithm that
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minimizes the cost of debt) package of incentives available from each state for
a firm of that particular type (defined by its sector, size, and headquarters struc
ture), making sure that no incentive program rules are broken by the package.
Once this has been accomplished, the NON-TAX-INCENTIVE-SYSTEM
distributes incentives to appropriate asset categories (land, plant, machinery,
infrastructure, and working capital). Thus, the NON-TAX-INCENTIVE-SYS
TEM must take the entire incentive package and distribute the total public fi
nancing to the appropriate (and permitted) asset classes, making sure that no
asset class receives more public funding than would have been provided by the
private sector. Finally, for incentives in the form of loans, loan guarantees, and
linked deposits, future interest and principal payments must be generated in ac
cordance with general program rules. PROGRAM reads this loan schedule in
formation into a series of 5 x 20 matrices (one for each of five asset classes over
a 20-year period). These matrices then replace the existing public financing
schedule in INCOME. INCOME subsequently recalculates its financing of as
sets, taking into account this new public subsidy. It produces a new balance
sheet and income statement and applies the relevant tax codes to that income.
PROGRAM takes these results and puts them into the RESULTS workbook.
The addition of city-level incentives brings a further level of complexity.
Firms receive these incentives on top of—or, in some cases, as replacements
for—state programs. Data on city-level incentives are held in a separate data
base. The INCOME workbook references this database to calculate appropriate
abatement and tax increment financing (TIF) awards in each city. Further Vi
sual Basic modules also reference this database to construct city-level grant,
loan, and loan guarantee incentives available in each city in each state and to
build the best package of city incentives. The detailed operations of TAIM are
summarized in Figure C. 1.
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Figure C.I Computational Structure of TAIM
PROGRAM
VisualBasic procedures

STATE
models (24).
Each STATE model
computes the best
incentive package for
a firm from a state
CITY
model.
Simulates city incentive
packages and then adds
them to state incentives
CITY database.
Contains database on all
city-level incentives

INCOME
model.
A single workbook that
constructs, from a series of
databases, a firm's:
• Balance sheet
• Income statement
• Cash flows
• Depreciation
• Project financing
• State and local taxes
Operating ratios
database

Each STATE
workbook
has the

STATE incentive
knowledge base.
Models that simulate each
state incentive and the best
state incentive package

Income and sales tax
database

STATE and loan
payment schedules.
Models that compute
payment schedules
on public debt
RESULTS
output.
Workbook containing the
results of the simulation

Property tax
database
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Table D.I The Impact of Taxes and Incentives on Project Returns, Small
Furniture and Fixtures Firms, 112 Cities

Mean
($)

Coefficient
of variation

Project returns
(255,378)
(0.411)
After basic taxes
After tax incentives
(207,444)
(0.473)
After all incentives
(18,434)
(9.029)
Increment in project returns due to
47,934
1.282
Tax incentives
Non-tax incentives
189,010
0.601
Hourly, per-employee wage equivalent of
0.04
Tax incentives
0.15
Non-tax incentives

Size of
range
($)

Hourly,
per-employee
wage equivalent
of range
($)

470,543
445,491
883,219

0.38
0.36
0.72

311,333
558,123
0.25
0.46

NOTE: Negative values are shown in parentheses.

Table D.2 The Impact of Taxes and Incentives on Project Returns, Large
Furniture and Fixtures Firms, 112 Cities

Mean
($)

Size of
range
($)

Hourly,
per-employee
wage equivalent
of range
($)

0.081
0.094
0.107

3,496,674
3,851,349
5,461,309

0.31
0.34
0.48

1.266
0.690

2,625,554
3,001,269

Coefficient
of variation

Project returns
After basic taxes
8,221,983
After tax incentives
8,705,916
After all incentives
9,346,248
Increment in project returns due to
Tax incentives
483,933
Non-tax incentives
640,332
Hourly, per-employee wage equivalent of
0.04
Tax incentives
Non-tax incentives
0.06

0.25
0.26

256

Table D.3 The Impact of Taxes and Incentives on Project Returns, Large
Soap Firms, 112 Cities

Mean
($)

Size of
range
($)

Hourly,
per-employee
wage equivalent
of range
($)

0.035
0.044
0.047

8,904,319
13,603,234
13,344,649

0.55
0.84
0.82

1.363
0.790

8,343,971
5,506,504

Coefficient
of variation

Project returns
After basic taxes
51,627,858
After tax incentives
.
52,919,613
After all incentives
53,803,767
Increment in project returns due to
Tax incentives
1,291,755
Non-tax incentives
884,154
Hourly, per-employee wage equivalent of
0.08
Tax incentives
0.05
Non-tax incentives

0.52
0.34

Table D.4 The Impact of Taxes and Incentives on Project Returns, Small
Plastics Firms, 112 Cities

Mean
($)

Coefficient
of variation

Size of
range
($)

Hourly,
per-employee
wage equivalent
of range
($)

Project returns

97,849
After basic taxes
After tax incentives
152,422
After all incentives
320,545
Increment in project returns due to
Tax incentives
54,574
Non-tax incentives
168,122
Hourly, per-employee wage equivalent of
0.06
Tax incentives
0.18
Non-tax incentives

0.992
0.635
0.479

482,229
464,937
789,037

1.228
0.615

311,262
516,917
0.33
0.56

0.51
0.50
0.84
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Table D.5 The Impact of Taxes and Incentives on Project Returns, Small
Industrial Machinery Firms, 112 Cities

Mean
($)

Coefficient
of variation

Project returns
After basic taxes
(3,830)
(46.284)
After tax incentives
116,361
1.711
After all incentives
356,586
0.802
Increment in project returns due to
Tax incentives
120,192
1.217
Non-tax incentives
240,224
0.684
Hourly, per-employee wage equivalent of
Tax incentives
0.08
0.16
Non-tax incentives

Size of
range
($)

Hourly,
per-employee
wage equivalent
of range
($)

790,808
976,320
1,266,732

0.53
0.66
0.86

646,370
776,537
0.44
0.53

NOTE: Negative values are shown in parentheses.

Table D.6 The Impact of Taxes and Incentives on Project Returns, Large
Industrial Machinery Firms, 112 Cities

Mean
($)

Size of
range
($)

Hourly,
per-employee
wage equivalent
of range
($)

0.216
0.201
0.208

19,545,516
20,964,961
23,877,858

0.54
0.58
0.66

1.282
0.928

14,963,988
7,969,315

Coefficient
of variation

Project returns
After basic taxes
21,075,382
After tax incentives
23,261,173
After all incentives
24,464,584
Increment in project returns due to
Tax incentives
2,185,791
Non-tax incentives
1,203,411
Hourly, per-employee wage equivalent of
Tax incentives
0.06
Non-tax incentives
0.03

0.42
0.22
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Table D.7 The Impact of Taxes and Incentives on Project Returns, Small
Electronic Components Firms, 112 Cities

Mean
($)

Size of
range
($)

Hourly,
per-employee
wage equivalent
of range
($)

0.625
0.509
0.433

1,528,710
1,701,391
2,425,336

0.42
0.46
0.66

1.227
0.681

1,063,405
1,347,166

Coefficient
of variation

Project returns
After basic taxes
514,484
After tax incentives
734,235
After all incentives
1,135,210
Increment in project returns due to
Tax incentives
219,751
Non-tax incentives
400,975
Hourly, per-employee wage equivalent of
0.06
Tax incentives
0.11
Non-tax incentives

0.29
0.36

Table D.8 The Impact of Taxes and Incentives on Project Returns, Large
Electronic Components Firms, 112 Cities

Mean
'($)

Size of
range
($)

Hourly,
per-employee
wage equivalent
of range
($)

0.721
0.561
0.526

16,891,559
17,925,312
20,631,480

0.62
0.66
0.76

1.232

10,675,662
7,780,432

Coefficient
of variation

Project returns
4,905,744
After basic taxes
After tax incentives
6,849,499
After all incentives
7,951,177
Increment in project returns due to
Tax incentives
1,943,755
Non-tax incentives
1,101,678
Hourly, per-employee wage equivalent of
0.07
Tax incentives
0.04
Non-tax incentives

0.894

0.39
0.29
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Table D.9 The Impact of Taxes and Incentives on Project Returns, Small
Auto/Auto Parts Firms, 112 Cities

Mean
($)

Size of
range
($)

Hourly,
per-employee
wage equivalent
of range
($)

0.177
0.169
0.181

12,218,429
12,247,625
16,897,421

0.51
0.51
0.70

1.271
0.909

7,252,643
6,972,737

Coefficient
of variation

Project returns
13,660,914
After basic taxes
After tax incentives
14,793,759
After all incentives
15,742,613
Increment in project returns due to
1,132,844
Tax incentives
948,854
Non-tax incentives
Hourly, per-employee wage equivalent of
0.05
Tax incentives
0.04
Non-tax incentives

0.30
0.29

Table D.10 The Impact of Taxes and Incentives on Project Returns,
Large Auto/Auto Parts Firms, 112 Cities

Mean
($)
Project returns
After basic taxes
After tax incentives
After all incentives

Coefficient
of variation

Size of
range
($)

Hourly,
per-employee
wage equivalent
of range
($)

4.861
1.610
1.353

54,279,143
58,016,319
57,782,121

0.76
0.81
0.81

1.300
1.098

30,599,903
9,805,576

2,480,101
7,488,671
9,189,576
Increment in project returns due to
5,008,570
Tax incentives
Non-tax incentives
1,700,906
Hourly, per-employee wage equivalent of
0.07
Tax incentives
0.02
Non-tax incentives

0.43
0.14
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Table D.ll The Impact of Taxes and Incentives on Project Returns, Small
Instruments Firms, 112 Cities

Mean
($)

Size of
range
($)

Hourly,
per-employee
wage equivalent
of range
($)

0.078
0.085
0.117

653,044
709,825
1,017,677

0.37
0.41
0.58

1.241
0.666

546,336
716,801

Coefficient
of variation

Project returns
1,687,584
After basic taxes
After tax incentives
1,774,660
After all incentives
2,024,889
Increment in project returns due to
Tax incentives
87,077
Non-tax incentives
250,229
Hourly, per-employee wage equivalent of
0.05
Tax incentives
0.14
Non-tax incentives

0.31
0.42

Table D.12 The Impact of Taxes and Incentives on Project Returns,
Large Instruments Firms, 112 Cities

Mean
($)

Size of
range
($)

Hourly,
per-employee
wage equivalent
of range
($)

0.045
0.048
0.053

12,658,540
13,834,561
15,861,121

0.52
0.57
0.65

1.274
0.897

10,506,146
7,716,225

Coefficient
of variation

Project returns
56,344,150
After basic taxes
After tax incentives
57,904,449
58,935,884
After all incentives
Increment in project returns due to
Tax incentives
1,560,299
Non-tax incentives
1,031,435
Hourly, per-employee wage equivalent of
0.06
Tax incentives
0.04
Non-tax incentives

0.43
0.32

Table D.13 Average Value of Incentives, Multistate Firms ($)
Value of all tax incentives
Firm
(plant size, in millions)

Value of enterprise zone
tax incentives only

State and local
non-enterprise zone incentives

State and
local

Tax
incentives

Other
incentives

Total
incentives

49,692

218,120

172,216

612,496

784,712

90,043

20,356

110,399

73,843

323,319

397,162

44,673

19,784

5,355

25,138

19,534

166,352

185,886

1,305,375 2,873,683 4,179,057

999,233

724,271

1,723,505

2,455,553

1,720,787

4,176,340

728,300 1,285,312

475,965

196,216

672,181

613,131

981,734

1,594,865

84,204 1,263,826

1,249,386

873,035

2,122,422

262,829

850,493

585,111

673,247

1,258,358

State and
local

State

Local

390,336

168,428

85,914

184,242

24,528

State

Local

197,835

192,501

#5: Soaps ($20)

98,328

#7: Plastics ($5)

20,144

Average for all city sizes
#2: Furniture ($40)

#14: Autos ($600)

#16: Instruments ($180) 557,012
Average of 16 firms by city size

500,000 or more
100,000 - 499,999

1,080,880 1,432,333 2,513,212 1,179,622
767,940 667,664 1,435,604 587,664

25,000 - 99,999

378,481

609,678

988,159

263,052 249,074

512,126

476,033

803,480

1,279,513

10,000 - 24,999

37,540

604,711

642,251

147,174

0

147,174

495,076

687,868

1,182,945

640,839 1,031,979

339,366

161,913

501,279

530,700

723,226

1,253,926

Average : all cities

391,140

NOTE: Items may not add to totals due to founding.
to
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Table E.I Correlation between State Average 1992 Unemployment Rate and Firm's Net Return on New Plant
Investment in Each State (Multistate Firms, State Taxes and Incentives Only)

Firm
(plant size, in millions)
#1: Furniture ($5)
#2: Furniture ($40)
#3: Drugs ($50)
#4: Drugs ($470)
#5: Soaps ($20)
#6: Soaps ($110)
#7: Plastics ($5)
#8: Plastics ($70)
#9: Machinery ($10)
#10: Machinery ($250)
#11: Electronics ($20)
#12: Electronics ($200)
#13:Autos($120)
#14: Autos ($600)
#15: Instruments ($10)
#16: Instruments ($180)

Net project returns
Infra
After
After
After
tax
all
Tax
structure
basic
taxes incentives incentives incentives subsidies
(0.53)
(0.49)
(0.12)
0.18
(0.23)
(0.63)
(0.51)
(0.52)
0.08
(0.08)
(0.47)
0.08
(0.17)
(0.53)
(0.46)
(0.41)
(0.45)
0.16
(0.19)
(0.48)
(0.56)
(0.45)
(0.36)
0.11
(0.15)
(0.44)
0.11
(0.58)
(0.48)
(0.16)
(0.18)
0.06
(0.24)
(0.63)
(0.58)
(0.55)
(0.56)
0.11
(0.14)
(0.63)
0.11
(0.64)
(0.45)
(0.18)
(0.13)
0.11
(0.61)
(0.48)
(0.54)
(0.10)
0.12
(0.10)
(0.68)
(0.53)
(0.36)
(0.53)
(0.56)
0.12
(0.11)
(0.68)
(0.12)
(0.62)
(0.54)
(0.57)
0.09
(0.48)
0.14
(0.19)
(0.51)
(0.39)
(0.57)
(0.26)
0.09
(0.63)
(0.09)
(0.61)
(0.54)
(0.57)
0.10
(0.13)

NOTE: Negative correlations are shown in parentheses.

Value of incentives
General
All
Job
training financing non-tax
All
subsidies programs incentives incentives
0.16
0.10
0.11
0.05
(0.20)
(0.33)
(0.25)
(0.33)
(0.14)
(0.14)
(0.21)
(0.13)
(0.49)
(0.20)
(0.51)
(0.09)
(0.01)
(0.02)
0.04
0.08
(0.41)
(0.19)
(0.16)
(0.39)
0.06
0.14
0.08
0.09
(0.27)
(0.32)
(0.22)
(0.34)
0.13
0.11
0.13
0.09
(0.27)
(0.48)
(0.47)
(0.30)
0.04
0.04
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.44)
(0.22)
(0.46)
(0.18)
(0.44)
(0.43)
(0.33)
(0.29)
(0.26)
(0.50)
(0.20)
(0.54)
0.12
0.13
0.10
0.13
(0.44)
(0.27)
(0.45)
(0.19)

Table E.2 Correlation between State Average Unemployment Rate 1989-1993 and Firm's Net Return on New Plant
Investment in Each State (Multistate Firms, State Taxes and Incentives Only)
Firm
(plant size in millions)
#1: Furniture ($5)
#2: Furniture ($40)
#3: Drugs ($50)
#4: Drugs ($470)
#5: Soaps ($20)
#6: Soaps ($110)
#7: Plastics ($5)
#8: Plastics ($70)
#9: Machinery ($10)
#10: Machinery ($250)
#11: Electronics ($20)
#12: Electronics ($200)
#13:Autos($120)
#14: Autos ($600)
#15: Instruments ($10)
#16: Instruments ($180)

Net project returns
After
After tax
basic taxes
incentives
(0.43)
(0.39)
(0.46)
(0.37)
(0.32)
(0.28)
(0.23)
(0.19)
(0.34)
(0.27)
(0.28)
(0.36)
(0.54)
(0.49)
(0.42)
(0.49)
(0.50)
(0.36)
(0.39)
(0.49)
(0.52)
(0.41)
(0.52)
(0.41)
(0.51)
(0.43)
(0.46)
(0.36)
(0.45)
(0.40)
(0.41)
(0.36)

NOTE: Negative correlations are shown in parentheses.

After all
incentives
(0.12)
(0-41)
(0.32)
(0.23)
(0.25)
(0.32)
(0.18)
(0.44)
(0.17)
(0.40)
(0.32)
(0.42)
(0.44)
(0.42)
(0.20)
(0.38)

Value of incentives
Tax
All
Non-tax
incentives
incentives
incentives
0.17
0.07
0.06
0.07
(0.23)
(0.30)
0.04
(0.22)
(0.16)
0.10
(0.08)
(0.38)
0.06
(0.06)
(0.02)
0.06
(0.32)
(0.15)
0.13
0.04
0.05
0.14
(0.30)
(0.22)
0.06
0.05
0.06
0.08
(0.29)
(0.15)
0.09
(0.06)
(0.03)
0.10
(0.30)
(0.14)
0.11
(0.31)
(0.22)
0.09
(0.43)
(0.21)
0.10
0.07
0.08
0.09
(0.31)
(0.18)

to
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Table E.3 Correlation between City 1992 Unemployment Rate and Firm's Net Returns from New Plant Investment
in Each City: Selected Multistate Firms, by City Size Class
Net project returns
Firm (plant size in
millions)/city population

Value of incentives

After
basic taxes

After tax
incentives

After all
incentives

Tax
incentives

Other
incentives

500,000 or more

(0.40)

(0.30)

(0.21)

0.04

(0.01)

0.01

100,000 - 499,999

(0.14)

0.15

0.08

0.29

(0.11)

0.18

25,000 - 99,999

(0.10)

0.23

0.13

0.49

(0.17)

0.31

10,000 - 24,999

(0.36)

(0.37)

(0.31)

0.06

0.13

0.15

500,000 or more

(0.25)

(0.16)

(0.11)

0.06

0.00a

0.04

100,000 - 499,999

(0.25)

0.08

0.00a

0.28

(0.16)

0.16

25,000 - 99,999

(0.10)

0.20

0.11

0.48

(0.17)

0.27

10,000-24,999

(0.26)

(0.24)

(0.09)

0.09

0.16

0.21

500,000 or more

(0.40)

(0.26)

(0.07)

0.33

0.18

0.31

100,000 - 499,999

0.10

0.30

0.20

0.27

0.02

0.17

25,000 - 99,999

(0.11)

0.19

0.05

0.46

(0.14)

0.17

10,000 - 24,999

(0.42)

(0.44)

(0.10)

0.09

0.16

0.18

All
incentives

#2: Furniture ($40)

#5: Soaps ($20)

#7: Plastics ($5)

(continued)
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Table E.3 (continued)
Firm (plant size in
millions)/city population

o
After
basic taxes

After tax
incentives

After all
incentives

Tax
incentives

Other
incentives

All
incentives

500,000 or more

(0.34)

(0.14)

(0.13)

0.51

(0.01)

0.49

100,000 - 499,999

0.14

0.31

0.26

0.30

(0.30)

0.21

#14: Autos ($600)

25,000 - 99,999

(0.09)

0.10

0.11

0.35

0.08

0.35

10,000 - 24,999

(0.39)

(0.42)

(0.45)

0.06

(0.22)

(0.02)

500,000 or more

(0.48)

(0.38)

(0.24)

0.18

0.04

.016

0.13

0.05

0.35

(0.26)

0.25

#16: Instruments ($180)
100,000 - 499,999

(0.22)

25,000 - 99,999

(0.07)

0.19

0.16

0.43

(0.07)

0.38

10,000 - 24,999

(0.35)

(0.35)

(0.34)

0.06

0.10

0.10

NOTE: Negative correlations are shown in parentheses. For each firm, the number in parentheses is new plant investment in millions of dollars. Basic
taxes include state and city corporate income and net worth taxes, state and local sales taxes on machinery and equipment and fuel and utilities, and state
and local property taxes. Tax incentives consist of state investment and jobs tax credits, sales tax exemptions or credits in enterprise zones, state property
tax credits in enterprise zones, and local property tax abatements. The value of incentives is measured by the net project returns after taxes and incentives,
less project returns after basic taxes only. The average correlation for all city sizes is a weighted average of the coefficients for the four city size classes; the
weight for a size class is the U.S. population living in cities of that size divided by the total U.S. population living in cities of 10,000 or more,
a. Absolute value less than 0.005.

Table E.4 Correlation between City 1992 Unemployment Rate and Firm's Net Returns from New Plant Investment
in Each City: Average for All City Sizes by Firm
Firm
(plant size in millions)
Multistate firms
#1: Furniture ($5)
#2: Furniture ($40)
#3: Drugs ($50)
#4: Drugs ($470)
#5: Soaps ($20)
#6: Soaps ($110)
#7: Plastics ($5)
#8: Plastics ($70)
#9: Machinery ($10)
#10: Machinery ($250)
#11: Electronics ($20)
#12: Electronics ($200)
#13: Autos ($120)
#14: Autos ($600)
#15: Instruments ($10)
#16: Instruments ($180)

Net project returns
After all
After tax
After
incentives
incentives
basic taxes
(0.18)
(0.23)
(0.25)
(0.21)
(0.21)
(0.23)
(0.18)
(0.19)
(0.16)
(0.16)
(0.19)
(0.17)
(0.20)
(0.15)
(0.25)
(0.24)

(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
0.00a
(0.01)
(0.02)
(0.04)
0.01
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.07)
(0.04)
(0.05)
(0.04)

0.01
(0.05)
(0.06)
(0.05)
0.00a
(0.04)
0.04
(0.06)
0.05
(0.04)
0.01
(0.05)
(0.08)
(0.06)
(0.02)
(0.06)

Value of incentives
All
Other
Tax
incentives
incentives
incentives
0.28
0.27
0.29
0.27
0.28
0.28
0.27
0.26
0.26
0.25
0.27
0.27
0.26
0.24
0.27
0.28

0.02
(0.04)
(0.07)
(0.15)
(0.04)
(0.07)
0.03
(0.05)
0.01
(0.03)
(0.01)
(0.06)
(0.02)
(0.14)
(0.01)
(0.06)

0.16
0.21
0.23
0.22
0.22
0.24
0.18
0.22
0.19
0.22
0.20
0.23
0.22
0.19
0.14
0.24

to
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Table E.4 (continued)
Firm
(plant size in millions)
Single-location firms
#1: Furniture ($5)
#2: Furniture ($40)
#3: Drugs ($50)
#4: Drugs ($470)
#5: Soaps ($20)
#6: Soaps ($110)
#7: Plastics ($5)
#8: Plastics ($70)
#9: Machinery ($10)
#10: Machinery ($250)
#11: Electronics ($20)
#12: Electronics ($200)
#13:Autos($120)
#14: Autos ($600)
#15: Instruments ($10)
#16: Instruments ($180)

After
basic taxes
(0.14)
(0.16)
(0.16)
(0.12)
(0.11)
(0.12)
(0.16)
(0.17)
(0.08)
(0.11)
(0.12)
(0.11)
(0.17)
(0.08)
(0.17)
(0.16)

Net project returns
After tax
After all
incentives
incentives
0.03
0.06
0.06
0.07
0.10
0.09
0.01
0.00a
0.09
0.04
0.06
0.06
0.01
0.08
0.04
0.04

0.07
0.05
0.04
0.05
0.11
0.08
0.07
(0.01)
0.11
0.04
0.09
0.05
0.00a
0.07
0.05
0.02

Tax
incentives
0.24
0.21
0.23
0.23
0.19
0.17
0.24
0.21
0.16
0.16
0.22
0.21
0.22
0.16
0.25
0.24

Value of incentives
All
Other
incentives
incentives
0.02
(0.03)
(0.07)
(0.15)
(0.04)
(0.07)
0.03
(0.04)
0.01
(0.03)
(0.01)
(0.06)
(0.02)
(0.14)
(0.01)
(0.05)

0.20
0.22
0.23
0.20
0.22
0.18
0.21
0.22
0.18
0.17
0.24
0.20
0.22
0.14
0.19
0.23

NOTE: Negative correlations are shown in parentheses. For each firm, the number in parentheses is new plant investment in millions of dollars. Basic
taxes include state and city corporate income and net worth taxes, state and local sales taxes on machinery and equipment and fuel and utilities, and state
and local property taxes. Tax incentives consist of state investment and jobs tax credits, sales tax exemptions or credits in enterprise zones, state property
tax credits in enterprise zones, and local property tax abatements. The value of incentives is measured by the net project returns after taxes and incentives,
less project returns after basic taxes only,
a. Absolute value less than 0.005.
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Table E.5 Effective Tax and Tax Incentive Rates in a Representative City
in Each State: Correlations with State Unemployment, Job
Growth, and Poverty Rates
Job
Taxes/incentives
Basic state taxes

Basic local taxes

Basic state and local
taxes

State tax incentives

Local tax incentives

Firm

Unemployment

growth

Poverty

#2: Furniture

0.79

0.10

(0.20)

#5: Soaps

0.76

0.10

(0.16)

#7: Plastics

0.68

0.19

(0.12)

#14: Autos

0.69

0.15

(0.08)

#16: Instruments

0.73

0.04

(0.27)

#2: Furniture

(0.14)

(0.14)

0.23

#5: Soaps

(0.12)

(0.15)

0.25

#7: Plastics

(0.13)

(0.09)

0.27

#14: Autos

(0.12)

(0.05)

0.25

#16: Instruments

(0.14)

(0.19)

0.23

#2: Furniture

0.50

(0.04)

0.03

#5: Soaps

0.64

0.01

0.00

#7: Plastics

0.24

0.02

0.18

#14: Autos

0.27

0.04

0.16

#16: Instruments

0.48

(0.13)

(0.02)

#2: Furniture

0.35

0.09

(0.07)

#5: Soaps

0.34

0.07

(0.04)

#7: Plastics

0.29

0.14

(0.01)

#14: Autos

0.25

0.00

(0.14)

#16: Instruments

0.21

0.17

(0.09)

#2: Furniture

0.08

(0.28)

0.07

#5: Soaps

0.08

(0.26)

0.08

#7: Plastics

0.08

(0.15)

0.09

#14: Autos

0.09

(0.30)

0.09

#16: Instruments

0.08

(0.28)

0.06
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Taxes/incentives
State and local total
tax incentives

State and local
enterprise zone tax
incentive package

Firm

State and local taxes
after all tax
incentives

Job
growth

Poverty

#2: Furniture

0.33

(0.16)

0.00

#5: Soaps

0.33

(0.11)

0.02

#7: Plastics

0.25

(0.05)

0.08

#14: Autos

0.20

(0.30)

0.03

#16: Instruments

0.20

(0.15)

0.00

#2: Furniture

0.30

0.11

(0.05)

#5: Soaps

0.32

0.16

(0.03)

#7: Plastics

0.26

0.24

0.03

#14: Autos

0.16

0.01

(0.03)

#16: Instruments

0.17

0.11

(0.04)

0.05

(0.41)

0.08

0.08

(0.41)

0.07

State and local non- #2: Furniture
enterprise zone
#5: Soaps
tax incentive package
#7: Plastics

State and local taxes
after non-enterprise
zone tax incentives

Unemployment

0.03

(0.34)

0.07

#14: Autos

0.07

(0.39)

0.07

#16: Instruments

0.05

(0.41)

0.08

#2: Furniture

0.52

0.14

0.00

#5: Soaps

0.63

0.14

(0.02)

#7: Plastics

0.29

0.21

0.20

#14: Autos

0.30

0.25

0.16

#16: Instruments

0.51

0.03

(0.06)

#2: Furniture

0.33

0.07

0.04

#5: Soaps

0.54

0.08

(0.01)

#7: Plastics

0.11

0.05

0.16

#14: Autos

0.19

0.22

0.16

#16: Instruments

0.40

(0.05)

(0.03)

NOTE: See Tables 4.6, 4.7, and 5.3 for explanations of terms.
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Employment performance. See Job
creation
Employment size, and hypothetical firm
method, 68-69
England. See Great Britain
Enterprise zones, 5, 77, 109
in cities, 186, 190-199, 191 (fig.)
general credits for, 116n
importance of, 193-194 (table)
spatial distribution of investment and,
190-199
tax incentives and, 119, 122-124,
134, 205
unemployment and, 184
Equilibrium, 28n7
incentive competition and, 10
Equity, incentive competition and, 218219
ETRs. See Effective tax rates (ETRs)

Exemptions
from sales tax, 37-38
See also Taxes and tax incentives
Expenditure(s)
hypothetical firm method and, 61
program or tax, 58
Expert systems
TAIM use of, 49, 84-85, 91-92
Factor proportions problem, hypothetical
firm method and, 61-62
FDI. See Foreign direct investment (FDI)
Federal Aviation Authority, 44
Federal government
competitive incentives and, 220
firm-specific incentives and, 216
incentives financed by, 32
local control of spending and, 43-45
state and local economic
development effort limited by, 5
See also Community Development
Block Grants (CDBG); Government;
Local government; Public policy;
State government
Federal taxes
on corporation income, 35
See also Corporate income taxes and
credits
Federal training programs, 41
See also Job training
Fees, on loan guarantees, 97
Financial statements
constructing, 63-64
and hypothetical firm method, 59
incorporating incentives in, 245-246
new plant financing and, 239-241,
242 (table)
Financing
of new investment, 62-63
role in state in local policy, 161
of subsidies, 6
See also General-purpose financing
programs
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Firm
benefits of incentives to, 3
characteristics and non-tax
incentives, 177-180
financial statements and new plant
financing, 239-241, 242 (table)
location affecting modeling, 70-72
tax and incentive evaluation and, 17
tax burden modeling, 18
value of incentives to, 2
See also Manufacturing industries;
Multistate firms
Firm size
non-tax incentives and, 154, 207
selection for study by, 65, 68
Firm-specific tax policies, 214-217
Fiscal policy, economic development
efforts and, 1
Flat tax rates, 116n
Florida, fund disbursement in, 137-140
Foreign direct investment (FDI),
importance of, 11
Fuel, sales tax on, 37
GATT. See General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT)
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), 101-102
General credits, 116n
General equilibrium technique,
evaluating incentive impact using, 17
General Motors Saturn plant, 18
General-purpose financing programs, 40
General-use incentives, 90-91, 93, 94,
108n22
Geographic dispersion, of states and
cities in study, 47 (map)
Geographic information systems (GIS)
database, 50
Geography
incentive program targeting, 104,
108n24
See also Spatial distribution of
investment returns; Spatial patterns
of incentives

GIS. See Geographic information
systems (GIS) database
Government
financing of subsidies by, 6
impact of economic development
on, 1
limitations by federal, 5
training programs and, 41
See also City government; Federal
government; Local government;
Public policy; State government
Government services, impact of
incentives on, 7-8
Grants, 40, 85
awarding, 95-98
general-use, 90-91
Great Britain
literature on impact of incentives on
investment decisions, 107nll
regional programs in, 29nl2, 33,
52n2
Greenville-Spartanburg airport, BMW
and expansion of, 2-3
Gross receipts tax, Washington, 113
Growth
impact of taxes and incentives on,
25-26, 109
measuring impact of taxes and
incentives on, 13-19
Headquarters
location of, 70-72
of single-state firm, 106n5
High-technology industries, 27n3
Highways. See Infrastructure incentives
Historical information, 91, 92
Hypothetical firm model, 4, 45—49
administration of incentives and,
98-103
aggregate tax measures alternative to,
56-57
analytical approach to, 48
assumptions and details of operation,
239-246
creation of firms for, 46, 48
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disaggregating results of, 82-83
evaluating incentive impact using,
18-19
firm characteristics in study,
66-67 (table)
life cycle of firms and, 78
for measuring impact of taxes and
incentives on growth, 18-19, 30
measurement of profitability in,
78-80
non-tax incentives and, 39^45,
49-50, 83-98
operation of, 58-63
problems with, 60
program counting alternative to,
57-58
program or tax expenditures
alternative to, 58
simulating worth of non-tax
incentives and, 83-98
TAIM as, 55
zero inflation assumption in, 81-82
Hysteresis effect, skill acquisition and,
29n9
Illinois Enterprise Zone program, 23
Incentive package, 171-172
for relocating and new plants, 6
simulation of, 91-98
tax-based and non-tax proportions
of, 5
Incentive programs, overlap in, 92-93
Income
impact of local taxes and incentives
on, 18
labor mobility and local distribution
of, 8-9
See also Corporate income taxes and
credits
Income-net worth tax, 110
Income taxes. See Corporate income
taxes and credits

Industrial location theory, 6-7
See also Location; Spatial patterns of
taxes and incentives
Industrial policy, 109
Industrial revenue bonds (IRBs), 22, 32,
44, 52n9
Industry-specific measures, of tax
burden,19
Inflation, zero
hypothetical firm effects of assuming,
80-81, 82
Infrastructure incentives, 87-89, 94
growth and, 30nl6
and Japanese auto plant investment, 3
programs for, 140
subsidies, 42^3, 172
value of, 142
Instruments of economic development,
2,5-6
Interest rates
and loan term assumptions,
242 (table)
See also Loans
Interlocal competition, vs. interstate
competition, 75-78
Internal rate of return (IRR),
hypothetical firm returns measured
by, 79-80
Interstate comparisons, hypothetical firm
method and, 70
Interstate competition, vs. interlocal
competition, 75-78
Investment
financing new, 62-63
foreign direct, 11
incentive-induced, 9-10
incentives as replacement, 85
Japanese auto plant, 3
relocation of, 12, 13-20
spatial reshuffling of, 9
trouble signs for, 34
Investment decisions
impact of incentives on, 107nl 1
process of making, 45-46
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Investment tax credits (ITCs), 76, 117,
119, 124n, 128,204-205,217
statewide, 62
Iowa, 21-22
competitive position in, 212
in TAIM study, 53nl2
training programs in, 137
See also Community Economic
Betterment Account (CEBA)
IRB. See Industrial revenue bonds
(IRBs)
IRR. See Internal rate of return (IRR)
ITCs. See Investment tax credits (ITCs)
Job creation, 8-9, 99-100
Job growth
effective tax and incentives rates and,
185 (table)
in enterprise zones, 190
and poverty, 198
Job Opportunities and Basic Skills
(JOBS) training, 41
Jobs
loss of, 8
spending on, by locality, 24-25
See also Employment;
Unemployment
Job search theory, 29nlO
Jobs Training Partnership Act (JTPA)
funds, 41,44
Job tax credits, 77-78, 117, 128,
204-205
and employee eligibility, 246
Job training
incentives and, 40-41, 89-90, 137,
142, 172
subsidies for, 177-180
JTPA. See Jobs Training Partnership Act
(JTPA) funds
Knowledge base. See Expert systems
Labor
as business cost, 13
growth shocks from incentives and,
12

mobility of, 8-9
skill acquisition theory, 29n9
See also Job training
Lawmakers, justification of spending by,
32
"Least-cost" site, 6-7
Life cycle of firms, hypothetical firm
model criticism, 78
Linked-deposit programs, 97-98
Loan subsidy incentive, 97
Loans, 40, 85-86, 90-91
awarding, 95-98
guarantees and, 90-91, 95-98
term and interest rate assumptions,
242 (table)
Local government
adoption of economic development
instruments and, 22
benefits of economic development
programs to, 11, 13
control over spending by, 43—45
results of incentive competition, 9
Localities
comparing variations in incentive
levels across, 24-25
disaggregating results for
comparisons, 83
importance of taxes and tax
incentives compared with state
variations, 129-134,
131-132 (table)
shared benefits with nation, 11
See also Variations in economic
development incentives
Location
assumptions about, 48
of firm, plant, and headquarters,
70-72
of General Motors Saturn Plant, 18
incentives as benefit to poorer areas,
12
interstate competition and, 75-78
"least-cost" site, 6
for modeled firms, 163-171,
167-170 (figs.)
tax differences and, 204
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traditional theory of, 6-7
value of investment to local residents,
7
See also Geography; Location
decisions; Multistate firms; Singlestate firms; Spatial distribution of
investment returns; Spatial patterns
of taxes and incentives
Location decisions
incentives and, 4, 13-20, 108n21
non-economic factors used in
making, 27n3
Location theory
economic development policy and, 2
hypothetical firm method and, 45-46
location behavior and, 27n3
Losses, modeling of firm's financial,
52n4
Machinery, sales tax on, 37
MACRS. See Modified Accelerated Cost
Recovery System (MACRS)
depreciation
Manufacturing industries
selection for study, 63-70
states with greatest employment in,
50
Markets, economic development policy
impact on, 10
Massachusetts
modeling in, 106n3
sales throwback and, 74-75
Mazda, Michigan incentives to, 3
Median-state approach, in TAIM model,
71-72
Mercedes-Benz, in Alabama, 1, 2,
208-211
Michigan
loan subsidy incentive in, 97
Mazda incentives, 3
tax abatements in, 23
Misallocation of resources, 28n7
Mississippi
"Balance Agriculture with Industry"
program, 5
exclusion from TAIM study, 53nl2

Mobility, of labor, 8-9
Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery
System (MACRS) depreciation, 81,
116n,241
Multistate Corporate Income Tax Guide,
51
Multistate firms, 60, 71, 77
firm characteristics and rankings of
investment returns, 69 (table)
project returns for, 144 (table),
145-154, 146-153 (figs.)
Multiyear analysis, hypothetical firm
model requirement for, 78
NASDA. See National Association of
State Development Agencies
(NASDA)
Nation
lack of benefits from incentives, 9
shared benefits with localities, 11
National advertising, 22
National Association of State
Development Agencies (NASDA),
103, 203
Negative-sum game, competition as, 213
Net operating losses (NOL), modeling
of, 35
Net present value (NPV), hypothetical
firm returns measured by, 79-80
Net worth taxes
corporate income taxes and,
114-116 (table)
See also Corporate income taxes and
credits
New investment
modeling assumptions on financing
of, 62-63
firm's financial statements and,
239-241,242 (table)
non-tax incentives and, 109
See also Variations in economic
development incentives
New York, tax credit in, 62
NOL. See Net operating losses (NOL)
Nonbusiness income, 36, 116
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Non-tax incentives, 32, 33, 55, 39^5,
172
after-tax value of, 85
basic tax system and, 205-206
clawbacks and, 99-102
compared with tax incentives,
140-142
and competitive positions of cities
and states, 206
customized job training and wage
subsidies, 40-41
extensions to hypothetical firm
method, 49-50
and hypothetical firm model, 84-86
impact of taxes on, 134-136
impact on new investment, 109
incentive programs not included,
43^5
information availability on, 103
infrastructure subsidies, 42-43
programs excluded from study,
43-45
simulating worth of, 83-98
size of plants and, 154
state role in defining, 161
TAIM and, 83-86, 86 (fig.), 103-104
value of, 134-142, 177-180
See also Hypothetical firm model;
Taxes and tax incentives
NPV. See Net present value (NPV)
On-the-job training, 41
Parent firm. See Headquarters
Payroll. See Corporate income taxes and
credits; Payroll factor
Payroll factor, 36
sales distributed among states and,
72-74
Per-capital expenditure, differences
among localities, 24-25
Personal property, taxation of, 37, 118
Plants
construction of, 46

financing of new, 239-241,
242 (table)
location of, 6, 70-72, 154-171
See also Firm; Firm size
Policies. See Public policy
Political justification, for use of
revenues, 7, 32
Poverty rate
defined, 233n
development effort and, 22, 23
effective tax and incentives rates and,
185 (table)
employment growth, net return on
new plant investment, and,
182 (table), 183
investment in cities and, 188-190
job growth and, 198
and net returns from new plant
investment (cities), 189 (table)
value of incentives and, 199 (table)
Private investment, incentives as
replacement, 85
Profitability
measures of, 79
value of incentive package and, 46
Profit maximizers, location of firms and,
6-7
Program counting
as incentive analysis approach, 57-58
Program expenditures
as incentive analysis approach, 58
Project returns
for 16 multistate firms, 144 (table),
145-154, 146-153 (figs.)
correlations with unemployment
rates, 265-275
impact of taxes and incentives on,
158 (table), 159 (table), 253-264
large multistate drug firms, 147 (fig.),
151 (fig.), 158 (table), 168 (map)
large multistate plastics firms, 149
(fig.), 153 (fig.), 159 (table),
170 (map)
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multistate instruments firms,
197 (fig.)
small multistate drug firms,
146 (fig.), 150 (fig.), 158 (table),
163 (map), 164 (fig.), 165 (fig.),
167 (fig.)
small multistate soap firms,
148 (fig.), 152 (fig.), 155 (fig.),
159 (table), 169 (map)
Property taxes
abatement of, 128, 192
on business realty and personal
property, 35
calculation of, 244-245
simulation treatment of, 38-39
by state (1992), 118, 120-121 (table)
Property tax rates, 75, 76
by state, 120-121, 234-235 (table)
Public debt, subordination of, 91
Public loans, 96
and guaranteed loans, 97
Public policy, 4, 12
competitive incentives and, 32-33,
211-212
incentive competition and, 203-221
justifications for, 28n4
See also Federal government; Taxes
and tax incentives
Quasi-governmental incentives, not
included in TAIM, 45
Rate of return, on new plant investment,
197 (fig.)
Redistribution of jobs, 20, 188
See also entries under Job
Regional policy, in Great Britain, 29nl2
Relocation
incentive packages for, 6
of investment, 12, 13-20
See also Location
Representative firm method. See
Hypothetical firm model

Research
on usefulness of incentives, 10-13
spatial patterns of incentives, 20-24
Reservation wage, 12, 29nlO
Residence, assumptions for enterprise
zone incentives, 246 (table)
Resources
efficiency in allocation of, 10
misallocation of, 28n7
Returns on investment
in best and worst states, 161-171
among cities, 73, 186-190
city-state differences and, 204
differences after taxes, in states and
cities, 171-173
enterprise zones and, 190-199
measurement over time, 78-79
among states, 176-185, 200-201
taxes, tax incentives, and spatial
distribution of, 175-201
Revenues, for new industrial investment,
7
Revolving loan funds (RLFs), 44,
108nl6
RLFs. See Revolving loan funds (RLFs)
Roads and highways
funding for, 44
See also Department of
Transportation (DOT); Infrastructure
incentives
Rule-based system. See Expert systems
Sales distribution, hypothetical firm
model, 72-75
Sales factor, 74
Sales taxes
on business purchases, 35
simulation treatment of, 36-38, 52n5
variations among states, 110-112,
111-112 (table)
Sales throwback, 74-75
Saturn. See General Motors Saturn plant
SBA. See Small Business Administration
(SBA)
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SBICs. See Small business investment
companies (SBICs)
Scotland, 27n3
incentives in, 52n2
Sector-specific tax policies, 214
SIC. See Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) manufacturing
industries
Simulation. See Hypothetical firm model
Single-state firms, hypothetical firm
model treatment of, 70, 77
Site Selection and Industrial

Development, 5, 39, 51, 103
Sites. See Location
Size. See Firm size
Skill acquisition theory, hysteresis effect
and, 29n9
Skills. See Job training
Small Business Administration (SBA)
financing available through, 140
programs of, 32
Small business investment companies
(SBICs), 45
South Carolina
BMW in, 2-3
training programs in, 137
Spatial distribution of investment
returns, 175-201
among cities, 186-190
enterprise zones and, 190-199
among states, 176-185
Spatial patterns of incentives, 2, 4, 12,
27n3, 142-171, 172,253-264
and national benefits of competitive
economic development policy,
211-212
poor vs. wealthy communities, 4,
21-24
standing offers and, 26
See also Econometric technique;
Location; Location theory
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)
manufacturing industries, 63-64

Standing incentive offer, 24-26, 46
tax vs. incentive differences and,
208-211
State government
benefits of economic development
programs to, 11-13
control over spending by, 43-45
economic development agencies, 5-6
economic development instruments
of, 2
efforts toward economic expansion,
22
incentives to firms, 2
results of incentive competition, 9
States
characteristics of sample,
225-226 (table)
city unemployment and, 188
cooperative agreements among, 221
correlations between project returns
and unemployment rates for,
265-275
data on taxes and tax incentives,
51-52
disaggregating results for
comparisons, 82-83
economic distress and expanded
incentives in, 23
incentives and economic conditions
in, 21
incentive wars and, 220
levels of variation in, 162-166
local property tax rates by,
234-235 (table)
returns on investment among,
176-185, 200-201
sales distributed among, 72-75
statewide investment tax credits
offered by, 62
studies of tax systems in, 59-60
for study, 50
taxes and tax incentives compared
with city variations, 129-134,
131-132 (table)
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See also Sales taxes; Tax credits;
Taxes and tax incentives; Variations
in economic development incentives
Subsidies
combinations of federal, state, and
locally financed, 6
infrastructure, 42-43
job training and wage, 40-41
loan, 40
to Mercedes-Benz, 209-210 (table)
provision of, 32-33
substitution and, 89
value of incentive and, 134
wage, and worker training incentives,
89-90
See also Job training
Subsidy indifference argument, 102
Substitution effects, 88
grants, loans, subsidies, and, 91
Survey technique, evaluating incentive
impact using, 14-15
TAA. See Trade Adjustment Assistance
(TAA)
TAIM. See Tax and Incentive Model
(TAIM)
Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (TJTC), 41
Targeted tax incentives, 118-119, 214215
Targeting geography, 104—105
Tax abatements, Michigan, 23
Tax and Incentive Model (TAIM), 4
AFTAX model and, 160
city/state selection for, 50-52
computational structure of, 247-250,
251 (fig.)
debt and tax structures and, 108nl5
and hypothetical firm method, 55
incentive selection by, 91-98
industry/firm choice for, 63-70
loan costs and, 107nl4
multistate vs. single-location firms,
70-72
non-tax incentives and, 49-50,
86 (fig.)

non-tax portion of, 103-104
public vs. private sector loans and, 93
results summary, 203-211
state and local discretionary
incentives and, 86
state-level targeting of, 108n24
subordination of public debt and, 91
tax treatment in, 33-39
tax vs. non-tax incentives, 32-33
Tax breaks, states and, 216-217
Tax credits
hypothetical firm model treatment of,
76
generally available, 62
See also Credits
Tax effects, hypothetical firm method
and, 55-56
Taxes and tax incentives, 5, 33-39
aggregate measures, 56-57
basic tax systems vs. tax incentives,
119-128
as business cost, 13
calculating for hypothetical firm
method, 59
compared with non-tax incentives,
140-142
competition, public policy, and,
203-221
corporate income taxes and credits,
35-36, 52n3, 113-117
correlation with unemployment, 184
credits as incentives, 6
differences between taxes and
incentives, 203-211
effective, in representative city in
each state, 135-136 (table)
efficiency and, 213-218
impact on growth, 13-19, 25-26, 109
impact on new investment, 109
importance of state vs. local,
129-134
incentive competition and, 10
income effects of, 18
interstate and interlocal competition
and, 75-78
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interstate differences in business, 55
non-tax incentives and, 32, 39-45,
52nl
property taxes and, 38-39, 118
sales tax and, 36-38, 110-113
spatial distribution of investment
returns and, 175-201
spatial patterns of, 142-171
state system studies and, 59-60
statewide and in enterprise zones for
distressed areas, 122-124 (table)
targeted tax incentives, 118-119
value to firm of selected features,
125-126
variation in, 110-119
See also Enterprise zones
Tax incentives. See Economic
development incentives; Tax credits;
Taxes and Tax Incentives
Tax incidence, hypothetical firm method
and, 60
Tax increment financing instruments
(TIFs), 94-95
Tax policy, economic development vs.
general tax policy, 33-35
Tax rates. See Effective tax rates (ETRs)
Tax subsidies, 32-33
Tax systems, neutral nature of incentives
and, 215
Throwback rules, sales factors and, 74,
75,173n4
Tiebout hypothesis, 213, 215
TIFs. See Tax increment financing
instruments (TIFs)
Time, measuring effects over, 78-82
Title IX, of EDA, 44
TJTC. See Targeted Jobs Tax Credit
(TJTC)
Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA), 41
Training. See Job training
Unemployed persons
mobility of, 9
See also Employees; Unemployment

Unemployment
assumptions for enterprise zone
incentives, 246 (table)
effective tax and incentives rates and,
185 (table)
intensity of incentives and, 23
and net return on new plant
investment, 178-179 (table),
187 (table), 197 (fig.)
redistribution of jobs and, 20
reservation wage and, 29n9
returns among cities and, 175-190
returns among states and, 175-185
value of economic development
policy in relation to, 12
value of incentives and, 195 (table)
See also Employment; Enterprise
zones; Job training; Taxes and tax
incentives
Unemployment rates, correlation with
project returns, 265-275
Urban Development Action Grants, 22
Urban Institute, 203
Value
administration of incentives and,
98-103
discretionary incentives, after-tax, 85
of incentives, 3-4, 82, 253-264
of non-tax incentives, 134-140
of selected tax features, 119-128,
125-126 (table)
of state tax incentives vs. non-tax
incentives, 140-142
Value-added tax, 110, 113
Variations in economic development
incentives, 109-110
in basic tax systems vs. tax
incentives, 119-128
importance of state vs. local taxes
and tax incentives, 129-134
non-tax incentive programs and value
to firm, 134-142

306
spatial pattern of taxes and
incentives, 142-171
in taxes and tax incentives, 110-119
Wages, taxes and, 13
Wage subsidies
job training and, 40—41
and worker training incentives, 89-90
Wisconsin
modeling in, 106n3
sales throwback and, 74-75
taxes in, 173n3, 245
Wisconsin Department of Revenue,
state tax system study in, 59
Workers. See Employees
Worth. See Value
Zero inflation assumption, 80-81, 82
Zero-sum process, 28n6
state and local incentive competition
as, 1,9, 11
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